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Abstract 
This dissertation argues that Plutarch’s biographical method falls within the realm of 
historiography, offering Plutarch’s handling of Thucydides’ History as a source for the Pericles 
and Nicias as test cases.  
The first chapter discusses the relationship between historiography and biography. History was 
among the influences in biographical literature’s development into a genre of its own. The genre 
of biography had the capacity for critical inquiry into what the individual in focus was truly like. 
The chapter also explores their similarities in methodology and purpose, and argues that 
historiography is broad enough to include biographical models of interpretation. 
The next chapter establishes Plutarch’s philosophical framework, examining what theories would 
influence his interpretation of the historical record. While taking Plutarch’s statements of 
separation between history and biography seriously, we can still see that his methods of 
interpretation are not substantially different from historiography, and he displays a rigorous 
critical inquiry in the Lives. 
The third and fourth chapters examine Plutarch’s engagement with Thucydides for the Pericles 
and Nicias. Where Plutarch quotes Thucydides, he preserves the main facts yet uses vocabulary 
and style of his own. We place particular focus, however, on Plutarch’s divergences from 
Thucydides, and theorize that these differences are due to Plutarch’s own historical reasoning 
about what happened. We argue ways in which Plutarch was making inferences and deductions 
from the text before him based upon his philosophical paradigms and broader knowledge of the 
history. Plutarch also makes deductions based upon his theory of character types, especially 
evident in the Nicias. His judgment of the character of every individual is formed by the 
historical record, and he makes further predictions of what individuals did for felt where the 
source is silent drawing from his philosophical understanding of character. 
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Introduction 
Greek literary endeavours underwent significant changes when the supremacy of the 
Mediterranean world swung from the Hellenistic kingdoms to Imperial Rome. Despite the 
hegemony of Latin-speaking Rome over the Mediterranean region, Greek culture and language 
continued to flourish. The Romans were content to allow existing structures to stand so long as 
stability was guaranteed, and they became fascinated with Greek culture. One aspect of 
Hellenistic culture that found an audience with the Romans was an interest in the lives of great 
generals, statesmen, kings, and philosophers. With the new political and social situation of one 
emperor, rather than a senate, ruling Rome, added to Hellenistic awareness of this singular 
imperial authority controlling their own nations, the stage was set for the composition of new, 
innovative forms of biography.1  
Biography had roots in the fifth century BCE when Greek historiography was 
developing.2 Histories usually contained some biographic information also, encompassing an 
entire war, time period, or nation, yet including such collective entities as armies or cities, and 
individuals as generals or kings.3 The genre of biography did not directly descend from history, 
however, as poetry, epic, and encomium have information concerning a person’s life as well.4 
Socrates’ popularity led to biographic writing from the philosophical schools.5 It became a more 
definite genre of its own in Hellenistic times when the word bios came into usage for writing 
about the ‘lives’ of individuals.6 By the period of Imperial Rome, biography was popular and 
was being composed in both Latin and Greek. 
                                                          
1 Marincola 2009:12. 
2 Momigliano 1993:23-42. 
3 Marincola 2009:16-17. 
4 See Stuart 1928: 9-29, 38-39. 
5 Momigliano 1993:17. 
6 Momigliano 1993:12. 
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Biography is centred upon one person – their character and actions, virtues and vices, 
achievements and failures. Yet a biography by nature concerns real people who lived and acted 
in history. Wallace-Hadrill insightfully remarks, ‘History or not history? The problem faces 
every biographer in varying degree. Biography occupies an ambivalent position on the outskirts 
of proper historical writing.’7 Wallace-Hadrill’s question can be parameterized further: to what 
extent were biographers doing history, not as a genre, but as a method. Knowledge of the stories 
and speech of the subject is a prerequisite to writing a biography, and an exploration of historical 
sources, especially texts, is the way in which biographers gain this kind of material for their 
work.8 Therefore, a key way to engage this question is to examine the use of the textual sources. 
What is the function of these texts for the author of a bios? A biography could contain tragic 
elements, philosophy, and even fiction.9 Do source texts serve a historiographical function, or are 
they mere fodder for creating entertaining stories or philosophical elaborations? Plutarch’s 
Parallel Lives could be offered as a case-study on the function of historical sources for a 
biographer in the Imperial period. Though many documents have been lost, a number of 
historians that Plutarch employed, including Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War are 
still extant.  
Work by Pelling, Wardman, and others have demonstrated Plutarch’s close affinity with 
the genre of history in his critical inquiry into the past and apparent attempts to make his account 
as accurate as possible.10 There is still some hesitation to call Plutarch’s method historiography, 
                                                          
7 Wallace-Hadrill 1983:8. 
8 This could be said for historians as well. However, Momigliano observes that many ancient historians were 
actually writing about contemporary events, thus attention to the written word to discover information of times prior 
to their own was more limited in their case. See Momigliano 1969:130-131. 
9 Momigliano 1993:56. 
10  Pelling 2011, Wardman 1974, Stadter 1965 and 1992 are some examples. 
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however.11 Wardman goes far to recognize the historical content of the Lives, and the 
biographical content of many of the Greek histories, yet comments that Greek historians were 
‘engaged in one kind of literary activity, while Plutarch is concerned with another.’12 Plutarch 
himself famously states he is not writing ‘Histories’ but ‘Lives’ in the preface to Alexander–
Caesar.13 But what did he mean by this? If his works themselves are not ‘Histories,’ can 
Plutarch’s method of composing Lives from his sources be considered a historiographical 
method? 
Historiography is essentially an attempt at reconstructing what happened in the past from 
research, then communicating it in narrative form. We will argue that Plutarch is one biographer 
who did employ the same methods as historians, and considered his sources for the Lives as 
historiographical, requiring methodological care to handle sources and determine truth about the 
past. This dissertation will select the Life of Pericles and Life of Nicias from Plutarch’s corpus to 
examine how Plutarch used Thucydides as historiographical source for these works. This will 
shed light on his methodology and perhaps give insight into the Greek biographical writing 
practices of the early Imperial period. 
Limitations  
Plutarch wrote up to ten Greek Lives with some reference to Thucydides,14 though for 
our purposes only the Life of Pericles and Life of Nicias will be examined here. Plutarch shares 
material from Thucydides’ History about the virtuous Themistocles, Cimon, and Aristides, but it 
                                                          
11 Pelling 2011 argues that Plutarch shares significant similarities to ancient historians (162) but exhibits varying 
degrees of concern for historical background depending on which Life he is writing (207) and does not call 
Plutarch’s method historiography. Pelling 2010: 217-235 marks some similarities between the Parallel Lives and 
‘global history’ and states ‘Eventually to do biography is to do history, as one can only do each of them by viewing 
through the filter of the other,’ (emphasis his, 230) but recognizes comparing Lives to ‘global history’ has severe 
limitations. Stadter 1992’s edited volume focuses upon Plutarch’s relationship with history, but highlights potential 
distortions and Bosworth 1992 says ‘few would claim that Plutarch was in any sense writing history.’ (56). 
12 Wardman 1974:1-4. 
13 Alex. 1.1-3. 
14 Counted in Helmbold and O’Neil 1959:71-72. 
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is not as extensive. Further, Herodotus’ Histories had more substantial narratives of the same 
stories, which Thucydides used himself,15 making it difficult to determine which source was used 
by Plutarch. Plutarch’s Alcibiades pulls from Thucydides heavily, though Alcibiades is firmly an 
example to avoid rather than imitate, which is atypical for the Lives and therefore does not make 
the best representative case. Further, the characterization theory Plutarch uses for Alcibiades can 
just as easily be argued from Nicias. Pericles and Nicias are both important characters in 
Thucydides’ work and therefore gave Plutarch abundant material to work with. Plutarch 
considers them to be men of morally exemplary nature, despite the presence of some character 
faults. Crassus and Fabius are the Roman parallels to Nicias and Pericles and each make up a 
unified book, thus that the prologue and ending synkrisis maintain the unity of the paired Lives 
will be kept in mind.16  
Certain aspects of history lie outside our purview here, such as the actual historical truth 
of the accounts. Demonstrating the use of historical method is not to say this method was 
actually successful in finding ‘the truth’ about the past (see below). The issue at hand is whether 
the biographers themselves thought these were true events and if they used historical reasoning 
in their writing. Thus, their historical method will be primarily discussed on their own terms, 
though comparison to modern historical theory will be referenced, as well as areas where 
Plutarch’s inferences correspond to inferences from modern historians.  
Organisation 
Chapter 1 will discuss the relationship between historiography and biography to show 
that theoretically, they can share the same methods and purposes. Genre is framed by audience 
expectations, and biography developed out of multiple other genres – including history, poetry, 
                                                          
15 Hornblower 1996:122-137. 
16 See Duff  2011b:213-278. 
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and encomium. The influence from history means that there could have been an expectation from 
ancient readers that biographies were similar to histories in some way. We will show this by 
pulling together the similarities of history and biography in their methods of critical thinking 
about the past, use of written evidence, didactic utility, and interest in important characters. We 
will also see that a delineating factor between history and biography is the scope of the narrative 
rather than methods of composition. From here, we will move to what it means to say that a 
biographer uses historiographical method and argue that by both ancient and modern 
understandings, biography can have this function. In theory, the biographical model could 
become historiography. 
Having established the theoretical possibilities of a shared methodology, we will argue in 
Chapter 2 that in Plutarch’s case the methods and purposes of history and biography actually do 
correspond. History is ideological, and constructing Plutarch’s intellectual framework will allow 
us to articulate the potential influences for his interpretations of the historical record. There will 
also be a study of his statements on history and the relationship between history and biography. 
Our findings here will suggest that Plutarch was careful in his methodology and that his 
philosophy would inevitably be the major factor in his interpretations of the past. Areas of source 
usage that appear inconsistent with historiographical standards at first glance may actually be 
explained by historical reasoning stemming from Plutarch’s philosophy.  
Chapters 3 and 4 will examine Plutarch’s usage of Thucydides’ History to test our 
assertion of Plutarch’s methods being historiographical. The discussion will begin with the 
function of the History in constructing narratives about Plutarch’s subjects. Principles of 
historiography will be applied to specific situations of parallel between Plutarch and Thucydides 
to determine whether his practice is consistent with historiography. It will highlight where 
10 
 
Plutarch preserved Thucydides’ facts, even if they were presented according to Plutarch’s own 
literary style. Building upon the work of Pelling and Stadter, we will examine differences with 
Thucydides to find whether they can be explained by a historiographical method. For Nicias, we 
will add to our findings that Plutarch’s paradigms of character interpreted Thucydides’ historical 
narrative. The biographical theory of character turns into a type of historiography itself, a way of 
discovering more about the past. 
 All English translations of texts are from Loeb editions unless otherwise 
indicated. Greek words will be transliterated when discussed as a concept, but replicated in 
Greek alphabet when discussing the texts directly or where the lexical form of the word is 
important. 
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CHAPTER 1: Biography as Historiography, Historiography as Biography  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate two main ideas: first, that biography has many of the 
same characteristics of historiography; second, that biography is a separate genre from history, 
yet lends itself to historical method and use of documents.To demonstrate this, there must an 
articulation of the ancient concept of genre and how modern generic theory can relate to it, as 
well as a description of both the development of biography and the methods and purposes of 
Greek historiography. We will also compare the aims and scope of biographies and histories, and 
consider analogies with modern historical theory. The analysis will reveal that although 
biography and history are separate genres, Plutarch could have had historiographical 
methodology for interpreting his sources. Biography could have a concern for what ‘really 
happened’ regarding the individual in focus, even if it is not history on a literary level. Just as the 
‘biographic’ appears in history, the ‘historiographic’ appears in biography.  
Navigating Genre in Ancient Literature 
The literary environment of Greek and Roman writers included a strong sense of generic 
rules. Genre involves ‘organising things into recognisable classes’17 and influential thinking 
about such division occurred in the realm of philosophy in the fourth century BCE. In the 
Republic, Plato does not delineate genres, but inevitably makes divisions of poetry and music in 
the process of deciding what kind of arts should be allowed into their ideal city. He divides them 
into three simple types: pure narration, imitative narrative, and a mixture of the two.18 Aristotle 
expands on this in the Poetics, and adds a prescriptive element, that every category of literature 
should be appropriate to itself – epics should not be organised like histories, literary devices for 
                                                          
17 Frow 2007:51. 
18 Republic, 392d. 
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heroic verse are not fitting for iambic verse, and so on.19 In discussing the relationship between 
theory and practice among Greco-Roman poets, Farrell observes that the ancient literary critics 
did not share or address the ambiguity that moderns have in discussing genre; rather, the 
categories were fairly straightforward to them.20 In the first century BCE, Horace used ‘law of 
genre’ (operis lex) as a technical phrase meaning there are rules which the poet should not break, 
though how closely the ancients followed their own rules is another problematic subject, as 
poets, even Horace himself, appear to transgress the rules in their poetry.21  
 The problem of generic rule-breaking in the praxis of literature has been a major 
contributive factor to the replacement of the classical, prescriptive model with more descriptive 
notions in modern genre theory.22 Frye, for instance, considered the old idea of rules for 
literature as a failure, and attempted to provide a taxonomy of literature.23 Frow argues genre to 
produce organized conceptions of reality which affect how we see the world, yet he denies that 
texts ‘ “belong” to genres but are, rather, uses of them; they refer not to “a” genre but to a field 
or economy of genres, and their complexity derives from the complexity of that relation.’24 
Classifications alone are not adequate, however. Hirsch has contended that genre is a convention, 
a norm, a framing of texts into categories in order to provide a set of general expectations so that 
the audience can comprehend it, yet leaves expansive room for a variety of things to be said.25 
                                                          
19 Poetics, 1459a. 
20 Farrell 2003:386. 
21 Farrell 2003: 393-394. This is why questioning the existence of abstract categories of genre in the ancient world to 
argue that writers imitated other writers, as Rosenmeyer 1985:74-84  argues, seems misguided. Abstract categories 
obviously existed, and would be on the mind of the educated writer, especially for such a philosopher as Plutarch. 
See Marincola 1999. 
22 Burridge 2004:31. 
23 Frye 1957:3-29. 
24 Frow 2007:2. 
25 Hirsch 1967:68-126. 
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The perception of the audience has grounded our understanding of genre today, even across 
ideological lines.26 
The idea of audience expectation as inherent to each generic category has parallels in 
ancient Greek thought as well. This is implicit in Aristotle’s Poetics, where any category of 
literature can give pleasure to the reader, but it must follow the rules of that category to do so.27 
These rules still allow for progress within the genre: Aristotle comments that people have high 
standards for contemporary poets, since they are expected to surpass the greatness of past 
poets.28 The small communities in earlier periods of Greek history allowed texts to meet the 
expectations of the audience yet contained a ‘dynamic element’ to permit competition with 
predecessors.29 However, the spread and preservation of prose works after the fifth century BCE 
lead to the transcendence of the localised Sitz im Leben; as texts spread outside of the particular 
communal context, the community itself could no longer determine the reader’s comprehension 
of the author’s work, because readers consumed literature from different geographical locations 
and time periods.30 Inherent characteristics, boundary markers within the text itself, were 
required to establish what kind of text one was reading, which led to the creation of generic 
rules.31  
The ancients’ strong sense of generic rules does not mean that new types of literature 
were forbidden or that writing was static. The dialogues of Plato or the Cyropaedia, Anabasis, 
and Memorabilia of Xenophon in the fourth century BCE were new, experimental forms of 
expression that became influential for other genres afterward. While Roman poets were careful 
to state that the rules of genre must be followed, their innovations in poetry went beyond their 
                                                          
26 Kent 1986:147. See also Dubrow 1982:31 and Burridge 2004:32. 
27 Poetics, 1453a, 1462a-1462b.  
28 Poetics, 1456a. 
29 Hose 2005:681. 
30 Hose 2005:683. 
31 Hose 2005:683. 
14 
 
own rules, implying that they were  more concerned about avoiding vagueness than maintaining 
purity of the category; their ‘generic self-awareness’ was strict but in practice more flexible.32 
This was the case with historiography as well.33 Marincola notes that when any author set to 
write, each one had to compete with other works and justify his own while at the same time 
imitating the good aspects of them, not ‘slavish copying of the model but the infusion of a new 
spirit into a traditional treatment.’34 This sheds light on how to approach two pieces of literature 
supposedly in different categories yet sharing significant similarities. It is possible to articulate a 
clear genre yet allow space for expansion and innovation, which may share content with other 
genres. In fact, cross-over of genres and creation of new types of texts were characteristic of 
Hellenistic and Roman literary activity.35 In the case of biography, it was a new genre formed 
from and alongside pieces of various other genres, as will be outlined below. At this point, we 
see that generic conventions that leave both freedom for the writer and parameters for the 
reader’s expectations are sufficient to satisfy both ancient and modern approaches. 
Having established that genre involves texts dynamically created under a set of generic 
norms or expectations, how does history and biography relate to genre specifically? From what 
has been said above, we can give three deductions. First, the space a genre gives for expansion 
implies that biography had the capacity to incorporate aspects of historiography. Second, it is not 
necessary to merge histories and biographies into one genre, even if they incorporate the same 
kinds of methodology. Third, genre determined by expectation tells us something about the 
audience. If any work is a painstaking reconstruction of what happened in the past, then this 
could be something the audience desires. If the audience is interested not only in an intriguing 
                                                          
32 Farrell 2003: 396. 
33 See Marincola 1997:237-257. 
34 Marincola 1999:299.  
35 See Kroll 1924:202-224. 
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narrative but also in the veracity of the events, they would listen or read with a critical mind and 
anticipate an attempt at an accurate reconstruction. Texts are created by authors in the hope that 
there will be an audience, therefore popularity and general expectations for what makes a good 
piece are significant in the context of the Mediterranean world. 
The development of bios  
Generic expectation helps explain the biographic material found across many kinds of 
literature prior to the fifth century BCE. Momigliano takes the predecessors of biography to be 
anything to do with ‘an individual in isolation’ from broader events, such as letters, speeches, 
sayings collections, or anecdotes.36 Greeks had been interested in ‘heroes of the past’ throughout 
their recorded history, as is evident from their poems.37 The Iliad and Odyssey make much of the 
individual feelings and deeds of Achilles, Nestor, Odysseus, and others. The poets themselves 
received biographical interest through anecdotes told about Homer and Hesiod, in addition to 
other leaders from the distant past such as ‘the Seven Sages’ and legendary lawgivers, who 
became the subjects of incidental narrative traditions.38 This curiosity about important 
personalities of the past led to the construction of biographic stories, but whether they were true, 
false, or partially true is difficult to determine. Some of them seemed legitimate enough to 
historians for inclusion in histories, such as the episode of Solon and Croesus in Herodotus.39  
The biographic found its way into prose when it became a common medium of writing in 
the fifth century. Herodotus included stories of individuals like Cyrus, Xerxes, and 
Themistocles.40 There were stories about the birth, upbringing, and actions of key figures who 
Herodotus thought relevant to the broader narrative. Momigliano observes that the biographical 
                                                          
36 Momigliano 1993:23. 
37 Momigliano 1993:24-25. 
38 Hägg 2012:10-11. 
39 Histories 1.29-33. 
40 See Histories, Book 7. 
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material contained in Herodotus is mainly from eastern kings or Greeks living in Asia: ‘evidently 
he found more biographical material in Asia Minor than in metropolitan Greece.’41 This may be 
a precursor to Nicolaus of Damascus, Philo, and other eastern biography writers to come, but it 
appears that there was a running curiosity about the leaders in the Persian Empire who had 
caused such change in Greece.42 In Thucydides’ History, individual leaders are discussed in the 
narrative, although they are present in the context of the greater story, and there is usually little 
personal information given. However, there are a number of comments on the abilities of a 
leader or general, and sometimes comments about their character.43 Westlake argues that 
Thucydides was not as interested in the ability and character of the individuals until the later 
stages of his historical composition, where his opinions on key players become more 
pronounced.44 Xenophon also includes considerable information about individuals. The Anabasis 
includes an extended section profiling the lives and character of the Greek generals captured and 
executed by Tissaphernes, including themes of their lives, such as Clearchus’ love of war or 
Menon’s greedy ambition.45 The Hellenica has many outstanding individuals who make up an 
important part of the flow of the narrative, such as attributing Agesilaos’ hatred of the Thebans 
as a cause for his hurry to invade before the Theban ambassadors returned, or the dynamic 
rivalry between Theramenes and Kritias in the rule of the Thirty in Athens.46 
                                                          
41 Momigliano 1993:34. 
42 At least, this is what such inclusions imply, in light of our above findings about reader expectations. 
43 Westlake 1968:7. 
44 Westlake 1968:15. Momigliano 1993:34 believed that Thucydides had an interest in biography, more so in the 
previous generations than in his contemporaries in Athens, though Westlake’s argument on Thucydides’ later 
interest in Nicias and Alcibiades may dispute this. However, a read of Thucydides makes it clear that individuals are 
part of a wider story and mixed with collective entities, as our comparison with Plutarch in the next chapters will 
show. 
45 Anabasis 2.6.1-30. 
46 Hellenica 5.1.32 and 2.3.1-56. 
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One predecessor to the scope and prose of biography was the encomium, a category of 
expression that praises a person for their good qualities.47 Encomium, like biography, was of 
lesser length than larger works, such as epics or histories. Isocrates gives one of the earliest such 
works with Evagoras, which became a model for future encomium in its careful exclusion of 
anything negative about the subject, as the ignoble death of Evagoras is absent from this piece.48  
Isocrates is clear on the experimental challenge he is undertaking, commenting that his is a prose 
work without the benefits of poetic devices, hence ‘we must not hesitate to attempt prose 
speeches to see if good men may be praised by such speeches just as well as by those who 
celebrate them in songs and meter.’49 Encomium is similar to biography in its individual focus, 
concern for moral behaviour, scope, and even the possibility of straining the truth to make the 
character appear greater. Burridge places biography on a continuum between history and 
encomium; therefore, a biography may share characteristics of either one to varying degrees.50  
The development of philosophy also proved to be a contributor to the development of 
biography. Socrates was remarkably influential, and his dramatic death in Athens galvanised 
some of his supporters to defend and venerate him in writing.51 Plato and Xenophon did not give 
full life stories of Socrates, but preferred anecdotes or dialogue forms, which may attempt to get 
across the spirit of Socrates more than precise re-enactments of what was actually said. This 
form of writing was popular enough for Xenophon to write the Cyropaedia, with its fictive 
accounts of the life of Cyrus, and for Plato to write dialogues presenting progressively less of the 
historical Socrates.52 Apparently, this lack of historical accuracy regarding speech was not a 
                                                          
47 Burridge 2004:65-66. 
48 Mirhady and Too 2000:139-140. 
49 Evagoras 9.11, Mirhady and Too trans. 
50 Burridge 2004:62. 
51 See Danzig 2010:5-13. 
52 This is the traditional understanding of Plato and Socrates, but it has been questioned. See Rowe 2006:159-170. 
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problem for them or their readership.53 It is the stories of the virtuous that were important, 
whether the quotations in the texts were verbatim or not. Nevertheless, there are episodes of the 
dialogues where a guarantee is given of the dialogue’s accuracy, based on memory of 
conversations, as in Socrates recalling a particularly engaging dialogue and relating it to friends, 
or others writing the dialogue down and checking with witnesses.54 In Plato’s Symposium, for 
example, Apollodorus is asked to tell the story of the banquet with Socrates, which he learned by 
heart and questioned Socrates on details to confirm their veracity.55 At the least, this shows that 
recollection of what actually happened is expected, even if fictionally portrayed. Claims for 
authentication are something the reader has come to anticipate, as various literary pieces 
including biographic material contain such statements.  
Stories concerning individuals leading up to the Hellenistic period are generally about 
praise-worthy persons: a great political leader, literary genius, or wise philosopher. It should be 
remembered that the driver of biographic material was an interest in these personalities. Certain 
individuals were very influential, such as Socrates for philosophy or Homer for the canon of epic 
poetry. Additionally, Alexander the Great’s initiation of Hellenic power over the Persians who 
overshadowed them for so long was a shock to Greek consciousness and generated interest in 
Alexander himself. By the fourth century BCE, Momigliano observes, ‘The evidence for interest 
in biography and autobiography becomes abundant and permeates all aspects of literature.’56 
There was a general fourth-century trend to shift focus from the polis to individuals, one of the 
reasons for the development of biography.57 Marincola exemplifies this by contrasting 
Thucydides, who makes Athens and Sparta ‘characters’ in the narrative, and Theopompus, who 
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progressed in his literary endeavours from the history of Greece to a history of Philip, a move 
from collective to individual locus in his historical writing.58 It is also important to note that 
while biographic material was found in non-historical literature, it did make a definite 
appearance in histories. A number of historians, including Callisthenes, Aristobulus, and 
Clitarchus, wrote ‘Alexander’ histories in which Alexander is the focal point, though not 
excluding aspects of the broader context, such as the material on India from Onesicritus.59 The 
fascination with Alexander – his character, deeds, and words – could be seen as a distraction 
from the wider picture and disrupt the narrative flow, becoming a potential problem in literary 
composition and structure. This tension between the broader narrative of events and the narrative 
of a specific individual like Alexander could be seen as an impetus for the initiation of its own 
genre, the bios.   
The term bios and the genre it represented arose in the Hellenistic age. Bios 
approximately means ‘a way of life,’ and as a genre was intended to relate what kind of men they 
were and establish an existential connection between them and the reader.60 Although Aristotle 
never wrote a biography to our knowledge, the peripatetic philosophers were influential.61 They 
made two major methodological contributions: the respect for the facts derived from inquiry and 
research, and the systemization of ethics from a framework of nature, habits, and character.62 A 
variety of philosophers, sophists, lawgivers, statesmen, and even playwrights were subjects of 
peripatetic biographers like Aristoxenus, Hermippus, and Satyrus, though they are no longer 
extant.63 There is a gap in extant texts from around 200 BCE to the first century BCE when we 
know of Latin writers, such as Cornelius Nepos and Varro, and Greek biography from Nicolaus 
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of Damascus.64 Polybius wrote at least one biography about the Greek statesman Philopoemen, 
and one wonders if he wrote others.65 Philo of Alexandria wrote a bios of Moses in Greek around 
the beginning of the first century CE. There was a departure from encomium in that there could 
be a sharing of the vices or failures of the man as well. Only fragments of the Hellenistic Lives 
remain, so it is difficult to get a sense of the entirety of the works or their structure.66 A century 
ago, Leo theorized that the bios genre formed out of two schools, the ‘Peripatetic’ which was 
meant for a popular audience, and the ‘Alexandrian’ which was more intellectual and didactic.67 
This strict division is difficult to sustain now, as it has become evident that these works were 
very diverse. They are so varied that Edwards questions whether to even call biography a genre 
at all, though going to this length is unnecessary.68 Hägg writes that ‘the biographical genre that 
gradually came into being had a core but no sharp outlines,’ which makes good sense of the 
diversity of texts that share the common thread of being ‘lives’ of individuals.69  
This shows us two things. First, the proliferation of biographies indicates the popularity 
of the genre and an interest in a wide variety of notable individuals, whether they were 
politicians or sages. Production of biography was driven by a popular interest.  Second, due to 
the broadness in the characteristics of biography, expectations may be broad as well; there was 
room for flexibility, and the reader may not be surprised to see vast differences in style. This 
freedom of the author to use any number of compositional strategies, the interest in ethics, and 
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the concern for facts about actual figures who acted in the past all contribute to the method of the 
biographer.  
Greek historiographical method 
Before answering whether the variable nature of biography incorporates historical 
method, it would be expedient to survey the subject. Opinions on how to write history varied 
widely, and on any particular author’s method there are many facets.70 Therefore, a few strategic 
examples will suffice from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius with a twofold focus: their 
level of critical method and their usage of source documents. Alongside these two areas we will 
also compare the historian’s perspective to that of Plutarch’s Lives and other biographies where 
appropriate. 
The earliest Greek methodological statements on history are those of Herodotus and 
Thucydides. Except for the statements strewn throughout his work about being told information, 
Herodotus does not explicitly state his methodology.71 He claimed his work depended on 
historia, an inquiry or investigation, and required a wide variety of activities to acquire sources.72 
Waters believes Herodotus grouped his source methods into a sort of hierarchy: autopsy, or 
‘personal visual investigation’; ‘knowledge’ from mostly oral, but some documentary, sources; 
and ‘tales’ that are commonly told about various things by individuals or within society.73  The 
use of documents is limited, which may be assigned to the fact that prose literature was still in its 
early stages and there was not much historical text material to build from.74 When he does bring 
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up written sources it is involved with criticism, as he does with the only other named prose 
writer, Hecataeus.75  
Hecataeus not only provided Herodotus with written documentation, but also served as a 
foil for his own historical reasoning. Lateiner argues that Herodotus referred to Hecataeus much 
more than he acknowledges, especially for geographical information, and the speculative 
theorizing of Hecataeus allowed Herodotus ‘the advantage of having ideas and explanations to 
object to.’76 Evidently Herodotus makes reference to king-lists, as in his section on Sparta, 
ending with a passing reference to other records that he will not duplicate.77 Poets make rare 
appearances in the Histories, more for rhetorical opposition than historical information.78 
Herodotus did not restrict himself to Greek sources, however. Persian and Egyptian sources were 
at hand as well, and while it is debated how much of it was written, documentary sources are 
very likely in several cases.79 The polemic of Herodotus indicates he was exposed to a variety of 
sources, whether written or oral, which gave him both information and room for disagreement. 
Thucydides became one of the most important models for ancient historians. In his 
opening sentence, Thucydides does not use historia, but sungraphein to describe his work, 
giving ‘a more technical feel’ to the project.80 Later in the first book he states the method and 
attitude towards his investigation, as well as sources.81 He starts his methodological statement 
with an admission of a weakness – that he himself and his informants do not always remember 
the speeches accurately – but then proceeds to his strengths. He names himself as a witness to 
many of the events, and indicates there are many other eyewitnesses whom he has taken 
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information from. Thucydides represents a critical approach to his subject, stating his cross-
checking of more than one source concerning the same event and making decisions afterward. 
Unlike Herodotus, who pulled up dubious or conflicting reports in his history and let the reader 
decide (or simply be entertained), Thucydides made choices of what to include beforehand, and 
gives a continuous narrative without many detours. Shanske observes that passages in the 
History are characterised by density, consistency, ubiquity, open-endedness, familiarity, and 
significance.82 These qualities have been much admired, and Thucydides’ influence on Greek 
historiography cannot be overestimated. It is likely that even through the Hellenistic period his 
difficult prose was read somewhat widely.83 At the start of the Imperial Roman period he was 
popular, and even into the second century CE Lucian’s essays and satires on history place 
Thucydides as the quintessential historian.84 Though documents were not the core type of 
evidence on which his histories depended, Thucydides did appropriate written diplomatic 
documents.85  He also may have used written sources for the more distant past or the events 
leading up to the Peloponnesian War in Book 1, possibly Herodotus himself.86 
Polybius deserves special attention, as his tour de force freely gives his thoughts on the 
writing of history and was composed in the same era as the bios genre’s initiation. Marincola 
comments that ‘no other ancient historian, not even Thucydides, gave so much thought to the 
epistemological difficulties inherent in writing up a historical narrative.’87 In his twelfth book, 
Polybius talks of ‘seeing and hearing’ as the ways in which the learning required for writing 
history is accomplished, but the seeing, the personal autopsy, is considered superior.88 This is 
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obviously not always possible, thus interviewing eyewitnesses is also important, and he criticizes 
Timaeus for only performing the easy work of sitting in one place using libraries.89 Levene has 
pointed out, however, that Polybius does not trounce the use of written documents in general, but 
rather the sole use of written material and nothing else.90 In his criticisms of Timaeus he even 
references the written work of Aristotle to support the results of his conversations with the 
Locrians.91 Later on, Polybius distils historical method into three areas deserving analysis, and 
specific attention to Plutarch is appropriate at this point: 
In the same fashion systematic history too consists of three parts, the first being the 
industrious study of memoirs and other documents and a comparison of their contents, 
the second the survey of cities, places, rivers, lakes, and in general all the peculiar 
features of land and sea and the distances of one place from another, and the third being 
the review of political events.92 
 
The review of political events is something that biographies can accomplish, but only 
insofar as it relates to the person they are writing about. Political events such as how Pericles 
came to full authority in Athens are intrinsic to the work Plutarch was trying to accomplish, as 
well as other larger events such as the start of the war with Sparta, though political events are 
only as interesting when they relate in some way to the character. Polybius would expect that 
knowledge of political events would relate to political experience, which Plutarch had, though on 
a smaller, localised scale.93 Other authors of biographies, such as Nicolaus of Damascus and 
Suetonius, also held political offices and could draw from these experiences in their writing. 
The second idea, familiarity with geography, can also be found in biographies, though 
once again, it is limited to what is relevant to the subject. Plutarch talks about geography 
occasionally where it relates in some way to the figure he is writing about, such as brief 
                                                          
89 Histories 12.27.2-6. 
90 Levene 2009: 627-629. 
91 Histories 12.7-8. 
92 Histories 12.25E. 
93 See Chapter 2. 
25 
 
descriptions of the roughness of the area around Syracuse to show how skilled Nicias was in 
building fortifications so quickly.94 Plutarch had also travelled to Rome, Athens, and parts of the 
Mediterranean that are relevant to his lives, which would go towards the experience of which 
Polybius speaks. In a biography, however, the principle of relevance to the individual’s life is the 
determining factor of how much geography is included, and the same holds for history. The kind 
of geography Polybius requires is that which is relevant to the stories being told. Polybius visited 
the Alps in person to discover more about Hannibal’s crossing.95 He would likely not spend time 
on insignificant villages or small islands which had nothing to do with the momentous events he 
was investigating.  
The first idea in Polybius’ list is the closest correlation to what biographers did – study 
documents and memoirs to obtain material for the man. Plutarch’s Lives were based on his very 
extensive reading, and he frequently names his sources and compares differing accounts within 
his narratives. We also saw above that Peripatetic biographers in the Hellenistic period prior also 
dug up documents to write about individuals of the past. The Synoptic gospel writers used 
written text for writing about the life of Jesus as well, and the Gospel of Matthew is especially 
dependent on a written copy of Mark’s Gospel.96  
However, later on in this book, Polybius appears to distance history from this key 
connector between history and biography. He states that studying old documents and spending 
time in libraries does not automatically make one qualified to write history, and he emphasizes 
the life experience required.97 This sounds odd to modern historians, who hold the study of 
documents in first place for obtaining answers to questions about the past, and there is often a 
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dichotomy between those who act and others who write literature about those who act.98 But 
three contextual issues must be remembered, which make this distance not so great as it may 
appear. First, Polybius has a rhetorical purpose – to assert the superiority of his Histories over 
those of his competitors. Timaeus was a very important historian of the period before Polybius 
and continued to be cited by other writers even after the harsh criticism from Polybius.99 To 
prove the value of his masterpiece, Polybius must put special stress on the points in which his 
work is superior to others. Second, Polybius is critiquing other historians, who are indeed 
historians and had their own ideas as to which methods are appropriate for historiography, yet 
their works do not survive for us to give a fairer appraisal. Polybius could not overturn the fact 
that they were historians or that documentary study was a common method of writing history, 
but argued that they were doing their job poorly if they did not have wider experience and or 
undertake proper methodological care. Lastly, and most importantly, Polybius is criticising other 
historians not for the study of documents in itself, but the study of documents in isolation from 
the broader world. Documents were still crucial to the historiographical process. Polybius was 
heavily absorbed in the study of documents to write his first two books, and quotes from other 
historians such as Fabius Pictor, Antisthenes, and Ephorus.100 He also obtained letters and 
memoirs, probably searched official archives, and had opportunity to access records from Rome, 
Rhodes, and the Achaean League.101  
The Histories of Polybius are universal and contain the broadest possible scope for a 
single work, making geography and experience inherently crucial to his purpose in a way that is 
not the case for a more restricted biography. Polybius’ three aspects of historiography are all 
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present to varying degrees in composing biography, but written documents play a central role for 
both genres. At this point there seem to be two major differences between the views of Polybius 
and the practice of biography: scope and current autopsy of the events. We will discuss the 
defining difference regarding scope below. First, however, the use documents as sources 
inevitably brings up the question of contemporary history versus history of the distant past. We 
must analyse this dichotomy and its relationship to biography. 
Contemporary history, the inquiry into the events of one’s own period, is a significant 
incongruence to biography, whose authors usually collect texts about individuals from prior eras. 
There has long been a distinction between history and antiquarianism that harkens back to 
Greco-Roman thought.102 Poring over smaller details of the past was grouped into the practice of 
antiquarianism, while the writing about causes and actions of people not far removed from the 
writer’s own time is history.103 Polybius was primarily writing about his own times, as did other 
major Greek historians such as Thucydides and Xenophon.104 Thucydides lived through the war 
of which he wrote, and even dismissed the possibility of knowing very much about the further or 
nearer past.105 Notable Roman and Jewish historians such as Josephus and Tacitus also focused 
on contemporary events. Does this sever a key methodological link between history and 
biography? 
We argue that it does not, for several reasons. The decision to write contemporary history 
need not have so much to do with methodology as with pragmatism. Witnessing contemporary 
events was often an impetus for someone to write a history of those events, for the simple reason 
that they experienced them and knew them well. They were confronted with events that became 
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highly significant, and wrote because they themselves were a part of the story. Thucydides 
believed the Peloponnesian War of which he played a part was the greatest war yet to be fought, 
and desired to keep a record for posterity.106 That Xenophon was among the Greek mercenaries 
who marched their way from Asia to Greece must have influenced his decision to write the 
Anabasis. Polybius saw the astounding rise of Rome and fall of Hellenistic power for himself 
and sought to research and write his histories on that basis.107 Josephus participated in the Jewish 
war, witnessed the fall of his homeland, and shifted his allegiance, an intersection of factors that 
brought him to write his own account.108.  
Moreover, the ancients faced the problem of all historians – finding sources for the past. 
The reason Thucydides disparaged writing about the distant past was the lack of evidence 
available.109 History-writing today confronts the same challenge; for example, there is drastically 
more data available for doing 20th century history than Greco-Roman history. The further the 
subject is from the present, the more evidence is usually lost. This is why cautious historians like 
Thucydides and Polybius kept to events close to their own period, and events of direct concern to 
themselves, rather than distant peoples with which the more adventurous Herodotus occupied his 
history.110  
Another practical reason for writing contemporary history is that the history of past 
generations was often already covered by others, making another work concerning the same 
period liable to be redundant. Some aspect of style from prior historians could be imitated,111 but 
traditions that had already been handed down from other historians were allowed to stand and 
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only be challenged on minor details; once it had been covered, the case was not reopened.112 
Thucydides did not attempt to write the history of the first half of the fifth century all over again, 
but started from where Herodotus left off.113 Xenophon’s Hellenica picked up the account of the 
war where Thucydides’ had ended. Polybius said that although other historians had written about 
particular events, his own work was unique in composing a general history that incorporates and 
connects the events together.114 Distant history would not need to be re-written unless there were 
gaps in the old narratives that the historian believed he could re-interpret or fill with other 
evidence available, which is precisely what Ephorus, Livy, and Tacitus did.115 Filling in a gap 
could serve to justify the biographer’s quest, because writing about a single life from an area of 
distant history already covered would not be redundant if information was gathered from various 
other sources and analyzed from a new angle. Plutarch justifies his Life of Nicias this way, 
saying he will not duplicate Thucydides, but try to include information from little-known sources 
to give a fresh picture of Nicias.116 Marincola comments, ‘the prohibition on non-contemporary 
history could be ignored when the author believed he had superior information.’117 Therefore, 
inquiry into the contemporary is not inherent to generic history; the inherency is rather the 
opportunity to excel in a work of literature about the past, a factor in common with biography.  
Beyond the practical reasons, we may also point out that the division between 
contemporary and distant history as categories was not even explicitly made by the Greeks. 
Historians wrote both current events and past events and did not hesitate to consider it all part of 
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their inquiry. Fornara asserts, ‘It is essential to recognize that, to the Greeks and Romans, 
“history” was not an aspect of time; “the past” and history were no more intrinsically related than 
were “the present” and history. The relation was identical for both: “history” was written both of 
the present and of the past.’118 Marincola doubts whether the distinction often made between the 
more antiquarian Roman ‘annalists’ and contemporary Roman historians is accurate.119 Even 
antiquarianism as a category did not develop fully until later in the Imperial period, after bios 
was well-established as a genre. The word for antiquarian, archaeologia, was used in Hippias 
Major to describe the study of genealogies or the ancient history of cities, but in Hellenistic 
writing became synonymous with archaic history.120 As Momigliano emphasizes, ‘There has 
never been an absolute divorce, a precise criterion of separation between antiquarianism and 
historiography.’121 
This is further supported by the fact that contemporary historians did include stories, 
information, or speculations about prior times and used documents, even if it made up a fraction 
of their work. As noted above, Herodotus and Thucydides, key figures in the development of 
history (and contemporary history) used documentation. In his first book, Thucydides spends the 
first twenty sections on the distant past, as well as further background on the fifty years leading 
up to the Peloponnesian War in ‘Pentecontaetia’ section of book one. Pearson observes that one 
important aspect of Hellenistic historians is their ‘convention to start their histories from the 
beginning.’122 Timaeus, Hellanicus, and Ephorus reached back as early as they could, discussing 
the founding of cities and stories of the heroic age.123 While the Jewish Wars of Josephus are 
contemporary history of the first century CE, his other history, Antiquities of the Jews, spent 17 
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of the 20 books on events prior to the first century. Josephus made extensive use of documents as 
well, including Roman records and Greek historical sources in discussing the Jews under 
Hellenistic rule and debates concerning the origins of written records.124 
Overall, use of documents was increasingly more common in Greek historiographical 
development. ‘By the end of the fourth century,’ Rhodes notes, ‘it had  come to be to be seen that 
documents were an invaluable source for certain kinds of information,’ such as constitutional 
arrangements, decisions of organizational bodies, lists, and treaties.125 Other genres related to 
history are commonly listed to be genealogy, ethnography, horography, and chronography.126 
Such organization into sub-genres has received some criticism, as it does not always represent 
the ancient’s own categories and literary development.127 Cursory reading of Greek historians 
shows that this kind of material finds its way into history proper – historians, once again, must 
use documents and study them to make a point, as Polybius said. If historians incorporated 
written documentation and inquiry from previous generations into their methods, and if the 
frequency of writing contemporary history stems from the practical situations we have 
suggested, then there is not a marked difference between history and biography in terms of 
erudite research. Biography need not be placed into an antiquarian category away from political 
history. 
Moral purpose in historiography 
Biography is sometimes contrasted with history from its moral standpoint. In Fornara’s 
discussion of his list of historical writing, for example, he comments, ‘we exclude biography 
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because it is an ethical, not historical form.’128 On the contrary, however, we will argue that 
moralism positively argues for links between history and biography, because Greek historians 
included significant moral aims in their work as well.  
Ancient historiography’s moral purposes are often not recognized due to the influence of 
Thucydides on our perception of the genre, but as Hornblower comments, Thucydides’ lack of 
moralizing is unusual compared to other ancient historians, and he was actually a ‘deeply moral 
writer’ in a qualified sense.129 Thucydides did not make ethical statements with attention to the 
gods. His account of the plague in Athens is a representative case, noting that whether someone 
was bad or good they died and the gods took no care,130 a statement other more pious historians 
like Xenophon would never make. However, Thucydides was concerned for the ethical 
implications of war, and the deterioration of the moral compass of individuals caught up in the 
hardship and pressures of warfare.131 Furthermore, Thucydides still revealed moral opinions on 
occasion, such as his negative portrayal of Kleon and his tactics, or his comment that Nicias was 
virtuous.132 Thucydides was aware of the instructive function for his work, and is inevitably 
related to a way of life. Momigliano writes, ‘Thucydides concentrated on political life; it was 
here that he found the meaning of human effort. By understanding the political life of the 
present, and its military consequences, he believed that he had understood the nature of man in 
its perennial elements.’133  
Herodotus set some precedents for moral themes in history as well, and placed them 
within his explanation of historical causation. Some unsavory deed would result in other events, 
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such as various parties stealing women from each other and bringing longstanding conflict.134 He 
also looks at attitudes, especially hubris. Herodotus suggests that divine retribution came on 
Croesus because he thought himself the happiest of all men, and Xerxes’ punishment of the 
Hellespont is told with disapproval and a foreshadowing of the Persian failure, a point to which 
he returns in the speech of Themistocles.135 Political history had a life-instructing aspect; even if 
it was without specific ethical aims, it did have didactic aims. Herodotus and Thucydides imply 
that authentic lessons could be learned from history by the reader, beyond providing mere 
entertainment.  
Xenophon’s historical writing is one of the most outstanding for its ethical themes. Gray 
argues that morality is the unifying theme of the Hellenica.136 The Hellenica does not have a 
strongly stated theme as found in the works of Herodotus or Thucydides, and the focus is not 
entirely upon military or political issues, though they are included.137 Important issues such as 
the Second Athenian Confederacy, the extent of the expansive Theban sphere of influence, or 
political events in Persia are not mentioned – a glaring absence.138 What did interest Xenophon is 
the moral aspect of the stories, and this is a major feature of his interpretation and inclusion of 
historical events. The interview of Cyrus and Lysander, or the duelling speeches in the accounts 
of Critias and Thrasybulus, are examples of the large spreads of narrative that were centred on 
dialogues and speeches of moral character, reducing the centrality of military actions.139 Even 
the military actions are narrated so as to demonstrate the character of a good military leader.140 
There is also implicit warning against good leadership gone too far. Hau notices a pattern where 
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‘success leads to arrogance, which leads to disaster,’ a model of historical causality that appears 
to be a major teaching point in the Hellenica.141 For Xenophon, historiography was an ethical 
form as well. 
Xenophon’s idea to include ethical material influenced succeeding historians.142 The 
historical works of Theopompus only survive in fragments, but they show ethical judgments on 
historical characters, such as asserting Athenaeus the Eretrian to be a flatterer, or that Lysander 
was hard-working, moderate, and ‘in control of his pleasures.’143 The pronouncements of 
Theompompus were controversial. Lucian attacked the character of Theopompus, calling him 
malicious, and a ‘prosecutor rather than a historian.’144 Other writers critique Theompompus as 
well, most notably Polybius for his unbecoming slanders of Philip;145 nevertheless, the 
complaints against Theopompus are not against his moralism as such, but his negativity, or 
‘bitterness’ as Cicero called it.146 Plutarch remarks that Theopompus praises so infrequently in 
comparison to his blaming, that when he does praise one is more inclined to trust him.147 
Theopompus represents a type of moralist history that went too far according to other Greek 
writers, but no writer questioned that history had ethical ramifications. 
Polybius held ethical views of his own which appear throughout his work. Eckstein 
asserts that ‘among the ancient historical writers now extant, no one more frequently breaks his 
narrative in order to comment in moralizing terms on human character and the lessons of life’ 
than Polybius.148 Polybius disliked drunkenness and took considerable length to portray it in a 
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negative light and uphold examples of sobriety.149 Virtues such as courage, mercy, and 
trustworthiness were also admired. Polybius considered reader improvement one of his goals in 
writing history, to expose the good and just for the reader’s imitation.150 Noble deeds help to 
educate the reader to be honest and a loyal friend, a certain kind of virtuous person.151 When 
Polybius gives lengthy comments on the misfortune of the Roman consul Regulus and his errors, 
he adds ‘This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there 
are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, 
the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter 
the less hurtful.’152 This moralistic idea of ‘reader improvement’ is methodological statement, 
very much akin to Plutarch’s opinions about historical writing. Hau observes that compared to 
the unspoken messages and implications in Xenophon’s narratives, these other Hellenistic 
historians ‘comment unambiguously on the narrated situations and set out the moral explicitly 
for the reader.’153 Further, it is significant that moral interest was not limited to the Greeks: the 
Roman historical writers such as Sallust, Livy and Tacitus had strong moral themes as well, duly 
taking note from Greek examples.154  
The moral concern in the histories has two ramifications: first, that it is not helpful to 
place a barrier between ethical and historical forms. History’s words and deeds of characters and 
peoples were meant to instruct. Second, there is a precise overlap here between biography and 
history. History could be as morally instructive as biographies. Both genres were  didactic and 
were expected by the audiences to uphold historical examples of people’s actions to imitate or 
avoid. 
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Points of contact and separation between historiography and biography 
Historiography and biography share significant points of contact – both genres are 
capable of looking to the distant past, employing documentary evidence and critical methods, 
maintaining an instructive purpose, and explicating the roles of important individuals. Having 
established important similarities to history, we should point out the major differences. Three 
important differences could be posited: length, intended coverage of the narrative, and the 
theoretical model.  
Histories were longer than biographies by a fairly wide margin. The differing length is no 
longer sustained in modern practice, but it was a defining contrast in Greek biography.155 
Herodotus had nine books, Thucydides, eight, and Xenophon’s Hellenica, seven. The universal 
historians had even more – Ephorus filled thirty books, Timaeus, thirty-eight, and Polybius, 
forty. Biographies tended to be much smaller works and a single bios would not cover multiple 
books. The biographies by Nepos are between two and ten pages long, while Plutarch’s are fifty 
pages on average.156 A pair of Plutarch’s Lives with prologue and synkrisis were contained in a 
single book.157 Although Philo’s Life of Moses is unusually long for a bios, it took up only two 
scrolls.158  
The widely divergent lengths between them is a convention that is directly related to the 
intended scope159 of the narratives. In view of the numerous methodological and thematic 
similarities seen above, the breadth of coverage appears to be the major difference between 
history and biography, one which divides them generically. History has the wider scope in that it 
is narrating and explaining larger entities and their interactions. Thucydides and historians with a 
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localized scope see collective bodies as actors in the narrative (such as a poleis or empires) 
insofar as they intrude into the locality in focus. Universal history is more ambitious, an attempt 
to cover everything that is known to the author, and rests on the foundation of ‘a universal 
conception of time and space in which the actor is mankind’, as Alfonso- Núñez remarks.160  
In the few places where writers speak about biography and history in the same place, 
scope is the major contrast. In his preface to Pelopidas, Cornelius Nepos comments on the 
balance his own approach requires – to avoid telling all of the deeds Pelopidas lest his readers 
will think it a history, or on the other side to tell too little and some readers be unaware of the 
leader’s greatness.161 Plutarch says the ‘multitude of deeds’ of Alexander and Caesar are so great 
that he cannot cover everything, then explains that he is writing lives rather than histories.162 
Therefore, the important question to be answered on the relationship between historiographical 
and biographical method is this: what determines the boundaries of scope? In the mass of 
evidence before the historian and biographer, what determines what is included in the final work 
and what is discarded? This question brings their respective theoretical models to the fore.  
The application of the biographical method yields an individual-centred focus. When 
Plutarch and Nepos write of excluding certain information from bioi, there is a methodological 
reason for saying so. Their concentration is upon one person, and this must determine the scope 
of their narrative. When Nepos voices concern that he not write history, he is drawing his limits. 
Including only enough material about Pelopidas to show his greatness necessarily excludes some 
material. That biography has a theory of composition that influences what data is included is 
noted by a number of scholars.163 Obviously, Greek historians also believed character was 
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important to history whether explicitly stated, as Polybius did, or implied, as in the inclusion of 
profiles of the executed Greek generals in Xenophon’s Anabasis.164  
However, it is clear that character was not the sole criterion for writing history proper, as 
it was in biography; it was only one of many strands in broad narratives. Wardman writes that 
characterization within historiography ‘is only incidental to other interests’ and that when 
Xenophon sketches Menon’s character in Anabasis, it does not appear as a theme throughout the 
narrative or become significant later in the story.165 Concerning the programmatic statements of 
Plutarch’s Lives, Pelling says this: ‘The theory is clear and consistent. Biography will often 
concentrate on personal details, and may abbreviate its historical narrative; its concern will be 
the portrayal of character, and its ultimate purpose will be protreptic and moral.’166 Similarly, 
Fornara writes that the evidence collected was studied by the biographer in order to discover 
what kind of life and character his subject had. He concludes, ‘history, the record of man’s 
memorable deeds, was irrelevant to biography except when deeds illuminated character. 
Conversely, subjects for illustration suitable to biography – for example, a sense of humor 
indicated by characterizing anecdotes – were unsuitable for history.167 Characterizing evidence, 
however, is still a historical matter, as will be shown in Chapter 4. Further, memorable deeds of 
bios may be mentioned which do not necessarily illuminate character explicitly, but provide 
some important function related to the broader purpose of the model. 
  This leads us to the problem that biographers do not always appear to follow their own 
theory. Pelling notes in Plutarch’s case that there are a number of points where he appears to 
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deviate from the method asserted in his prefaces.168 This will be discussed further in the next 
chapter, but there are three points appropriate to mention now. First, Plutarch was not alone in 
his apparent departures, as the methodological statements of Greek historians often lead to more 
complications upon further inquiry.169 Second, giving more context for the hero’s life contributed 
to the ethical-didactic purpose of the biographer’s model. Third, generic rules of bioi were 
flexible, as argued above, and could allow additional information so long as it did not make the 
biography too lengthy. Again, genre as reader expectation is helpful here – bios must be centred 
upon the person rather than too much into the broader scheme of the historical situation. How 
much background or diversion is too much depends upon the decision of the author and what the 
audience will reasonably allow. Even the genre of historiography faced the inverse of this 
problem, as Imperial Rome progressively witnessed histories becoming more biographically 
focused due to the increasing importance of the Roman emperor, something the readers would 
expect as participants in this new situation.170  
Historiographical theory, ancient and present 
The ancient biographies differed from histories in scope and focus on a generic level. 
However, can the biographical method be considered a historiographical method? It has already 
been established that history and biography share many other features, and the writers of both 
drew from documents and experience to write on historical events and people with an ethical-
didactical vision. What remains is to demonstrate that this theory of evidence selection and 
composition meets the expectation of historiographical method, the meaning of which must be 
addressed before proceeding. 
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The challenge to be met is the nature of the association between historians of Greco-
Roman epochs and critical historians of today. Marincola remarks, ‘Perhaps the most 
fundamental shift over the last thirty years has been the recognition, with all of its attendant 
consequences, of a significant break between ancient civilization and our own.’171 Yet he also 
notes the possible problem of falling into a ‘modern superiority complex.’172 This possibility has 
taken the form of a strong skepticism in some quarters. For example, Finley asserts that ‘the 
ability of the ancients to invent and their capacity to believe are persistently underestimated.’173 
Finley goes on to question the dubious nature of their material on early Rome, created to fill 
unwanted gaps in their knowledge.174 To this problem may be added the invention of speeches in 
historical works and its apparent acceptance, since any invention is antithetical to modern 
historiography. Woodman argued that it is not viable to believe ‘that classical historiography 
resembles its modern namesake’ and that the ancients viewed it as ‘rhetorical genre’ like 
poetry.175 There is also the problem of how much intellectual and cultural development has 
occurred. Loraux argues under the searching title, ‘Thucydides is not a Colleague,’ that we must 
maintain serious distance from the ancient historians and their context, because their aims were 
limited to the immediate situation, and are at variance with the answers we now seek.176 
Thucydides should not be seen as a master historian telling us modern historians how things 
really were; rather, his work should be allowed a ‘status as a text, taking in this way enough 
distance to constitute it as a document,’ a piece of writing on par with comedies, poetry, or epics 
from which we can glean information for our own inquiry.177  
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Such progress notwithstanding, there is a real danger of exaggerating the differences and 
diminishing the accomplishments of ancient historians. Though it is not precisely the form and 
critical type of historiography practiced now, ancient historiography is still historiography. That 
distance should be given between us and texts like that of Thucydides is evident, because their 
context does not equal our own. Nevertheless, even speaking of ‘our’ context is problematic, as 
today there are historians across cultures and nations with a multiplicity of perspectives and 
questions concerning history. The famous quotation from L.P. Hartley, ‘The past is a foreign 
country: they do things differently there,’ portrays one way in which we understand our 
relationship to the past as historians. Just as when one encounters new, unfamiliar cultures in our 
time and grapples with the challenges of understanding and interpreting them, the historian must 
be aware of gaps in understanding when encountering the past.178 When one approaches another 
culture or country there is another conceptual, linguistic, and moral framework to understand, as 
is the case in any study of history. If scholars from such culturally diverse countries as China, 
Egypt, and the United States can be colleagues today, it is not too far from perception to consider 
ancient Greek and Roman historians in the same vein, even while their texts additionally serve as 
monumental documents, as Loraux has shown.  
This is further strengthened by the influence ancient historiography has exerted on the 
development of western historiography.179 The precise nature of the continuity of ideas through 
history is still controversial in the field of intellectual history,180 and is outside the scope of this 
dissertation, though all that must be established now is a broader ‘path of thinking,’ as Gordon 
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says, in historiography while remembering the alternate contexts.181 Some have argued that 
ahistorical, fictitious features, such as speeches or narratives from historians of whom we are 
suspicious, are more historically grounded than is often believed.182 When the ancient 
weaknesses are accepted, it must be allowed that over the course of millennia it would be 
expected that a significant development of historiography would occur, shifts in conceptions of 
the world in philosophy, logic, and natural science. Collingwood has shown that we ought to be 
careful to judge historical concepts and theories within their own context, as the meaning of 
many concepts has shifted over the course of time.183 Even with the revolution of ‘scientific 
history’ in the nineteenth century, where more advanced methods were developed, postmodern 
critics have shown issues inherent to historical discourse which plague critical historiography 
today as well.184 
There is also enough continuity between ancient and modern historiography to surmise 
that it is essentially the same activity. One example is the respect for truth. The Histories of 
Herodotus are a more amusing and interesting narrative than the dense style of Thucydides, yet 
Thucydides ultimately became more important to many Greeks because it was believed that 
Herodotus told lies.185 Greek and Roman historians were acutely aware of truth and falsehood in 
history, a theme commonly discussed in Polybius’ work.186 Lucian criticizes historians’ factual 
errors, not only arising from prejudice, but errors of fact as such, which, as Pitcher comments, ‘is 
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hard to square with the idea that it was universally acknowledged in classical antiquity that 
factual accuracy did not form part of the concept of “truth” as it pertained to historiography.’187 
History was a branch of rhetoric as Woodman has emphasized, but under that rhetoric existed an 
idea that truth still mattered.  
Another example is bias in history, the awareness of which is not new. Among extant 
Greek works, Polybius is the first to discuss bias head-on, and later Sallust and Josephus make 
significant mention of it.188 In fact, eliminating bias became a competitive factor in cases where 
historians wrote on the same period as their predecessors and attempted to surpass their accounts 
by being more objective.189 Rhetoric and historiography were closely interconnected, though this 
does not mean ‘the truth’ was unimportant, or that there was free invention, even in the presence 
of bias or exaggeration.190  
Organizational strategies have also been influential. The histories of Ephorus were 
written in a topical arrangement within certain sets of chronological sections, a revolutionary 
organizational principle of large-scale history that was imitated by subsequent Greek historians 
and is used in modern histories today, such as the Cambridge Ancient Histories.191 Lucian’s True 
Stories, although satires rather than history proper, even preclude several key strands of 
postmodern historiography arguments, particularly those of White.192 Indeed, Greek historians 
were still affected by biases and personal perspectives and ideas, but historians today face the 
same problem, which has become increasingly recognized. As Pitcher insightfully comments, 
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‘Ancient historiography is not always as ancient, or modern historiography as modern, as is often 
supposed.’193 
Historians interpret texts, and they do this according to some kind of intellectual 
framework. Debates concerning truth and subjectivity in historiography are ongoing and varied, 
and it is not necessary to survey them here.194 Though disagreements exist over the nature of 
historical truth and discourse, all sides of the debate are compatible with the existence of theories 
or ideas as drivers of historiographical thought and writing.195 This is a significant point of 
contact between modern and ancient historians, as ancient historians used theories as well.196 The 
explicit idea that historians are to interpret the past is never clearly outlined in the range of 
ancient historiography, though Hornblower notes that this is what they were doing, and the 
Roman historian Sempronius Asellio plainly stated that relating what had happened is deficient 
by itself because why those things happened should be included in history as well.197 
Collingwood went so far as to argue that ‘all history is the history of thought,’ and ‘when a 
historian says a man is in a certain situation, this is the same as saying that he thinks he is in this 
situation. The hard facts of the situation, which it is so important for him to face, are the hard 
facts of the way in which he conceives the situation.’198 Finley similarly states, ‘The study and 
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writing of history, in short, is a form of ideology’ in the broad sense of systems of ideas in 
collective and individual entities.199 Fischer defines a historian as ‘someone (anyone) who asks 
an open-ended question about past events and answers it with selected facts which are arranged 
in the form of an explanatory paradigm.’200 Livy, a very prolific historian, still would state his 
own limits, that since it was difficult enough to tell the numerous deeds of the Romans, the wars 
between other nations were not to be discussed.201 That choices must be made is normal. 
Speaking primarily of modern historians, Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob say this:  
[…] historians must deal with a vanished past that has left most of its traces in written 
documents. The translation of these words from the documents into the story that seeks to 
be faithful to the past constitutes the historians’ particular struggle with truth. It requires a 
rigorous attention to the details of the archival records as well as imaginative casting of 
narrative and interpretation. The realist never denies that the very act of representing the 
past makes the historian (values, warts, and all) an agent who actively molds how the past 
is to be seen.202  
 
Historiography also has to do with choices about inclusion of historical data, and it is in 
this sense that the term will be applied in explaining the interpretive choices of Plutarch. Sorting 
through documents and asking certain questions of texts – questions which the texts may not 
have been originally intended to answer – very well describes what biographers like Plutarch 
were doing. By pulling together various sources, thinking about what the texts say happened, and 
noticing details, the biographer creates a new narrative. Biographers make choices using a more 
restrictive interpretive theory than history proper, centring the narrative upon a single person. 
That historiography is ideological helps explain the patterns in Plutarch’s Lives, as we will argue 
in the next chapter. Plutarch had definite ideas about what kind of things happen in human 
affairs, which influenced the way he saw history and interpreted historical sources. For example, 
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his view of Greek politics is repeated often in the Lives, at times missing the distinctiveness of 
Roman politics in explaining many political situations.203  
That ideas present in bioi may not be those of political historians of the stripe of 
Thucydides or Polybius is therefore no hindrance. Ancient historians came from a wide variety 
of backgrounds – statesmen, philosophers, generals, or rhetoricians – and they brought with them 
ideas from their experience, be they political ideologies or metaphysical hypotheses. The current 
situation of history as a profession has only solidified in the past few centuries, and even in 
modern times ideas from other background fields, such as literary theory, philosophy, and 
economic theory, have influenced historiography. It is uncontroversial to speak of ‘schools’ of 
history based upon political affiliation or social science theories.204 The 20th century saw a 
plethora of new interpretive paradigms for viewing the past, and expanded the field considerably. 
Models such as Marxist history and Feminist history are theories which are applied to evidence 
of the past and interpreted accordingly.205 A biography is doing much the same thing: an 
explanatory paradigm constructed around an individual, gathering evidence that shows their 
ethical character, actions, and whatever else and interpreting it according to relevance to that 
individual. The product itself is need not be a ‘history’ in the sense the ancients understood it; 
rather, the techniques of historians are implemented in the creation of the product with one 
individual as the locus of thought. Even many modern genres outside the purview of history 
involve historiographical method in some sense. A philosophical monograph may have a 
historical prologue in the first chapters, in which selected historical data is interpreted by the 
philosophy, and then proceed to arguments in the rest of the book. Historiography is not limited 
to strictly generic history, and is open to biographers as well. 
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The standards and diversity of modern historiography aid our contention that the 
biographical model is a historiographical method. Historiographical method consists in 
interpretation and serious thinking about the past. If the composers of biographies are doing this 
kind of interpretation and thinking, it should be considered a historiographical method. Our 
question is to what extent Plutarch did this, which remains to be demonstrated in the next 
chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the bios genre could incorporate historical 
method. Due to the close genealogical relationship between the historical and biographic, there is 
theoretically much work that the biographer can do that would be like history, and using the 
kinds of methods that historians use as well. That the genres of the Greco-Roman world were 
malleable, that historiography and biography share traits of moralism, use of documents to 
research the past, and critical models of interpretation of the evidence, all support a close 
relationship between historiography and biography.  Having shown that it is theoretically 
possible that the sources of Plutarch have a historiographical function and could be interpreted 
according to historical method, the next chapters will examine Plutarch’s usage of Thucydides 
and see whether this is an appropriate description. 
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CHAPTER 2: Plutarch’s Intellectual Influences and Paradigms of Historiography 
 
This chapter will elucidate Plutarch’s intellectual background and perspective on history 
in order to map out what our expectations should be for his use of historiographical method in 
his reading of Thucydides. Plutarch will be placed within his wider cultural and intellectual 
context, illustrating his affinity for interpretive care and what sorts of ideologies influenced his 
writing and theoretical models for the Lives. Since we are arguing that Plutarch is doing 
historiography, it is important to construct his contemporary situation to see what his influences 
would be for interpreting history. His responsibilities in his community affected how he 
approached writing, as well as what he would desire to relay to his audience. After discussing his 
personal background, we will probe into his philosophy, because philosophy is central to 
studying any historical writing, especially for an avowed philosopher as Plutarch was. It will be 
shown that Plutarch gleaned from other philosophical schools, especially from Aristotle, but he 
was a steadfast Platonist. Platonism and Peripatetic thought combined to give him a robust 
interpretive paradigm for the past consisting of Platonic dogmas, critical method, an ethical view 
of history, and respect for traditional authorities. From here, Plutarch’s programmatic statements 
and other comments will be examined to illuminate his purposes and idea of history, and 
therefore the biographical theory he espoused. We will see that Plutarch considered his Lives to 
be historical, and his methods of composition treated his sources as such. This being Plutarch’s 
historiographical theory, we will be prepared to see how this worked out in practice for the 
Pericles and Nicias in the next chapter. 
Plutarch’s Situation and Intellectual Background 
Although Plutarch proudly maintained his permanent residence in Chaeronea, he 
travelled well beyond his hometown, visiting Alexandria, Rome, and elsewhere in Italy and 
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Asia.206 These travels include places where events in the Lives occurred, giving him a basic 
awareness of geography, the quality Polybius valued in a researcher of history. In his youth 
Plutarch studied under the Platonist philosopher Ammonius in Athens. Political missions brought 
him to Rome, and he spent some time in the city giving lectures on philosophy as well. Plutarch 
was an avid reader, as is evident from his frequent quotations from numerous poets, playwrights, 
historians, and philosophers. The Lives alone cite at least 275 authors by name, and there were 
undoubtedly even more authors who were not named to avoid disrupting the flow of his 
narratives.207 This situation gave him deep understanding of the position of Greece under the 
authority of Rome and informed the aims of the Lives. 
His identities as priest, local statesman, and philosopher moulded Plutarch as a writer. He 
was a member of the council of the Amphictyonic League which helped maintain the shrine, and 
was also a priest with financial and ritual duties for at least twenty years at Delphi.208 Some of 
his works such as On the E at Delphi and On the Cessation of Oracles reflect his involvement 
with and devotion to the shrine. Plutarch believed in the gods’ justice and benevolence, and he 
even engaged in theodicy though his essay On the Delay of Divine Vengeance. Piety was 
important to Plutarch, though he sharply distinguished it from superstition, which is criticized 
heavily in several places.209  
His political activity was under the structure of Roman government. Opinions regarding 
the situation under Roman rule can appear positive, in that he recognizes the peace and stability 
Rome had brought to Greece.210 However, Duff notices that he does not place the Romans as the 
cause of peace, nor praises Roman gifts to Delphi in essays related to the site, implying ‘not a 
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passive acceptance of the pax romana but a studied indifference to Roman intrusion.’211 Plutarch 
was a Roman citizen, with Roman friends, and spent time in Rome, leading Hägg to believe he 
was Roman as well as Greek, a man of two cultures.212 This may be an overstatement, however. 
His writings never mention the fact that he was a Roman citizen, which could imply it was not 
particularly important to him.213 Even if he knew Latin better than he let on, as Hägg supposes, 
his background and environment was overwhelmingly Greek. He did not spend very long in 
Rome or incorporate himself deeply into Roman affairs, as Polybius and other Greeks had done. 
We can expect therefore that Plutarch would place a strongly Hellenic perspective on the past 
and current affairs and would not understand deeper aspects of Roman culture. 
Nevertheless, Plutarch’s audience for the Lives included both Greeks and Romans, who 
shared an interest in political affairs and education. Plutarch wrote for a well-educated and 
intelligent readership with the capacity to listen critically and make their own judgments upon 
the actions of the characters.214 Romans were a dynamic component of his audience.215 Plutarch 
dedicates the Lives to Sosius Senecio, a two-term consul and an advisor to emperor Trajan, and 
this likely indicates the two men knew each other, especially in view of Aemilius prologue, 
which itself may imply that he encouraged Plutarch to produce biographies in the first place.216 
Plutarch also wrote for fellow Greeks to contend that although Rome was in control, Greeks 
could still be active in their local polity. Aratas was dedicated to Polycrates, a descendent of 
Aratas himself and was meant to educate his sons.217 Greeks being advised and encouraged into 
political life was one effect Plutarch hoped to achieve through the Lives, and this aim is 
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displayed in his essay, Precepts of Statecraft, which recognized that a Greek statesman’s 
participation in government was as a ‘ruled ruler.’218  
All of this indicates that an interest in political acumen was shared between Plutarch and 
his audience. As opposed to a demagogue or a tyrant, Plutarch saw the good statesman, the 
politicus, as a man of virtue, who works for the moral betterment and peace of the entire 
community; he follows the rule of law, yet is ‘many-sided’ and acts shrewdly in the midst of 
challenging situations according to what is needed.219 Plutarch’s views were informed both by 
the illustrious Greek political history and the pragmatism of living under Roman rule, but 
philosophy influenced his politics much more. Plutarch had read Plato’s treatment of the subject 
in the Republic and Laws, and was deeply affected by the importance of virtue and philosophy in 
government. Dion’s association with Plato is explored in a positive tone in that Life, and Plato’s 
effort to take philosophy to the tyrants is given respect.220 Roskam’s survey of Plutarch’s 
treatment of the public activity of professional philosophers shows he valued their political 
commitment (though sometimes over-imagining their political influence) and accentuates their 
actions more than their theories.221 Plutarch drew from Aristotle’s political thought as well. 
Aristotle was aligned with Plato’s tradition of the philosopher as advisor to the ruler, theorizing 
that the wisdom of philosophy was essential for the true statesman; in other words, as Roskam 
summarizes, ‘in order to be a good politician, one cannot but philosophise.’222 Plutarch’s essay 
That a Philosopher Ought to Converse Especially with Men in Power expresses precisely this 
idea of the close relationship between philosophy and statesmanship. The good political life for 
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Plutarch was also the philosophical life. And, as we will now show, it is Plutarch’s philosophy 
that is most essential to understanding his biographical works.  
Plutarch found himself on the margins of the Second Sophistic, a movement coinciding 
with Roman interest in Greek thought and looking back to Hellenistic philosophy.223 Plutarch 
looked to Hellenistic philosophy as well,224 though he was careful to distinguish ‘philosophers’ 
(the class in which he belonged) from ‘sophists.’ In his essay about listening to lectures, he says 
one must think seriously about the lecture’s content, ‘in order that we may acquire a habit of 
mind that is not sophistic or bent on acquiring mere information, but one that is deeply ingrained 
and philosophic, as we may do if we believe that right listening is the beginning of right 
living.’225 Plutarch distanced himself from the rhetoric of the sophists. He held that rhetoric was 
to be accepted as a tool rather than as an end in itself, that true end being the philosophical 
life.226 
Plutarch has not always received respect as a philosopher over the centuries. Subsequent 
Neoplatonist philosophers knew Plutarch, but they were careful to distinguish ‘Plutarch of 
Chaeronea’ from ‘Plutarch the philosopher,’ another philosopher from Athens who shared his 
name, implying Plutarch was less than a full philosopher in their view.227 Plutarch as a moralist 
was recognized up through the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and nineteenth century 
scholarship gave him attention for source-hunting, but he was not commonly considered for 
philosophical argumentation or innovation of his own.228 However, Plutarch considered himself 
a philosopher, as did his friends and acquaintances, and even if he was not a master on the level 
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of a Plotinus or Posidonius, there is good reason for us to agree with his self-assessment.229 Since 
Russell asserted in 1973 that the work of commenting on Plutarch ‘has in some senses hardly 
begun,’230 there has been a ‘resurgence of Plutarchan scholarship’231 which increasingly 
recognizes Plutarch as a philosopher. Additionally, Dillon says that although ‘by no means a 
great original philosopher,’ Plutarch ‘is an important link in the chain of evidence for the 
development of Middle Platonism’ and ‘not quite devoid of originality in his doctrines.’232 Some 
of Plutarch’s more complex philosophical works have not survived, although every one of his 
works is permeated by philosophy, especially that of a moral nature.233 Scientific and theological 
forays were not ends in themselves within his philosophy; rather, as Russell comments, ‘The 
centre of gravity of Plutarch’s philosophy lay in ethics.’234  
One specific challenge we must consider is locating Plutarch as a specifically Platonist 
philosopher. By his self-understanding, Plutarch was a Platonist, but also was influenced by 
Pythagorean thought, the Peripatetics, and Stoics.235 Like Seneca to Stoicism, Plutarch’s 
extensive reading and wide range of quotations can give the impression of a somewhat looser 
connection to the Platonic school.236 His view of the creation of the world was rejected by later 
Neoplatonists, and was important enough for their rejection of him as an orthodox Platonist.237  
Plutarch took an interest in Pythagorean thought, which shows in his Life of Romulus, as well as 
his discussions of vegetarianism and the traditional Pythagorean ban against eating beans.238 
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Pythagoreanism and Platonic thought had a respectful relationship, therefore this is not 
unusual.239 He was capable of stating positive notions of the Stoics, and probably owes the 
teaching principles of How A Young Man Should Read Poetry to Stoic hermeneutical thought.240 
In agreement with Stoicism, he believed virtue to be paramount and sufficient in itself for 
attaining happiness.241 Additionally, he praises the idea of ‘apathy’ (apatheia) toward 
misfortunes, a major Stoic concept, though he uses the term in a more nuanced sense to be the 
control of emotion rather than its total nonexistence.242 Agreements aside, Plutarch still 
vigorously opposed both the Stoics and Epicureans in such works as Against Colotes, On the 
Self-contradictions of the Stoics, and On Moral Virtue, though many Stoics were considered 
worthy opponents as fellow philosophers, a respect he did not seem to give to Epicureans.243 
Aristotle is named over two hundred times in Plutarch’s writings, and his grasp of key 
Aristotelian concepts reveals a broad, though not deep, knowledge of Aristotle’s works.244 
Plutarch delineated the Peripatetic opposition to Plato’s Ideas and the immortality of the soul, but 
he never formally attacks them and actually incorporated their ideas into his Platonist thought 
(for reasons to be evident below).245 In all of these cases, Plato becomes the standard by which 
all other schools are judged, borrowing from other schools notwithstanding. 
This shows that Opsomer was correct to say that Plutarch’s philosophy was ‘deeply 
Platonic’ and ‘willing to incorporate foreign ideas and techniques only insofar as they agree with 
the fundamental ideas and practices of Platonism.’246 In his dialogue On the Divine Vengeance, 
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Plutarch asserts an end-goal of life typical of Middle Platonists, to pattern oneself after the virtue 
and beauty of God.247 Another mark of Plutarch’s allegiance to Platonism was his effort to 
solidify the Platonic chain of thought in light of its somewhat turbulent history. In the first 
century BCE, the dogmatic line of Antiochus and Eudorus broke away from the skeptical line of 
Arcesilaus and Carneades, and Plutarch sought a rapprochement of the two sides based upon his 
reading of Plato.248 Boys-Stones explains that skepticism in the Academy could be either 
articulated negatively as a method to avoid false beliefs, as Arcesilaus and Carneades seemed to 
stress, or positively as the only way to discover truth, as the later Metrodorus and Philo 
articulated.249  
Plutarch’s philosophical writings suggest a positive form of skepticism.250 His approach 
allowed a serious dialectic of questioning in an attempt to lay bias aside and aim to discover 
actual knowledge, and therefore juxtapose both suspension of judgment and belief in doctrine as 
viable options in philosophical thinking.251 In effect, this turns skepticism into a methodology; 
this is how truth is found.252 Plutarch sought to show continuity within Platonism throughout its 
history, from Socrates to his own day, and thereby revealed his own methodology for 
discovering truth, especially the type of philosophical truth which Plato discovered in his own 
dialectic.253  
Plutarch’s idea of questioning and skepticism to discover truths would influence his 
interpretations of historical facts, determine his choices of inclusion, and inform what message 
he is attempting to extol in his work. His Platonic pattern of critical questioning was very likely 
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to influence his historiographical thinking and methodology. The same can be said for his respect 
for authority (see below), as Plato himself was an authority on all matters, and appeals to 
authority or authoritative tradition were a common feature of Platonic revival of this period.254 
The results from this are profoundly important, because it brings history and philosophy into a 
very close relationship: good philosophy comes from understanding of good historical traditions. 
Pelling has noted that Plutarch uses this philosophical model to read history, and that ‘Platonic 
political philosophy can be a powerful analytic tool, affording a repertoire of, and for, historical 
evaluation.’255 We have seen that Plutarch connected good politics with good philosophy, and 
philosophy’s goal is ethics, which are informed the Divine. A Platonist idea of history appears 
when philosophy meets historical narrative. 
Platonism also informed his ethics. Plutarch founded ethics on his metaphysics, 
especially from his understanding of Plato’s Timaeus, yet ethics were also revealed by deeds, a 
broadly Hellenistic philosophical concept.256 History is composed of individuals doing deeds, 
which inevitably intertwines ethics and history, making biography of individuals who have done 
great deeds a very appealing model for Plutarch’s historical research. Ethics in history have 
already been discussed in Chapter 1, but at present the problem arises of Peripatetic influence, 
since Plutarch’s ethical thinking was framed very much by Aristotle as well. Due to Aristotle’s 
systemization of key areas of philosophy, other philosophers, whether Peripatetic or not, found 
themselves operating from the clarity Aristotle provided, ‘playing Aristotle’s game’ as it were.257 
Plutarch’s relationship with the Peripatetics deserves more scrutiny because the Peripatetic 
biographies are the main precursors to the Parallel Lives. There are two areas of potential 
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Peripatetic influence on Plutarch’s method  – philosophical thinking and biographical writing. 
We will discuss each in turn. 
As previously noted, Plutarch was capable of criticism of Peripatetic views.258 
Nevertheless, he did not write nearly as much against the Peripatetics as he wrote against the 
Stoics and Epicureans, and was overall very positive toward Aristotle. As Karamanolis has 
shown, Plato and Aristotle were seen to be much in agreement by this period, and into late 
antiquity.259 He argues that ‘the majority of Platonists in this era shared the view that Aristotle’s 
philosophy, when understood in the right spirit, is essentially compatible with Plato’s doctrine, as 
they interpreted it.’260 This affinity harkens back even earlier than Plutarch, as the first Platonist 
to approve of Aristotle was Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130-68 BCE), following the closure of the 
skeptical period of the Academy.261 He was familiar with Aristotle’s logical system, and wrote a 
lecture and an eight-book series about it, besides a work against Chrysippus relating to logic, 
though all of these are lost.262 Plutarch found a way to transform Plato’s tripartite division of the 
soul into a bipartite division by subsuming Plato’s two lower parts into the irrational soul, and by 
this pattern of reasoning argued that Aristotle was not far from Plato’s view.263 Due the common 
ground of Plato and Aristotle on the basic rational-irrational division of the soul, Plutarch was 
able to use the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle for his account of virtue, which Karamanolis 
summarizes as ‘an extreme of excellence (akrotes), which however lies in a mean, determined by 
reason, between two opposite emotions.’264 Despite being indebted to Alexandrian Platonism 
                                                          
258 Dillon 1996:186. 
259 See Karamanolis 2006. 
260 Karamanolis 2006:3. 
261 Karamanolis 2006:8. 
262 Karamanolis 2014. 
263 Dillon 1996:195. 
264 Karamanolis 2014. See Plutarch’s On Moral Virtue 443D-444D; Nicomachean Ethics 1107a6-8. 
58 
 
through his teacher Ammonius, Plutarch goes to Aristotle for ethics.265 Aristotle’s language of 
inherited nature, habits, education, virtue, moral character, and the question of the ability of 
nature to change are all part of Plutarch’s language.266 Russell goes so far as to say, ‘Without the 
[Nicomachean] Ethics, there would be no such thing as Plutarchan biography.’267 This is 
significant, in view of how important ethics were to Plutarch’s entire philosophical and 
biographical program.  
The influence of the Peripatetic school on the genre of biography would impact Plutarch 
by extension,  but this influence is debated. Despite the Hellenistic biographies which many 
Peripatetics wrote, Momigliano did not see them as the decisive initiator of biography.268 He 
argued that if biography is not founded upon Aristotelian ethics, then it could not be Peripatetic, 
even if their important contribution is recognized.269 However, Fortenbaugh disagrees with this 
argument, since non-Peripatetics used Aristotelian vocabulary anyway, and even the existence of 
Aristotelian technical vocabulary within Peripatetic biographies would not imply a technical 
meaning, since they were written for a wider audience than fellow philosophers.270 Fortenbaugh 
ultimately agrees with Momigliano on biography’s independence of the Peripatos, however, 
since many features of biography are not limited to Aristotle’s ideas: interest in an individual’s 
training and nature find precedent with Plato and Xenophon as well, and Polybius, who also 
discussed these issues, was not necessarily a Peripatetic.271  
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As far as Plutarch is concerned, he would be influenced by Peripatetic methods of 
biography because he read peripatetic biography. Plutarch made only sparse reference to them, 
and they are not extant, therefore it is difficult to establish the precise degree of their 
influence.272 He read Theophrastus' Callisthenes, which is not extant but seems to have heavily 
focused upon character.273 Phanias of Eresos may be one Peripatetic source for his Themistocles 
and is cited five times, but is barely used at all for the Solon and Aristides, and there may be a 
Peripatetic connection with Demetrius of Phaleron and Duris of Samos, both associates of 
Theophrastus.274  
Direct quotation from the biographies of the Peripatos is limited, but Scardigli has said 
that three compositional principles from them influenced Plutarch: the categorization of 
characters and possible changes to character evident in Theophrastus, the distinction between 
biography and history Plutarch made in Alexander, and the principle of comparison common in 
Peripatetic thought.275 Characterization was a Peripatetic enterprise, but Scardigli’s attribution of 
distinction between biography and history to Peripatetics seems to assume the Peripatetic origin 
of the genre, which, as argued above, is not tenable. Nepos makes this generic differentiation in 
one of his works, but he was a Roman writer with no clear links to Peripatetic philosophy.276 
Plutarch may have actually taken the comparison idea from Nepos, but as Hägg observes, 
‘Plutarch is a comparatist by inclination and habit; he works consistently, both in essays and in 
biographies, with juxtaposition, comparison, and contrast. If he borrowed the idea from Nepos, it 
was because it suited his own analogical thinking.’277 Indeed, comparative patterns are found not 
only in the Lives, but in the Moralia, such as his essays comparing atheism and superstition or 
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fortune and skill.278 While Aristotelian thinking was likely influential in this regard, Plato 
performed serious comparative discussion as well, his exposition of the types of government 
being one famous example.279  
By this account so far then, Plutarch did not benefit from actual Peripatetic biographies 
so much as the ideas behind them. Russell credits two Peripatetic methodological ideas for 
providing the structure necessary for Plutarch’s biography: the systematization of ethics and the 
erudite collection of facts.280 Russell comments that the Peripatetic respect for fact, represented 
from their biological and socio-political research, was possibly even more essential to Plutarchan 
biography.281  
However, the fact-collection does bring up the opposition of antiquarianism to 
historiography. This has already been addressed in Chapter 1, that historians did indeed use old 
documents and inscriptions in their work. What separated historians and antiquarians is the 
matter of interpretation, in that antiquarians are seen as gathering facts, while historians seek an 
understanding of the facts upon collecting them.282 However, which category would be 
appropriate for Plutarch? Payen sees Plutarch as an antiquarian ‘to the extent that in both the 
Lives and Moralia he shows an interest in preserving cultural heritage that comprises political, 
religious, and moral traditions, social customs, and military conduct.’283 However, Plutarch was 
doing much more than this. He was not above studying chronology, as he obviously did so to 
write the Lives, but this was resorted to as a historian would, for a purpose beyond mere fact 
collection – to bring up divergent sources that affect the course of the narrative.284 Plutarch even 
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spoke against one antiquarian strain in his disparaging of the chronographers for their 
contradictions regarding Solon’s meeting with Croesus.285 There are clear literary structures to 
the Lives, narratives rather than lists or mere descriptions, as well as moral instruction. Plutarch's 
explicit opinions on his work show he was not only preserving, but also critically sifting 
evidence to include or exclude from his work, interpreting it according to ethical interests. As 
Scardigli observes, he was not ‘a mere collector of secondary material,’ but rather, committed to 
‘creating a work which was pleasant to read and at the same time instructive.’286 Collingwood 
had argued that scissors-and-paste style of collecting various old texts or facts and simply 
placing them together is not truly history; rather, history requires critical examination and 
inference from the evidence.287 This dissertation argues that Plutarch did not do mere research, 
but historiographically interpreted the record and retold it as narrative. However, our claim is 
problematized by his programmatic statement for Alexander, as well as the challenge stated in 
Chapter 1 as to how historiography can be reconciled with Plutarch’s specific purposes as a 
biographer. 
Plutarch’s Idea of History and Historiographical Method 
Before proceeding, three points from the previous chapter are worth recalling – that the 
genres of history and biography are dependent upon reader expectations, that scope is a major 
delineator between the two genres, and that theoretically there need not be a separation of 
biography from historiographic method and function of source texts. These theses will aide in 
interpreting this passage more clearly. Plutarch begins Alexander with a statement of apology, 
worth quoting in full: 
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[…] the multitude of the deeds to be treated is so great that I shall make no other preface 
than to entreat my readers, in case I do not tell of all the famous actions of these men, nor 
even speak exhaustively at all in each particular case, but in epitome for the most part, 
not to complain. For it is not Histories (ἱστορίας) that I am writing, but Lives (βίους); and in 
the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice, nay, a 
slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes a greater revelation of character than 
battles when thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities. Accordingly, 
just as painters get the likenesses in their portraits from the face and the expression of the 
eyes, wherein the character shows itself, but make very little account of the other parts of 
the body, so I must be permitted to devote myself rather to the signs of the soul in men, 
and by means of these to portray the life of each, leaving to others the description of their 
great contests.288 
 
The Alexander prologue is often referenced to embody Plutarch’s decisive view on 
history and biography, or as a universal statement on Greco-Roman ideas of the genres, but this 
understanding has been challenged to argue that the statement was only for this particular Life. 
Pelling denies this passage unlocks all of ‘Plutarch’s biographical technique.’289 Duff likewise 
cautions that it is not necessarily meant to be a universal statement about the generic distinction 
between history and biography, nor should it even apply to all of Plutarch’s Lives.290 Duff 
concedes that a distinction is made ‘occasionally’ in ancient literature, as in Nepos’ Pelopidas. 
However, in light of how few biographies have survived, it may be important to take such 
surviving statements seriously, because Plutarch repeated the same idea as that of Nepos from 
two centuries before, which may suggest other, now lost, precedents in ancient literature as well, 
or a common generic expectation for biography.291 Although it may not be the key to 
understanding all of the Parallel Lives, this prologue must relate to the other Lives to some 
extent. For instance, Plutarch was definitely interested in seeking ‘small things’ like phrases or 
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jests in other Lives when he could.292 Nevertheless, the basic contention that the Alexander 
statement did not apply equally to all of Plutarch’s work seems correct. It is relevant to other 
Lives, but an over-abundance of material for Alexander-Caesar was not the situation for the 
other Lives, and it is the nature of the material that made this statement necessary, as will be seen 
below. 
Essentially, Plutarch is submitting both a positive and negative idea here. Stated 
positively, he is writing a ‘Life’, a βίος. Chapter 1 already established the development of the 
word and genre it represents, but it deserves brief attention here. The meaning of the term, as 
recalled from above, is ‘a way of life’, which all the more fits the episodes of everyday life that 
Plutarch sought to include. Duff argues that the word here has a double reference, both to the fact 
that these are biographies and also to an application for the lives of his audience.293 The portrait 
painter example serves to explain what it means to write Lives. Just as he shapes the life of the 
hero, he is also shaping the lives of his readers toward moral betterment.294 Plutarch elsewhere 
compares the historian, particularly Thucydides, to a painter in giving vivid representation of the 
events and the emotions of the characters.295 Further, if a painter is permitted to concentrate on 
some features and not others, his selective ‘practice of looking for signs of the soul’ is 
vindicated.296 He must search for, and include, details that reflect character; even if they are 
relatively insignificant to larger-scale history, they are valuable to the individual’s character. 
Even so, Plutarch implied that he is tied to his sources because he is committed ‘to penetrate to 
what reveals the soul of my subject, and through this reveal the life of each.’297Information about 
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the ‘soul’ of the subject was to be found in historical records, information about them that 
already exists and requires scrutiny. 
The negative idea on the other hand has to do with limitation and exclusion. He says it is 
not history. But history (ἱστορία) has a fairly wide range of meaning. What kind of history is it 
not? Duff notes that the term could be used generally for narratives of any type, but suggests that 
here ἱστορία signifies ‘large-scale’ history.298 Scardigli, noting Valgiglio’s study of the 
fluctuation of the word’s meaning, sees Plutarch as broadly exemplifying ‘a historian of ancient 
culture’ rather than practitioner of pragmatic history.299 Plutarch could easily be considered a 
historian of ancient culture by the function his writings serve for historians today, though it may 
be an anachronistic depiction rather than an accurate representation of how Plutarch saw himself. 
The separation from pragmatic history makes good sense here, however: he is not writing on the 
scale of a Ephorus, or Thucydides. Further, Plutarch's idea of including small things in Alexander 
and Caesar is the opposite of Lucian’s advice in How to Write History – that small matters 
should be gone over quickly but more time ought to be spent on larger, more consequential 
matters.300 Such histories help readers seeking broader perspective, but Plutarch was a 
philosopher writing for the education of the reader about political individuals, their character 
traits and deeds. 
Duff reads Plutarch as separating Alexander-Caesar in ‘subject-matter’ and ‘purpose’ 
from broader histories, that the character must be understood from a moral standpoint rather than 
the great actions typical of historiography.301 However, there are two problems with this. First, 
Plutarch was keenly aware of Xenophon’s historical writings and the pragmatic history of 
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Polybius, which also seek understanding from moral standpoints, as shown in the previous 
chapter. Moral focus is not the delineator between large-scale history and individualized 
biography, neither does Plutarch actually state that ethics is what divides history and biography. 
He merely says that great deeds do ‘not always’ (οὔτε … πάντως) manifest virtue or vice. 
Second, great deeds can and do show virtue, as is clear from the many significant actions of 
Alexander and Caesar that Plutarch does include. The great and small things are, as Pelling 
observes, a ‘polarity’ which Plutarch introduces to set the stage for a diverse range of 
connections within the pair.302 
Having established character as a boundary-marker, anything not deemed relevant to this 
focus is permitted to be excluded. Plutarch has given himself the authority to make interpretive 
and inclusive decisions regarding historical evidence. Alexander, one of the most famous Greek 
leaders, would already be very familiar to Plutarch’s audience, thus many of his omissions would 
likely have been noticed. Some Lives suffered from a dearth of information; this was not the case 
with Alexander. For this reason, Hägg asserts that this contrast was not made to distinguish 
between history and biography as genres, but a simple ‘excuse for summarizing or omitting 
historically important facts in the cases of Alexander and Caesar.’303 It was necessary that he 
make a statement like this to evade criticism and establish from the start what the expectation for 
the work should be. Pelling notes that the phrase μὴ συκοφαντεῖν which is translated ‘not to 
complain’ or ‘not to regard this as a fault,’ actually carries a further connotation of disingenuous 
criticism or ‘quibbling’, thus the statement serves to take away ground from any unsympathetic 
critic.304 
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Further, Plutarch would have to make a generic statement of his limited scope for the Life 
because Alexander in particular complicated historiography.305 History before Alexander was not 
so focused upon single individuals as on corporate groups or many great individuals competing 
against each other. Even Xenophon is not central in the Anabasis, and the Persian emperor in 
Herodotus’ Histories is countered by a range of individuals such as Themistocles or Leonidas. 
Alexander on the other hand dominated this period in the historical record, as hinted at in the 
titles of his historians, such as the Anabasis of Alexander by Arrian, or the History of Alexander 
by Cleitarchus. Alexander’s accomplishment was so immense from a Greek point of view306 that 
any large-scale account of the period would place him as the central historical figure, and would 
be lengthy compared to the conventional span of Lives. Thus, Plutarch needed to make a generic 
clarification for his reader’s sake, to limit the scope of the work to Alexander himself. 
Additionally, Duff points out that Plutarch is engaging in a ‘recusatio,’ a literary form that 
legitimizes a work as unique from others, and serves to further honour Alexander by saying there 
are so many great things that were accomplished that there is no space to recount them all.307 As 
Baldwin states, ‘It was simply that his current subjects were too vast to admit every detail 
important in the context of grand figures of Alexander and Caesar.’308  
It seems therefore that this limitative statement serves a generic, pragmatic, and narrative 
function, but it does not deny that Plutarch is utilizing historiographical method. He is excluding 
his work from universal, exhaustive histories and focusing upon the character of a historical 
individual by searching through evidence. Further light is shed on Plutarch’s Lives and history in 
other programmatic statements that mention this word.  
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In Aemilius Paulus 1.1, Plutarch makes a parallel of bios and historia, rather than the 
contrast found in Alexander. Plutarch writes, ‘I began the writing of my ‘Lives’ (τῶν βίων) for 
the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the work and delighting in it now for my own 
sake also, using history (τῇ ἱστορίᾳ) as a mirror and endeavoring in a manner to fashion and 
adorn my life (τὸν βίον) in conformity with the virtues therein depicted.’309  This first sentence 
uses the two terms as equivalent. He goes on to say that he ‘welcomes each subject of my history 
as a guest’ and by his observation of them can select what was the most important and ‘beautiful’ 
(κάλλιστα) to know. Hägg comments regarding this passage, that history ‘is no opposite to 
biography, but rather the substance that makes up the Lives.’310 The process described in the 
Aemilius prologue is historiographical and philosophical.311 Plutarch is writing about the way of 
life of individuals in history, and by a sort of interaction with them through his studies, both 
improves his own life and finds what is worthy of inclusion within the written product for the 
improvement of his reader’s lives. The picture of the mirror is frequently used elsewhere in 
Plutarch’s works and Greek literature to illustrate anything that symbolizes what is good in 
reality.312  Mirrors can also represent the bad, and here it likely challenges to readers to take their 
own initiative in assessing admirable or worthless examples.313 The ‘mirror’ is equated with the 
lives of the men which are mediated through his historical sources, and also with the finished 
Life that is available to the readers.  
The rapprochement of the past and present, text and life, was Plutarch’s attempt to show 
the value of his writing, and reveals an assertion of his historiographical method, besides an 
invitation to anyone in his audience to frame their own lives upon the lives of these virtuous 
                                                          
309 Aemilius Paullus 1.1.  
310 Hägg 2012:272. 
311 Aemilius Paullus 1.1-5. 
312 Duff 1999:33. 
313 See Zadorojnyi 2010:169-195. 
68 
 
heroes.314 Duff notes that Plutarch on some occasions, as in this one, refers to his work as 
history, in the double sense of both the enquiry into the past and the events of the past.315 
Another case of Plutarch stating his work as history seems to be Theseus. Plutarch writes that his 
history, or research, on Lycurgus and Numa had brought him near to the times of Theseus and 
Romulus, and by purifying myth he hoped to take on a ‘semblence of history’ (ἱστορίας ὄψιν), 
adding that not everything included will be plausible, requiring the patience of his audience for 
old stories.316 There is a further implication here that his other Lives are history, by virtue of his 
statement of the unique situation of this pair. In other words, this pair will have to merely seem 
like history, unlike the other Lives which, by inference, are history. Therefore, it is evident that 
Plutarch considered his works to be historical, and in some sense, history, though it is the history 
of one person’s life rather than sweeping multi-book narratives on the level of the pragmatic 
historians. A Life is the history of one person. 
However, Plutarch’s narrative style has some affinity to tragedy, which brings up the 
question of whether Plutarch engaged in rhetorical ‘tragic history.’ For instance, tragic technique 
is borrowed for the narrative of Crassus at Carrhae, and used to give a portrayal of the character 
of Crassus.317 However, there are various points where Plutarch seems to avoid tragic effects. He 
may add academic parenthesis or a moralizing speech at an odd point in the narrative. For 
example, in the climactic event of announcement of liberty for the Greeks, he follows it with an 
excursus on the possibility of the ravens falling out of the sky from the loud cheering.318 He also 
liked to avoid tragic endings, trying to include some positive or moralist statement at the death of 
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the hero.319 Plutarch speaks dismissively of tragedy in some of his works as frivolous and 
unreal,320 voices his dislike of so-called ‘tragic history’ that tries to affect the reader’s emotions 
with fictionalized accounts, and strongly criticizes those he believes to be tragic historians.321 
Plutarch saw the past as filled with great models for imitation, but strongly opposes any 
interpretation of the past where their true worth is minimized.322  Plutarch criticizes Herodotus 
for suppressing the truth about Greek greatness by neglecting to mention their acts of bravery 
and making barbarians seem greater than Greeks.323 Recent scholarship has questioned the 
category of tragic historians itself, making it an unhelpful distinction to place upon Plutarch.324 
Our findings so far are consistent with the theoretical framework set up in Chapter 1, that 
the author’s parameters and reader expectations frame the genre of individual works. Plutarch’s 
Lives are not universal histories, but biographies with historical content, as we see from 
Plutarch’s sense of historia as enquiry and narration of the past. This means they are liable both 
to historiographical method and to a philosophy of history.  
Plutarch’s method is multifaceted and will be further revealed in examining Pericles and 
Nicias below, but there are three aspects of his stated methods worth noting at this point. First, 
Plutarch portrays his Lives as enquiring into historical facts. He explicitly makes his apology in 
Life of Theseus because dealing with more mythical evidence that may not have happened is an 
exception to the rule.325 Even so, he dismisses some accounts of Romulus’ birth as ‘utterly 
mythical’ and approves of opposing accounts supported by Fabius Pictor and Diocles as they are 
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more reliable.326 He also notes the problem of contradictory historians in Lycurgus, as well as 
stating his effort to choose ‘authors who are least contradicted, or who have the most notable 
witnesses (μάρτυρας) for what they have written about the man.’327 Records of events with a 
higher likelihood of occurrence seem to be his goal. 
Near the end of his fairly lengthy introduction to Cimon-Lucullus Plutarch states a serious 
concern for historical truth. Plutarch tells the story how the Orchomenians gave a bad report on 
the city of Chaeronea on the murder of some Roman soldiers, and Lucullus wrote testimony 
telling the truth that the city was not  to blame, delivering them all from punishment. He 
continues that since they still owe Lucullus for his truthful testimony (remembering that Plutarch 
was Chaeronean himself), he will narrate the character and disposition of his life truly, and 
states, ‘as a return for his truthful testimony (ἀληθοῦς δὲ μαρτυρίας) he himself surely would not 
deign to accept a false (ψευδῆ) and garbled narrative of his career.’328 Plutarch compares truthful 
court testimony with his own research and biographic account, and the implication that he owes 
him the existence of his beloved hometown makes the comparison all the more powerful. It is 
not surprising that Lucullus’ deliverance of Chaeronea would be included by Plutarch, but it 
could have been taken to stress the necessity to recount his virtue or how appropriate it would be 
for himself as Chaeronean to write about him, or other directions besides articulating a solemn 
need to relate truthful facts. Any study of the past meant discovering the truth, and he faults any 
historian who failed to do this, especially if falsified deliberately (his polemic against Herodotus 
being a notable example).329 
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The second aspect of his method is the focus upon the individual, the components of 
character in his historical interpretations. We have already seen that Plutarch combined ethics 
and history, and that the defining aspect of the Lives is the focus upon a single character in turn. 
However, what is involved in character, and what makes individual character important in 
history? Plutarch saw character (ethos) as based on nature (physis), in that a person’s nature can 
be educated so as to inform their character either towards virtue or vice.330 The education of an 
individual begins in childhood, but childhood can also reveal prior nature. In Dinner of the Seven 
Wise Men, Plutarch presents Thales to comment on the strange nature (φυσει) of Alexidemus, 
and proceeds to tell a story from Alexidemus’ youth to demonstrate.331 These principles allow 
childhood stories into the Lives as part of history, since while the episodes may be relatively 
insignificant, they reveal more about that individual.332  
Plutarch’s major aim in writing about his selected heroes is to show examples of virtue, 
those who have done fine things, and have done these things by reasoned choice (proairesis).333 
Humans make morally responsible choices to do an action when it is done freely and rationally, 
as opposed to being forced or stemming from fits of passion.334 Plutarch saw the human soul as 
‘essentially non-rational and yet receptive of reason that stems from the intellect,’ and used this 
division of the soul to explain human agency, as an interaction between these two parts.335 When 
this rational part of the soul interacts with emotion in a positive way, virtue (arete) is produced, 
but when emotions gain power over reason, it yields vice.336 Plutarch could use his Platonic 
psychology concerning parts of the soul to heighten understanding and exemplarity of historical 
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figures.337 Plutarch’s idea of human character was also influenced from Nicomachean Ethics, 
where, as Harris explains, ‘in defining moral virtue Aristotle began with natural impulses present 
in all men, which by means of repeated actions (πραξις) develop into a fixed moral disposition 
(ἕξις.) Hence the stress in all Peripatetic biography on actions as the key to character; historical 
study from this angle was an integral part of the young politician's training.’338 
Aristotle and later Peripatetic tradition with which Plutarch was familiar recognized static 
character types, such as presented in Theophrastus’ work Characters. Other Peripatetics created 
portraits of character in a similar way: Lycon wrote about drunkards, and Philodemus includes a 
series of character-sketches in a work, On Relief from Arrogance, though we are not sure of their 
original form.339 Character types will be important for his interpretations of history, as our 
analysis of Nicias will show. Gill has articulated a difference between ancient concepts of 
‘character’ which show more fixed conceptions of moral nature and ‘personality’ which 
identifies more special or unique traits of an individual, yet sees Plutarch as going along with the 
former conception.340 However, even character types present a problem for historical research. 
Different sources may describe the actions of the individual yet not fit together to give a 
completely consistent picture of character. Plutarch may answer such incongruities in two ways. 
The issue may lie with a biased or inaccurate source, which Plutarch is often willing to point 
out.341 Plutarch may also surmise that the person’s character actually changed.  
Plutarch recognized that changes in character were possible, and dealt with this problem 
in his research. Character change could be from bad to good, or good to bad. Anyone changing 
from good to bad is a problem for Plutarch, stemming from his Platonic sensibilities. On 
                                                          
337 Pelling 2011:344-46 examines Plutarch’s analysis of the ‘spirited’ Coriolanus from this perspective. 
338 Harris 1970:186. 
339 Diggle 2004:9-10. 
340 Gill 1983:469-487. See also Gill 1990:1-31. 
341 Lycurgus 28, Cato Minor 52.4-5. 
73 
 
Sertorius’ poor treatment of hostages near the end of his life, Plutarch wonders if he concealed a 
cruel nature under a mild façade for political expediency, because he could ‘not think that any 
external accident could ever make virtue, when it is pure and in accordance with reason, move to 
its opposite.’342 The good young Philip V turning into a sensual and cruel tyrant is explained 
thus: ‘this was not really a change in nature, but a disclosure, when he was no longer afraid, of a 
badness that for a long time had not been acknowledged through fear.’343 Moving from bad to 
good is easier, and fit well within Plutarch’s intellectual framework, having written an essay on 
progress in virtue.344 Pelling has pointed out that Plutarch did have the capacity to recognize the 
uniqueness of an individual and move toward the ‘personality’ side of Gill’s spectrum.345 It is 
outside our purposes here to discuss which of these Plutarch identified with the most, but it will 
be discussed at points relative to his historical research in the next chapters. In any case, the 
individual becomes the locus of interpretation. This is what makes Plutarch a biographer, but it 
can also be seen as a type of historiographical method, except parameterized into the narrow 
focus of a single hero in his context. 
A third aspect of his method is his idea that history reveals truths about the world that 
educate the reader. History is didactic, mostly in the sense of studying the character and actions 
of historical individuals and to gain insight from the process and learn moral facts. On Making 
Progress in Virtue goes so far as to treat history (and poetry) as complementary to philosophy in 
educating one's character. History should be searched to find what is valuable in informing one’s 
own character and to check emotions.346 Since he says this as a philosopher, this shows a high 
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regard for the value of history in informing how to live the good life.347 Plutarch sees history as 
teaching philosophical facts, and this is evident in the Lives, such as his presentation of 
Coriolanus’s life to illustrate his philosophy of anger.348 History can also teach political facts, an 
especially important function in light of Plutarch’s hopes to encourage statesmen. For instance, 
Plutarch has a simple model of political realities, such as the ‘aristocracy versus people’ tension 
that emerges throughout the Lives.349 Pelling has shown that this moralist interest influences his 
historical explanation, leading him to see episodes as having a timeless, imminent quality rather 
than a one-off event.350 Plutarch believed history follows sets of principles, a view also found in 
other ancient historians.351 Studying the past for Plutarch is very much the same thing as 
studying characters, except that a piece dedicated to one individual has a more narrowed focus 
than the wider story.  
These insights into his historiographical method bring us to a basic understanding of 
Plutarch’s idea of history. It is to be truthful, didactic, and based on the actions of great men. His 
idea of history is further elucidated in his general attitude toward history. Plutarch was a 
traditionalist. He maintained a strong respect for the past, as seen in his historical statements and 
even in his philosophy. His philosophy was settled in Plato and Aristotle, the old philosophical 
traditions, while opposing the relatively newer traditions of the Epicureans and Stoics.352 Further, 
his respectful disagreement with the Stoics and complete rejection of the Epicureans is 
interesting in light of the Stoics being more similar to Platonism and Aristotelianism than the 
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Epicureans, who repudiated all philosophy before Epicurus.353 All of this reflects Plutarch’s 
traditionalism, and we may expect him to relate to his sources accordingly, and with a great deal 
of care. His essay On the Glory of Athens presents an idea of his love for the Greek past. His 
respect for the virtue of the Roman past is demonstrated in the very project of writing parallel 
Lives, and his accolades for Roman figures is not restricted. However, his affinity towards the 
concept of Greek liberty also implies admiration of the days when Greece was free, however 
much he may have appreciated the Romans.354 Duff writes, ‘For Plutarch, the past provides a 
protected space, shielded from the unpleasant realities of Greek political weakness, a space 
where Roman history might be appropriated into a Greek world-view and Greek culture 
championed freely.’355 The greatness of classical Greece was not meaningless now that it served 
Rome, however, because Plutarch’s high view of the past also meant that the past has things to 
teach those living in the present. The past is composed of individual characters doing deeds, and 
it is those great individuals doing fine actions that have something in particular to teach, and 
their character is worthy of study. The Lives came out of this philosophy of history.  
Having laid out Plutarch’s method and idea of history, was he successful? As has been 
mentioned previously, Plutarch has gained some respect from many scholars for his historical 
acumen. Badian argues that ‘Plutarch, when he set his mind to it, could be a critical historian 
superior to many of the professedly historical writers.’356 In his study of several cases in 
Plutarch's Alexander, he shows that Plutarch was aware that many of the stories he shared were 
dubious and would tag some of them with some marker to indicate this, such as 'it is said' (using 
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some form of lego or esti logos) or dokei.357 Plutarch either follows a consensus of authors or 
weighs a trustworthy author such as Aristobulus as a criterion for inclusion of material, and even 
‘expresses disbelief or doubt regarding anecdotes or sources he quotes introduced to enliven the 
narrative.’358 Furthermore, Plutarch's omission of what other authors claimed belays critical 
reasons for exclusion.359 Pelling has likewise argued for Plutarch’s concern for truth, and even 
the use of inscriptions and comic poets as sources shows his nearness to modern 
historiography.360 Plutarch had the capacity to be careful and detailed. He organized his Sayings 
of Kings and Commanders in careful chronological order, displaying ‘a conscientious effort to 
present his subject matter as exhaustively as possible’ as Payen comments.361  
Pelling and Wardman note shifts in Plutarch’s methodology depending on the sources he 
had available, which implies Plutarch’s faithfulness to the integrity of the historical record. 
Wardman, already noting Plutarch’s restricting mechanism to display ‘small’ points of character 
in Alexander—Caesar, also observes that the dependence on single historians who already 
covered the important points, such as Thucydides for Nicias and Xenophon for Artaxerxes, 
forced Plutarch to ‘amplify and produce variants.’362 In Artaxerxes, he included a more 
unbelievable account by Ctesias on the death of Cyrus, though he shows his suspicion of the 
story by making fun of Ctesias.363 Pelling observes that for several of his Lives, there are 
pronounced gaps in his sources, yet Plutarch deliberately avoids fabricating material to close the 
gaps, leaving some of the Lives ‘veritable string vests, more hole than substance,’ as in the cases 
                                                          
357 Badian 2003:28-29. 
358 Badian 2003:32-33. 
359 Badian 2003:34-43. 
360 Pelling 2011:147-128. 
361 Payen 2014:238. 
362 Wardman 1974:159. 
363 Wardman 1974:158. 
77 
 
of Phocion, Aristides, and Crassus.364 In Nicias he attempted to bring in other evidence besides 
Thucydides, such as an epigram from Euripides to show the bravery of Nicias and his men, 
though it was a struggle to scratch this meager evidence together.365 In cases where there were no 
childhood stories, as was the case for many of the characters, he allows the absences to remain in 
his work, avoiding any place for fiction.366 While Plutarch’s efforts may not always be the most 
effective by our standards, this shows a level of dedication to his sources.  
However, there are problems found in Plutarch’s historical efforts as well. Badian quoted 
above noted Plutarch’s critical historiography ‘when he set his mind to it’ and Pelling ‘when he 
wants to be’ as there are other instances where his critical guard seems to lower.367 Bosworth's 
study into the parallel biographies of Eumenes and Sertorius argues that Plutarch bended the 
facts to create more parallels between the men, leaving him skeptical of Plutarch, as he writes: 
The general conclusions to be drawn are somewhat dispiriting for the historian. Plutarch's 
preoccupations, as one would expect, are moral and artistic. What he is looking for is a 
neat, consistent interpretation of character that makes for satisfying comparison and 
contrast with the parallel Life.  Material is selected as it proves appropriate for the model 
and important episodes are discarded without scruple if they have no obvious illustrative 
value. Oversimplification is the norm. […] In isolation Plutarch is dangerously 
misleading. It is not merely that he is writing biography, not history. He is writing 
parallel biographies, and there is an additional element of distortion. The material is not 
merely subsumed to a view of character: the view itself is artificial, determined by the 
need for similarity and contrast.368 
 
De Romilly also sees distortions in Plutarch’s use of Thucydides, which will be heavily 
discussed in the next chapter.369 As noted above, Plutarch’s ideology was indeed comparatist in 
general, but this does not necessarily equate to distortion of history, even if comparison is 
susceptible to distortion. Rather ethical comparison is one set of questions that could, in theory, 
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be historiographical. Comparison and contrast did involve critical thinking on Plutarch’s part.  
Some comparisons would have been obvious, as the case of Alexander-Caesar, which includes 
that Caesar read about the life of Alexander and took inspiration from him.370  At other times the 
comparison is not immediately apparent – he may choose one individual first, then think of 
someone from the other nation who is comparable, as he did for Lucullus and Cimon.371 It is also 
not surprising that Plutarch, like any ancient author, would use and perhaps misuse rhetoric. As 
Bowen states, it was ‘the staple of ancient education’ but adds conversely that Plutarch was also 
among the ‘Platonists who mistrusted rhetoric.’372 However, the relaxing of his method is still a 
concern, and these criticisms bring up many interesting questions. Is omission, rhetorical 
strategy, and moral agenda paramount to historical distortion, or are they actually one historical 
perspective informed by Plutarch’s philosophy? Was Plutarch interested in what really happened, 
as he says? Did he let his critical method lapse or take historiographical care only when it suited 
him?  
These questions are important, because in explaining the methods or thought of any 
ancient author, there should be an attempt to understand it as simply and consistently as possible. 
Viewing Plutarch’s Lives as literary and ideologically motivated distortions of history runs 
against what we have seen of Plutarch’s concern for getting the past right. There should be some 
attempt at least to explain the author consistently. Wright notes this principle in stating, ‘Any 
hypothesis which can display an overall consistency of thought, provided that the data are 
retained and enhanced, and provided that there is at least the promise of coherence with wider 
fields of study, will always be preferable to one which leaves the writer as a scatty individual, 
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chopping and changing his mind at every turn.’373 The next chapter will be an attempt to do this, 
and include passages where Plutarch may initially seem to not have exercised historiographical 
care, and posit solutions toward his consistency. Recalling Fischer’s understanding of a historian, 
one who asks questions about the past and answers them with facts interpreted in the form of an 
explanatory paradigm,374 we must give special attention to his problematic usages of Thucydides, 
and the way in which a Plutarchan historiographical method could explain them. Having 
constructed Plutarch’s intellectual background, the stage is now set to analyse Plutarch’s use of 
Thucydides as a source in for his biographies of Pericles and Nicias, what was preserved and 
what was changed, and how his interpretive reasoning relates to his model of writing.  
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CHAPTER 3: Thucydides in Plutarch’s Life of Pericles  
Our study of Pericles and Nicias will focus on general ideas pulled from Thucydides, and 
specific passages from Thucydides which Plutarch worked from, and show how historiographical 
thinking and interpretation can account for his authorial choices. In comparing Plutarch’s use of 
Thucydides in these cases, we will attempt to answer two sides of this question. First, what does 
Plutarch share with Thucydides, or in what ways does his account agree with that of Thucydides 
as a historical source?  The second question will look more carefully at the text, and especially 
examine the divergences. Are the changes made arbitrarily, or can these be logical choices, 
choices that could be explained by historical reasoning? Historical reasoning will be defined here 
more simply as using a worldview to determine what happened in the past. For a biographer, this 
surrounds the character, deeds, and words of a single person within their historical context. 
‘Historical reasoning’ then for Plutarch has to do with his philosophy – ethics, political 
paradigms, his respect for the classical authorities, his critical skepticism informed by Platonism, 
and religious belief.  
For Pericles, we will embark on a study through the whole book looking for gleanings 
from Thucydides, mainly depending on Helmbold and O’Neil’s collections of Plutarch’s 
quotations from Thucydides.375 After a discussion on Plutarch and Thucydides, we will argue 
that they share the same essential picture of the historical Pericles, and that Plutarch sought to 
collect a wide variety of sources together to come to the same conclusion as Thucydides on 
Pericles’ character.  
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Plutarch and Thucydides  
Thucydides does not provide as much material for Pericles as for Nicias, but Plutarch 
used a wide variety of other authors to construct the Life. Besides inscriptions, he mentions 
twenty other authors by name, including philosophers, historians, and comic poets.376 For 
chapters 3-21 of this Life, he appears not to have had a main core source before him, but by 
chapter 22 he is able to use Thucydides as his base text, using it for the overall narrative structure 
of the rest of the work.377 Pelling has argued that the manual method of writing history for the 
ancients was to have one main source scroll in front of the writer for any given section, with 
supplements added in the process obtained from memory of previous research, or from another 
supplementary notebook.378 Stadter questions whether Plutarch had the text of Thucydides before 
him, as Plutarch already knew Thucydides well and the error about the eclipse suggests he was 
working from memory.379  
The eclipse will be addressed below, but there is good reason to think that Plutarch had 
Thucydides in front of him. First, with the general ancient concern to be distinctive from 
predecessors, Plutarch may have needed to directly reference Thucydides to ensure that he did 
not copy him, and as we will see below, there are many points where Plutarch seems to 
deliberately attempt to use synonyms and slightly different language from the same passage in 
Thucydides. Second, Thucydides’ History as a whole was a dense text and not easy even for 
Hellenistic writers to understand, as the studies from Dionysius of Halicarnassus show.380 This is 
not the sort of text that would be easy to remember details from, and our study will observe 
minute details that Plutarch included. This chapter will assume therefore that Plutarch had 
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Thucydides in front of him, though the arguments regarding Plutarch’s historical reasoning will 
remain viable even if not. 
Before proceeding, however, a note is necessary on Plutarch’s relationship with 
Thucydides’ work. Thucydides was loathe to give biographical details, though he did give them 
whenever it was part of the larger story or when he discussed individuals of the previous 
generation because no one had done so.381 This brings a challenge to Plutarch’s task because he 
is trying to extract certain information from a text which does not precisely share the same 
interests and questions that he does. If Plutarch was using historiographical method, he would 
have to read between the lines and make inferences based upon the information he is given, 
passed through his philosophy of ethics, character, politics, and events. 
Plutarch did hold Thucydides in high regard, as is evident from many positive statements 
concerning his work.382 In his Malice of Herodotus, he frequently upholds Thucydides as an 
exemplification of a good witness with his fairer treatment of controversial people like Kleon, 
Nicias, and Hyperbolus.383 In Themistocles, Plutarch cites Thucydides as an authority against a 
claim by Stesimbrotus,384 and later on presents the conflicting reports of historians on whether 
Themistocles had audience with Xerxes or his son Artaxerxes, in which Plutarch takes the 
Artaxerxes position by reason of the value of Thucydides according with the ‘chronological 
data.’385 As mentioned above, Plutarch had a high regard for tradition, and it seems Thucydides 
was allowed into Plutarch’s circle of authorities. Furthermore, the political theory found in 
Thucydides has some affinity to Plato, and would resonate with the Platonist Plutarch as well.386 
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Therefore, we have good reason to think Plutarch considers Thucydides fairly reliable on what 
happened and would be inclined to take Thucydides at his word. 
Solving conflicting sources from Thucydides: Pericles’ character development 
Stadter posits three aims of Plutarch for the Pericles: ‘to demonstrate through a 
presentation of his actions that Pericles in fact possessed and exercised the virtues of praotes and 
dikaiosyne, to refute those who hold the contrary opinion, and to lead the reader to make a 
decision to put these virtues into practice in his own life.’387 These goals all revolve around the 
person of Pericles. Accordingly, Plutarch gleaned aspects of the sources pertinent to Pericles’ 
character, straining out what is less relevant to this one determining question. For this reason, an 
obvious place to begin in discussing Plutarch’s use of Thucydides concerns what representations 
of Pericles are shared. To what extent did Plutarch replicate the picture of character found in 
Thucydides, and beyond this, what did he infer from his evidence? It is clear from a cursory 
reading of the Life that Plutarch considered Pericles a good statesman, but how does Thucydides’ 
text relate to his assessment? 
Pericles is characterized by alternating vignettes between Pericles’ character and the 
broader context in which he operated. This broader context was provided by Thucydides. It 
begins with a lengthy and eloquent introduction that includes themes common throughout the 
Lives.388 Plutarch told an anecdote of Caesar jesting at the expense of those who spend their 
natural human affections on animals rather than on fellow human beings, thereby introducing the 
concept of wasting senses on unworthy objects, and the necessity to spend the human nature’s 
desire to learn and know on worthy objects, namely, virtuous deeds.389 He then proceeds to give 
a description of Pericles’ family and appearance, and his relationship with sophists and 
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philosophers such as Anaxagoras and Zeno the Eleatic.390 This is to be expected from Plutarch, 
as Plato’s political writings held that the state should be ruled by philosophy, and this is reflected 
in Plutarch’s frequent collapsing of philosophy and statesmanship together (outlined in Chapter 
2). Plutarch could not imagine a good statesman who was not near to philosophy. Plutarch 
especially highlighted his relationship with Anaxagoras, that Pericles admired him and learned 
philosophy, which influenced him to be solemn, reserved, scientific rather than superstitious, and 
stirred in him an eagerness to gain a reputation for himself.391 From here there is an account of 
how Pericles reluctantly began his political career, and the habits and rhetorical skill he 
developed to gain the respect and awe of the people.392 For these specifics Plutarch so far relies 
on other sources besides Thucydides.393 
The first mention of the historian Thucydides occurs in chapter 9, when Plutarch raises 
the crucial problem his sources present to him – the character of the politically active Pericles. 
He directly quotes Thucydides 2.65.9, which says Athens was a democracy in name but really a 
government by the rule of its first citizen. This same passage from Thucydides also states that 
Pericles led the people rather than him being led by them, and he did not hold power from wrong 
motives or flattery. A dilemma presents itself: Thucydides’ assertions in 2.65 are that Pericles 
controlled the people well, but Plato represents Pericles as overindulging them.394 Both sources 
are highly respected – Thucydides one of the best historians, and the ‘divine Plato’ who stands at 
the head of his entire philosophy. Here Plutarch’s critical ability conflicts with his sympathy with 
the authorities and Pericles on an unavoidable character question in history. His ingenious 
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solution is to posit what de Romilly terms a ‘psychological evolution,’395 stating that he will 
examine the cause of this change in him (διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἡ αἰτία τῆς μεταβολῆς).396 
Pericles’ character will be subject to historical development and causation. From here until 
chapter 15 his focus is how Pericles moved from being a flattering demagogue to the strong 
statesman Thucydides described. 
Plutarch proceeds to wade through non-Thucydidean material in order to obtain the 
picture of Pericles’ character that Thucydides provided. An important political model for 
Plutarch was the tension between the demos and the aristocracy,397 and he evidently saw this at 
work in Athens. Knowing that others of the aristocracy were wealthy and already firmly 
established, Pericles threw himself in with the people and opposed the famous leader of the 
aristocrats, the much-loved Cimon, and procured his ostracism. This was no small feat, but as 
Plutarch explains, so great ‘was the power of Pericles among the people.’398 Pericles’ political 
prowess is shown not only in Cimon’s ostracism, but also in his compatriots preventing the 
banished Cimon from participating in a battle against the Spartans, and initiating the recall of 
Cimon when he gauged that the people wanted him back.399 At this point, Pericles is already 
recognized by the Athenian aristocrats as the greatest citizen (ἤδη τὸν Περικλέα καὶ πρόσθεν 
ὁρῶντες γεγονότα τῶν πολιτῶν), but they attempt another effort to blunt his power in supporting 
of Thucydides of Alopece against him.400 Plutarch explicitly constructs this as a battle between 
the many and the few, and explains this is how Pericles became a pleaser of the people. He had 
to maintain his power base, with the added benefit of increasing Athenian power by building new 
settlements and giving the people something to occupy and enrich themselves. He also focuses 
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on the public works as initiated by Pericles amid criticism from his opponents, yet eventually he 
succeeded in winning an ostracism vote against Thucydides of Alopece.401 Plutarch recognizes 
further negative opinions and accusations against Pericles in the record, but protests that the 
passage of time makes it difficult to find the truth of the matter by research.402 In any case, with 
Pericles’ triumph over his last organized opposition, he held complete sway over Athens and 
everything under its control, from tribute funds to dynastic alliances, yet ‘he was no longer the 
same man as before’ and did not spoil the people as previously.403 Nevertheless, by the end of 
this section Plutarch is able to present the conclusion of Pericles as transcending the demos-
aristocrat power differential and becoming the leader of Athens.  
The final picture of Pericles agrees with Thucydides’ overall assessment of Pericles, even 
beyond the single sentence from 2.65.9. Thucydides speaks at length about Pericles in that same 
section, asserting that Pericles could manage the people well. The people respected him for his 
superiority to bribes, his distinction, and ability, and their respect was high enough for them to 
accept chastisement from him, and listen to him when he encouraged their confidence. 
Thucydides also argued that Pericles was simply right by how later events turned out – both on 
his war strategy and on the strength of Athens. The former is argued from the early success of 
this tactic, plague notwithstanding, and how leaving the Periclean strategy cost Athens in the 
war. Thucydides took the post-Pericles Athenian failures to show the latter, that Athens survived 
for years using the wrong tactics against overwhelming enemy forces because of their residual 
strength.  
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Plutarch voices his agreement with Thucydides, showing how Thucydides’ record 
explicitly, and the comic poets’ satires implicitly, show the power of Pericles.404 Plutarch 
likewise painted a positive picture of Pericles’ tactic for defeating Sparta in chapters 33-34 (more 
on this  below). Plutarch does not dwell upon Pericles’ correct assessment of the strength of 
Athens as Thucydides did, but he indicates that Athens was strong under Pericles’ leadership. 
Plutarch’s concern was Pericles’ solitary importance to the city’s success rather than the 
Peloponnesian War after Pericles here, thus leaving this out could be seen as an expected 
decision for a biography.405  Plutarch agreed with Thucydides on his reputation and refusal of 
bribes, but de Romilly observes that Plutarch left out the word judgment (gnome) from 
Thucydides, instead going ‘his own way, in other directions.’406 This is a key term for 
Thucydides, signifying one of the most important qualities of a statesman, therefore it may seem 
odd for it to be left out.407 However, Plutarch does use the term to describe Pericles later on in 
chapter 33, which will be examined below. But if any ancient writer was to maintain the 
distinctiveness of their work, the use of a source historiographically would not require the 
repetition of its technical terms.  
Plutarch conveys the same ‘good judgment’ idea as Thucydides through his own 
vocabulary, giving equivalent ideas in chapter 15, except in a more picturesque fashion. He 
elaborates Pericles’ aristocratic and kingly statesmanship (ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν 
ἐντεινάμενος πολιτείαν), and that he taught, or instructed the people (διδάσκων τὸν δῆμον).408 
Duff notes that the reference to aristocratic leadership harkens back to both Plato and Aristotle in 
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describing the rule of the best men, regardless of the precise form of government.409 Pericles, 
being a both a philosopher and a statesman according to Plutarch’s understanding, is inevitably a 
teacher, and it is the philosopher Anaxagoras who inspired Pericles most to an urge for 
distinction (τὸ ἀξίωμα) in the first place earlier in chapter 4. Pericles is presented as knowing the 
correct action to take at the right time with the people, and cared for them either gently or 
strongly like a wise physician (ἀτεχνῶς ἰατρὸν).410 That Pericles had keen abilities and good 
judgment is evident then from this passage, even if he does not replicate the technical term from 
Thucydides. Thus de Romilly’s ‘other directions’ within Plutarch’s picture is still consistent with 
Thucydides’ view. 
De Romilly sees a contrast in the specific meaning between Thucydides 1.65 and 
Plutarch here, in that Thucydides was doing abstract political analysis; therefore, ‘democracy in 
name, but in fact the rule of the first citizen’ is a statement about politics for Thucydides, yet a 
statement about Pericles for Plutarch.411 Thucydides and Plutarch were indeed at cross-purposes 
for an atomized meaning for this sentence, but it cannot be said that Thucydides was 
disinterested in the person of Pericles, nor that Plutarch was disinterested in the historical 
background. In the end, Thucydides has made a statement about Pericles, an individual. 
Similarly, the above analysis indicates that Plutarch presented an account of words and deeds 
beyond a singular internal ‘psychological evolution,’ and gave an attempt at a historical view of 
the development both of Pericles’ character in his station as statesman, and the city of Athens – 
the state under Pericles’ influence. Pericles’ psychology has a context; Plutarch has 
parameterized one part of the meaning of Thucydides’ words and expanded them into further 
historical reasoning on Pericles’ personality and role in this context. It is evident from them both 
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that Pericles did not simply command Athens – a tyrant may do the same – but rather there is a 
depiction of Pericles as a good and wise statesman, who was not without opposition, albeit 
opposition he could control. We can say therefore that Plutarch shared the same basic picture of 
Pericles as Thucydides did, putting weight upon Thucydides’ assessment of both the wisdom and 
political power of Pericles. 
However, was Plutarch’s developmental solution to divergent sources an example of 
historiography? Our analysis of Plutarch’s decision implies the answer is yes. He was writing on 
past events regarding Pericles in such a way as to make the best use of other sources, yet be true 
to Thucydides. In view of the conflicting sources, de Romilly approves of the developmental 
option as ‘in itself admissible and well presented.’412 However, she also writes it was ‘a means of 
doing away with contrary judgments.’413 Our argument would agree in one sense: if Plutarch was 
eliminating contrary judgments, it was to find the historical Pericles while taking all of the 
evidence seriously rather than an uncritical dismissal of evidence. He was able to pull together 
his sources into a coherent narrative, solving contradictions in the record and making reasoned 
guesses based upon his knowledge of politics, philosophy, and history. This is the kind of 
activity that historians do, and indeed seems to be an example of historiography.  
Before proceeding, it should be noted that one objection to our argument is that Plutarch 
seems to overlook the evidence from Thucydides and elsewhere that Pericles faced continued 
opposition during the war. Plutarch’s evolutionary narrative in chapters 9-15 depends in large 
part upon Pericles defeating his opposition to become the statesman of first citizen rule. 
Thucydides noted opposition to Pericles at the start of the war, as well as the criticism he 
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received and eventual removal from position by the Athenians.414  Kleon in particular may have 
been opposed to him during the war.415 However, in the place where Thucydides mentions the 
opposition, immediately before the conflict when speeches were made on whether or not to 
declare war on the Peloponnese, not one of his opponents is named, nor were their speeches 
recorded; only Pericles is named, and only Pericles is given a lengthy speech.416 Westlake 
suggests that his silence could be taken to mean that ‘opposition to Pericles was at this time 
almost negligible.’417 Though he adds that it does not necessarily mean this, Pericles’ authority is 
a plausible inference from this passage, a position Gomme also took.418 Plutarch’s inference then 
was the kind of inference a historian could make. Further, the radical nature of Pericles’ tactic to 
withdraw into the city and fight only by sea, plus the length of time it took before Athens finally 
demoted him, make Plutarch’s interpretation reasonable, especially in view of the re-
appointment of Pericles after his demotion and fine that Thucydides records in the same breath 
as his demotion.419 Plutarch saw the opposition as present, but with little weight, and needed to 
bide time until disasters occurred that were great enough to allow them to punish Pericles.420 
By chapter 15 then, the narrative is where Plutarch wanted it to be, with Pericles the 
powerful first citizen of Athens near the start of the war with the Peloponnesians, the sources for 
which come more frequently from Thucydides. In what follows, we will examine more specific 
quotations of Thucydides following from the Helmbold and O’Neil collection of Plutarch’s 
quotations as much as possible, and see how Plutarch’s handling of them can be explained by 
historical reasoning within his ideological paradigm. We will be assuming that Plutarch had the 
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scroll of Thucydides in front of him from this point until chapter 34, as stated previously, and 
this will also enter into our understanding of Plutarch’s method of using Thucydides.  
Chapter 19 and 21 quotations: moving down the scroll of Thucydides   
Chapter 19 of Pericles carries a narrative of his action in the Peloponnese from Pergae, 
events also covered by Thucydides in 1.111. Thucydides recorded that Pericles was commander 
of the expedition with one thousand Athenians, sailed along to Sicyon and won a land battle, and 
immediately afterward with the Achaeans attacked Oeniadae, a town of Acarnians, besieging but 
not taking it, then returning home afterwards. Plutarch’s account is far more detailed and written 
in a more positive tone than that of Thucydides, priming his introduction to the story with the 
admiration Pericles received among foreigners for the feat. Plutarch still carries the same 
concepts as Thucydides, however, while using his own language. Where Thucydides says 
‘sailing across’ (διαπλεύσαντες πέραν) to Oeniade, Plutarch states ‘proceeding to the opposite 
land’ (τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον ἐκομίσθη). There are repetitions of Thucydides as well, such as 
their ‘return home’: the ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾿ οἴκου from Thucydides is ἀπῆρεν ἐπ᾿ οἴκου in Plutarch. 
Positive tone notwithstanding, Plutarch’s basic outline is the same as that in Thucydides 
and repeats much the same idea using altered phrasing or synonyms, but there are two 
noteworthy exceptions. First, rather than citing the one thousand men as Thucydides recorded, 
Plutarch said ‘one hundred triremes.’ He may have obtained the trireme number from another 
source, though admittedly this is problematic because Diodorus, who may very well share the 
same positive source as Plutarch, said fifty ships sailed.421 Alternatively, this could be Plutarch’s 
estimate of the number of ships that would have sailed on the expedition, based upon the 
thousand fighting men. The Decree of Themistocles inscription, which allegedly lists the normal 
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crew of a trireme, prescribes ten hoplites per trireme.422 Elsewhere Thucydides numbered one 
thousand hoplites and one hundred ships regarding another expedition.423 If a ten-hoplite 
contingent was a normal number for a trireme, Plutarch could have made the estimate of triremes 
that way. The second divergence is the handling of fighting at Oeniade. Thucydides said they 
attacked and besiege Oeniade, but ‘failed to take it’ (οὐ μέντοι εἷλόν γε). Plutarch’s text gives no 
indication that Pericles attempted to take the city. Rather, he ‘shut the people of Oeniade into the 
walls’ (κατέκλεισεν Οἰνιάδας εἰς τὸ τεῖχος) making the mere fact that they had to flee inside the 
fortifications a Periclean success. Plutarch did not deny there was a siege or that it failed, but he 
focused on the bright side of the fact.  
As mentioned above, the additional non-Thucydidean details Plutarch includes are 
positive in nature. Stadter notices that Plutarch’s affirmative take is similar to that of Diodorus, 
so he is not alone in this assessment of the successful nature of the campaign, even if he 
expresses it more strongly than Diodorus.424 Plutarch and Diodorus both agree that Acarnania 
was taken except for Oeniade, and that it was a famous action which others heard about, though 
while Diodorus talks of leadership without naming anyone, Plutarch attributed the fame to 
Pericles. This would be an obvious inference, because Pericles was the general. However, that 
both Plutarch and Diodorus thought the expedition went well indicates that Ephorus, another 
source for Plutarch about Pericles which is no longer extant,425 also had more positive details. 
But even if we believe that Plutarch’s added details were not actually in Ephorus, they could also 
be explained by historical understanding. Plutarch has Pericles setting up a trophy after the battle 
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with the Sicyonians.426 Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus record this, but Plutarch’s logical 
inference from the victory could have been this way: setting up a trophy is normal after a  
victorious battle, therefore Pericles must have done so. 
Plutarch continues the story of Pericles on his expeditions in Sinope, then discusses 
Pericles’ strength in restraining the impulses of the citizens to press their fortune to take Egypt, 
Sicily, Tuscany, or Carthage, and how Pericles directed them to focus on maintaining what they 
already had and keeping Sparta in check.427 Here, the next section of Thucydides found value as 
a source for Plutarch, on the subject of the Sacred War. 
The structure of them is very similar, and worth repeating here. 
Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ 
κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς· καὶ αὖθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι 
ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν. 
 
After this the Spartans engaged in the campaign known as the sacred war. They took over 
the temple at Delphia and give it  back to the Delphians. As soon as they had retired, the 
Athenians marched out, took the temple again, and gave it back to the Phocians.428  
 
And Plutarch: 
ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι στρατεύσαντες εἰς Δελφοὺς Φωκέων ἐχόντων τὸ ἱερὸν Δελφοῖς 
ἀπέδωκαν, εὐθὺς ἐκείνων ἀπαλλαγέντων ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπιστρατεύσας πάλιν εἰσήγαγε τοὺς 
Φωκέας. 
 
The Lacedaemonians made an expedition to Delphi while the Phocians had possession of 
the sanctuary there, and restored it to the Delphians; but no sooner had the 
Lacedaemonians departed than Pericles made a counter expedition and reinstated the 
Phocians.429 
 
Plutarch has quoted from Thucydides, though he added extra details to help clarify the situation 
of the Phocian occupation of Delphi. The differences in wording are stylistic, but Plutarch’s 
important shift was to ‘Pericles’ being named as the respondent rather than the ‘Athenians.’ 
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Stadter thinks it ‘unlikely that another source was more precise’ and posits this is a change on 
Plutarch’s part.430 This reassignment of subject would make sense to Plutarch historically. If 
Pericles really controlled Athens as first citizen, than the decisions of Athens would also be the 
decisions of Pericles, and Pericles would be at the forefront of any such important action. 
Plutarch told this specific story of the Sacred War to demonstrate the foreign policy, power, and 
wisdom of Pericles. If the assembly decided on an action, by Plutarch’s picture, it would have 
been the will of Pericles as well, who would not allow the people to veer away from any of his 
own plans for their best interests. While the change serves the practical literary purpose of 
glorying Pericles, it also reveals his idea of the historical situation and its causes. 
Plutarch continues from chapters 22-28 in anecdotes of Pericles and Aspasia and the war 
with the Samians, which is also covered in some way by Thucydides,431 but the narrative is 
supplemented by a mix of other sources such as Ephorus and comedies. Following Helmbold and 
O’Neil, we will proceed over to the next quotations in 29, which discusses the start of the 
Peloponnesian War and Pericles’ role within it. 
Chapter 29 analysis: Explaining the start of the Peloponnesian War  
Thucydides has a causation narrative in which Potidaea was under blockade by Athens,432 
and this was the final reason for Corinth to complain directly to Sparta.433 Corinth told other 
allies to send delegates to complain as well. Aegina secretly played a major part in encouraging 
the Spartans to war, though they were too afraid to send an open delegation, and finally Megara 
also sent diplomats with serious grievances due to their exclusion from the agora of Athens and 
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all the ports under Athenian dominion, contrary to the treaty (σπονδάς). After narrating the naval 
action involving Corcyra, Plutarch summarizes Thucydides’ narrative here in the following way: 
The Corinthians were incensed at this procedure, [of helping Corcyra] and denounced the 
Athenians at Sparta, and were joined by the Megarians, who brought their complaint that 
from every market-place and from all the harbours over which the Athenians had control, 
they were excluded and driven away, contrary to the common law and the formal oaths of 
the Greeks; the Aeginetans also, deeming themselves wronged and outraged, kept up a 
secret wailing in the ears of the Lacedaemonians, since they had not the courage to 
accuse the Athenians openly. At this juncture Potidaea, too, a city that was subject to 
Athens, although a colony of Corinth, revolted, and the siege laid to her hastened on the 
war all the more.434 
 
Plutarch agrees with Thucydides 1.67 that the Corinthians were upset and denounced Athens at 
Sparta, joined by Megarians, who complained of their exclusion from ports under Athenian 
control, with the Aeginetans secretly (κρύφα) working as well. However, it reveals three 
significant differences. First, Plutarch collapsed the narrative and shifted the causation chain – 
immediately before the Corinthian delegation, he told the story of Pericles sending ships to 
Corcyra, and it is at this that the Corinthians are incensed. Second, there are several shifts on 
Corinth’s allies: the Megarians are mentioned second after Corinth, a reversal of Thucydides’ 
order, and Thucydides’ neutral statement of Aegina’s fear of Athens (δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους) 
turns to lacking courage (οὐ θαρροῦντες), along with mere statement (λέγοντες) of grievances 
upgraded to the added imagery of ‘crying’ (ἐποτνιῶντο) to the Spartans. Third, Plutarch does not 
ignore the Potidaean siege, but appends it to the end of the episode rather than the beginning as 
in the History.  
These differences reveal historiographical thinking on Plutarch’s part. He seemed to have 
held the Corcyran issue to be the main causal factor in sending the delegation. This is a 
reasonable conclusion from elsewhere in Thucydides, where Athenian alliance with Corcyra had 
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left Corinth angry and seeking a way to retaliate against Athens.435 A key issue in the Corcyra 
situation was their navy – several places in the History it is stated that Corcyra had a strong navy, 
comparable to only two other navies among the Greeks – Athens and Corinth.436 With a conflict 
with the Peloponnesians on the horizon at this point in the narrative, Plutarch might have seen 
the prospect of Corcyra and its navy going to one side or the other to be more important than 
Potidaea’s revolt. He knew that the Sybota battle as Thucydides tells it involved hundreds of 
ships, making it the largest naval battle fought between two Greek states up to that time.437 
Athenian involvement in Corcyra was completely contingent on the navy – their ten ships 
observing the battle were not to interfere unless Corinth pressed on and attempted to make a 
landing on their shores.438 Plutarch elsewhere praises the concept of a strong navy, as he does in 
his Themistocles, giving Themistocles credit for building the Athenian navy that saved Greece 
and including motifs in common with Thucydides on the value of naval power for Athens against 
the infantry of other Greek states.439 Sea power was certainly important for Pericles as well, due 
to the design of Pericles to place the burden of victory upon the Athenian navy and refuse hoplite 
battles with the Spartans. This follows from what he says later, in agreement with Thucydides, 
that Pericles’ strategy to refuse infantry battles and focus on naval warfare was the wise tactic.440 
Plutarch did mention as an apparent afterthought the Potidaean situation in a nod to Thucydides, 
adding that it ‘hastened on the war all the more,’ yet he has reduced its causal power. 
The description of the other allies has a significant interpretive factor. In the section 
immediately after this one, Plutarch puts forth considerable discussion on the Megarian decree, 
and the reversal of order with the Aeginetans shows his priority on this decree in causing the 
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war.441 Thucydides’ line runs as follows: ‘The Megarians, who presented a great many other 
grievances, and chiefly this, that they were excluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian 
dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty.’442 (Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ 
ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς 
Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς.). Stadter observes that Plutarch doubles and parallels the 
complaint: πάσης μὲν ἀγορᾶς, πάντων δὲ λιμένων, ὧν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσιν, εἴργεσθαι καὶ 
ἀπελαύνεσθαι παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια .443 The doubling of universalized adjectives, along with 
parallel terms of exclusion and abnormality intensifies this complaint, and serves a 
historiographical aim. Plutarch’s emphasis introduces the urgency of the Megarians’ situation on 
which he is about to elaborate in relation to Pericles’ role in starting the war. Aegina had been 
forced into the Delian League with Athens about twenty-five years previously,444 therefore any 
open opposition to Athens would be dangerous.  Plutarch may be positing a more negative 
perspective on their activity, with the juxtaposed ideas of wailing (ἐποτνιῶντο) and having no 
courage. Stadter notices that Plutarch mostly uses the term πότνια, denoting cry of ‘horror, 
indignation, or entreaty,’ to describe an action of women.445 Courage (θαρροῦντες) was used 
positively for facing death and combat elsewhere, so the lack of this courage was undesirable.446  
Plutarch’s concentration has been from 1.67 in the History, but from here Thucydides 
includes speeches of the Corinthians, Athenians, King Archidamus, then the Pentecontaetia 
excursus before proceeding to another Spartan congress that actually voted the for the war. These 
are irrelevant to the Pericles. By 1.126 the embassies moving between Athens and Sparta are 
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important, though Thucydides has an irrelevant excursus on the origins of the ‘curses’ and stories 
of Pausanias and Themistocles. Plutarch seems to have moved ahead with his scroll to 1.139, 
where Thucydides finally wrapped up his other explanations and continues his narrative of the 
build-up to the war. In this chapter, Thucydides includes several diplomatic missions: first the 
Spartan demand to drive out the curse of the goddess and the Athenian counter-demand, then 
another set of Spartan demands that Athens stop the siege of Potidaea, free Aegina, and revoke 
the Megarian decree. Finally, there is a third mission from Sparta with the ultimatum to free the 
Hellenes, at which point an assembly was called and Pericles stands to give a speech that they 
not submit the Spartan demands. 
This Thucydidean chapter serves as Plutarch’s basis for the next paragraph in chapter 29, 
which discusses the Megarian decree. Plutarch generalized the three embassies of Thucydides 
into Athens, stating that since the Spartan King Archidamus wanted to avoid the war through 
these embassies to satisfy his allies, the only other reason for going to war was the Megarian 
decree. The wording of Plutarch (οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ συμπεσεῖν ὑπό γε τῶν ἄλλων αἰτιῶν ὁ πόλεμος 
τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, εἰ τὸ ψήφισμα καθελεῖν τὸ Μεγαρικὸν ἐπείσθησαν καὶ διαλλαγῆναι πρὸς αὐτούς) 
is  similar to Thucydides ( καὶ μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων 
ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον). Stadter writes that Plutarch ‘ignores the statement 
of Thucydides (1.126.1) that they had already decided on war but considered that the embassies 
would establish a better justification for the decision.’447 It might be argued that Plutarch was 
simply following what Thucydides actually said at this juncture in 1.139, and there was no 
attempt to harmonize Thucydides’ previous divergent statements. However, this would still seem 
misleading, as Plutarch implied that the war was still avoidable at this point, and that the 
embassies were sent because there was still a possibility of peace, with no other explanation 
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given. Did Plutarch forget about the Peloponnesian vote for war in 1.126? If not, why is it 
ignored? 
Thinking through the ways Plutarch was using the scroll of Thucydides and Plutarch’s 
broader historical understanding helps answer this problem. As Plutarch moved the scroll from 
1.67 to 1.139, he would have come across the initial debate at Sparta, where four speeches are 
given about the grievances against Athens. King Archidamus gives one of these speeches, and 
suggests to not rush to war, but attempt to divert it by sending an embassy about Potidaea and 
other grievances while preparing for war just in case.448 Nevertheless, the ephors put it to a vote 
and war is decided upon.449  
Coming across that passage, Plutarch may have thought that Archidamus had power at 
that time, as king, to influence against the assembly’s declaration. In Cleomenes there is a 
passage detailing that the kings of Sparta were given more power by the lawgiver Lycurgus, and 
ephors were only given more power much later due to the stresses of the Messenian War; 
furthermore, in the post-Peloponnesian War period, the ephors were unjustly usurping power 
from the kings by banishment, putting them to death without trial, or forcing them to do their 
will by fear.450 Plutarch was aware that these abuses of the ephors occurred in the aftermath of 
Sparta’s success in the Peloponnesian War, when Sparta had become corrupted by ‘luxury and 
greed,’ so that a few became powerful and rich and most became poor.451 Plutarch may therefore 
have been combining his knowledge of King Archidamus’ reluctance for war and his idea 
concerning the king’s strong authority in the pre-Peloponnesian War period (before money and 
greed came to Sparta) to say that peace was still possible. Even if the ephors and Spartan 
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assembly saw their diplomacy to be searching for pretexts, the plan of Archidamus could have 
been the opposite, to prevent these pretexts from coming to fruition. Though the Spartan 
assembly voted for war, the war did not start immediately, as Thucydides states himself,452 and 
since they were looking for further excuse for war, Plutarch could have interpreted this vote as 
inadequate for actual action, so that they were essentially following Archidamus’ advice anyway. 
Thucydides himself explicitly pointed to the Megarian decree as the main point of contention, so 
that the war could still be avoided at this point if the Athenians would revoke it.453 Another 
source that could have suggested this understanding to Plutarch was his later anecdote454 about 
the Spartan envoy’s clever suggestion that the decree be turned around, which, if true, means that 
‘some Spartans at least were still doing their best to avoid war,’ as Gomme comments.455 
Archidamus having a counter-scheme would also fit well with Plutarch’s idea of great men 
driving history, theorizing that a wise, capable king of Sparta as Archidamus would try to do 
what was best for his people.456 
The last sentence of this chapter draws the causes for the war together to show why 
people blamed Pericles.457 We have seen that Plutarch had ample reasons, drawing from some 
places in Thucydides at least, for considering that the war was avoidable up to this point. 
Combining these ideas together – King Archidamus’ desire to avoid war, Sparta still needing a 
further pretext for war, Sparta’s allies being angry about the decree – means that if Athens 
revoked the Megarian decree, the war would not occur. Pericles was instrumental in Athenian 
stubbornness, and was therefore held responsible for the war. If Thucydides said the Megarian 
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decree was the main point of contention, and Pericles, the leading, most powerful man in 
Athens,458 was instrumental in keeping it a point of contention, then he would be held 
responsible for the outbreak of the war. 
The Pericles narrative continues in 30 to 32, drawing from other sources, discussing 
Pericles and the Spartan embassies, especially on the Megarian decree, as well dutifully 
reporting accusations that Pericles was fomenting war to distract the pressure that him and his 
associates were facing at this time from litigation. The next important employment of 
Thucydides, however, is in chapter 33. 
Chapter 33: Sparta against Pericles and Pericles’ control of Athens 
For chapters 33 to 35 Thucydides made up the core source for Plutarch, with the 
exception of two or three minor places where another source was used.459 Plutarch moved back 
in the scroll from 1.139 to 1.126, and picked up again at the Spartan embassies, saying that they 
ordered them to drive out the ‘Cylonian curse’ (ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τὸ Κυλώνειον) 
in order to instigate the Athenians to depose Pericles and find them more flexible. The phrase of 
Thucydides is that they ‘ordered them to drive out the curse of the goddess’ ἐκέλευον τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ. Plutarch’s replacement of ‘goddess’ with ‘Cylon’ allows 
him to collapse the story of the curse into one word.460  
A significant note on Plutarch’s use of this chapter is the change in the chain of 
causation. He omitted mention of the first part of 1.126 that the embassies were sent to find a 
pretext for war. Reasons for omission have been discussed above, but it is important to note here 
that Plutarch focused on the agency of Pericles – it is Pericles’ upholding of Athenian power, 
whether for good reasons or bad, that controls the entire situation. An important theme in this 
                                                          
458 Thucydides reiterates this in 1.139. 
459 Stadter 1989:305. 
460 Cylon was the man who seized the acropolis and whose suppliant followers were killed. 
102 
 
biography is Pericles’ grasp of affairs and success over his opponents – despite what the 
Lacedaemonians and his Athenian opponents schemed, Pericles was able to out-manoeuvre 
them. If Sparta desired a pretext for war, it may seem like Pericles is playing into their hands by 
refusing it, which would not fit Plutarch’s understanding of the situation. On the other hand, if 
Sparta wished to avoid war by making Athens submit, Pericles’ refusal forces Sparta into the 
war. Plutarch was making interpretive decisions from the evidence based upon the historical 
pattern of a character’s consistent overturning of his opponents’ will.461 
By placing the pollution story at this point in the narrative, Plutarch has deviated from the 
chronological order in which Thucydides lists the embassies, both in his narrative order from 
1.126 to 1.146, and also from his summary in 1.139, which Plutarch had just used earlier for 
chapter 29. Pelling has noted Plutarch’s general freedom in maneuvering the order of things 
throughout the Lives, or what he calls ‘displacement.’462 Chapters 29-33 are not precise 
chronological lines, but an effort to explain the start of the war in the logic of a single block.463 
As seen above, Plutarch probably regarded the Megarian decree as the key issue in the 
start of the war, and in introducing the build-up to the war, this was deemed more appropriate to 
include first. A further argument for this was Thucydides’ own statement that the demand was 
not serious, but only a political move against Pericles.464 Placing the curse here serves another 
important  function in explaining how Pericles regained popularity in the face of the internal 
attacks against him. The city depends upon Pericles when it is in danger, which allowed Pericles 
to capitalize on the tensions with Sparta – a point which Plutarch records, though he was not sure 
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that this record is true.465 Thucydides provided another explanation which allows Plutarch to 
show Pericles’ support without resorting to dependence on the warmongering explanation:466 
The Spartan attempts against Pericles backfired, giving him ‘even greater confidence and honour 
among the citizens than before, because they saw that their enemies hated and feared him above 
all other men.’467 The hostility that other sources record is now reconciled with Thucydides’ 
picture of his power over the people.  
Plutarch finishes the sentence with explicit citation of Thucydides (1.127.1) (Περικλέα 
τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα ) explaining that the curse was connected to 
Pericles’ family on his mother’s side (τὸ μητρόθεν γένος τοῦ Περικλέους ἔνοχον ἦν). We see that 
he changed vocabulary and clausal structure to make it his own. The first part of this sentence is 
also from 1.127.1, where Thucydides said the Lacedaemonians thought that if Pericles were 
exiled, they would receive concessions from Athens. Thucydides added, however, that they did 
not actually expect Athens to exile Pericles, but hoped to make him unpopular and blame the war 
on him.  
Plutarch holds out the possibility that Pericles be deposed (καταλυθέντος ), but leaves out 
that Sparta expected to hurt his reputation rather than actually have him exiled. Plutarch could 
mean this term for ‘depose’ in a broad sense of Pericles losing the position he had, though not 
necessarily exiled. The word is used for the dissolution of the oligarchy at Samos, which 
overthrew its power yet apparently did not exile everyone in the oligarchy.468 Stadter observes 
that this word is used more of political structures tumbling than the fall of individuals,469 
                                                          
465 Per. 32.3. 
466 Thuc. 1.126. 
467 Per. 33.1. 
468 Per. 25.2. 
469 Cf. Per. 3.1. 
104 
 
although it is used of the exile of Thucydides of Alopece in chapter 6.470 The tactic to generate 
blame against Pericles for the war and thereby reduce his popularity, exile or not, worked in the 
long run when the Athenians eventually fined and removed him from office after the plague.471 
On the other hand, in light of Pericles’ eventual chastisement, plus the hostile, anti-Pericles 
forces present in his other sources, Plutarch could have had καταλυθέντος to mean actual exile, 
believing the exile tactic more plausible than Thucydides let on. Pericles’ friends were under 
litigation and many kinds of accusations were being thrown against him, implying he was by no 
means invincible. Either way, Plutarch appears to give an implicit nod to Thucydides in that the 
demand to remove the curse was a popularity challenge anyway, as his statement of the 
backfiring of the plan is constructed in terms of the Spartan hopes of ‘suspicion and slander’ 
towards Pericles when actually it increased his honour.  
However, this statement of an increase in the popularity of Pericles from the Cylonian 
curse demand is not found in the History. Stadter says that while there is no such statement from 
Thucydides, there is a statement of the peoples’ trust in Pericles in 1.145, suggesting that 
Plutarch ‘draws his own conclusion’ from this.472 This would be consistent with what has been 
argued above – if the sources critical of Pericles were correct, then the opposition Pericles was 
facing must have turned around at the start of the war, especially in light of the fact that 
Athenians from rural environs pulled into the city in a break from tradition, following ‘the advice 
he gave them and brought in from the country their wives and children and all their household 
goods, taking down even the wood-work on the houses themselves.’473 Plutarch made an 
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inference on how the people must have taken the challenge, based upon a synthesis of critical 
sources and the Thucydidean picture of an authoritative Pericles. 
Plutarch’s next sentence is sourced in Thucydides 2.13, and preserves its causation 
structure. Thucydides states that Archidamus was gathering the Peloponnesians on the isthmus, 
and Pericles suspected Archidamus might spare his fields out of their guest-friendship, or to 
encourage accusations against him from the Athenians. Therefore, Pericles spoke to the assembly 
stating that in spite of his friendship with Archidamus, he would not allow any harm to come to 
the city, and if his fields were not ravaged as the others were, he would discharge them to the 
people so that no one would raise suspicions against him. Plutarch summarized the long sentence 
about marching to the isthmus to a cleaner ‘before Archidamus invaded Attica with the 
Peloponnesians.’ (πρὶν ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἔχοντα τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ).  
Plutarch skips Thucydides’ description of Pericles’ mental realization, avoiding the 
repetition, and goes straight to Pericles’ proclamation in the assembly. Plutarch writes that 
Pericles made a ‘proclamation’ (προεῖπε) to the Athenians rather than a ‘speech’ (προηγόρευε ) 
as the History says. Plutarch has taken this word that Thucydides used for the Spartan 
proclamation (προεῖπον) of the curse earlier in the sentence to impute action to Pericles. This 
helps confirm that Plutarch had Thucydides’ text in front of him as he said the same idea in his 
own words. When paraphrasing one sentence of a text, a word may be taken from elsewhere on 
the same page of the work and embedded in the paraphrase. By saying ‘proclamation,’ Plutarch 
was also able to omit Thucydides’ ‘in the assembly’ as this verb implies a public statement to the 
assembly anyway. 
[…] ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μέν οἱ ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δὲ 
ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, 
ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι, καὶ μηδεμίαν οἱ ὑποψίαν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.  
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[…] that he had relations of hospitality with Archidamus but this was not to be a source 
of harm to the city: if the enemy did not ravage his land and houses as they did those of 
others, he would give them up to be public property, and no suspicion should attach to 
him in connection with this.474 
 
[…] ἂν ἄρα τἆλλα δῃῶν ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος ἀπέχηται τῶν ἐκείνου διὰ τὴν ξενίαν τὴν οὖσαν 
αὐτοῖς, ἢ διαβολῆς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐνδιδοὺς ἀφορμάς, ὅτι τῇ πόλει καὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς 
ἐπαύλεις ἐπιδίδωσιν 
[…] that in case Archidamus, while ravaging everything else, should spare his estates, 
either out of regard for the friendly tie that existed between them, or with an eye to 
affording his enemies grounds for slander, he would make over to the city his lands and 
the homesteads thereon.475 
 
Plutarch changed clausal and word order as we have come to expect, but shared some necessary 
points of vocabulary. Thucydides’ ‘suspicion’ (ὑποψίαν)  turns into ‘slander’ (διαβολῆς). 
Plutarch uses the word for suspicion elsewhere in conjunction with an accusation, as he does in 
Pyrrhus, where Pyrrhus holds the Sicilians in suspicion, and one of them is accused of betrayal 
and executed, and another flees beforehand, presumably to avoid the same fate.476 Plutarch 
presumed that Pericles’ opponents were ready to pounce on any opportunity, and given the 
foregoing account in chapter 32 of accusations of bribery, called διαβολάς there by Plutarch, this 
presumption is not unreasonable. Plutarch had also stated his agreement with Thucydides 
elsewhere,477 that Pericles was disinterested and superior to bribery, doing everything for the 
glory of Athens, so these would be empty accusations.478  
Another observation we can make on this text is the flexing of perspective on the enemy. 
Thucydides stated the possibility that Archidamus and the enemy (πολέμιοι) might not harm his 
land; Plutarch individualized the enemy by making Archidamus the subject, and the abstract 
category of an ‘enemy’ shifts over to Pericles’ political enemies. Plutarch’s word for it is 
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different (ἐχθροῖς), but the tension of opposition remains, regulated to his foes within Athens. 
This reflects Plutarch’s concern with the evidence of Pericles’ opposition within Athens; it still 
existed at this point, and Thucydides implies as much in bringing up the possibility of suspicion 
being generated, but Plutarch makes it more clear. This also fits one of the themes of this 
biography, presenting Pericles as being opposed to the Spartans on one side and the Athenian 
foolhardiness on the other, a personal siege found in both Thucydidean and non-Thucydidean 
sources which Plutarch seeks to emphasize, making a contribution to the understanding of 
Pericles and his historical context. 
Now, the rest of Thucydides 2.13 actually contains a much larger speech of Pericles, 
including not only the assignment of his property, but also arguments for his strategy of the war 
and encouraging the Athenians, the ‘same advice as before.’ The next sections are details about 
the rural people within the walls, and background histories of rural life and oracles, then moves 
to the initial Peloponnesian activity besieging Oenoe. Plutarch skips over this material as 
irrelevant, stating simply the Peloponnesian invasion and their encampment at Acharnae, facts 
taken ahead from 2.20.  
Coming now to the next portion of chapter 33, Thucydides 2.21 now provides the base 
source, though Plutarch drops out extraneous detail, such as the stages of the Peloponnesian 
march, the mention of past invasions of Pleistoanax and the Persians, and the cavalry skirmish. 
In common with Thucydides he wrote that they went up to Acharnae, cutting the area down in 
order to entice the Athenians to fight, though Thucydides’ statement that they hoped to cause 
Athens internal discord is omitted, probably because Plutarch had already addressed this before. 
Plutarch uses similar vocabulary, but does not copy Thucydides, such as his δῃοῦντες τὴν χώραν 
instead of γῆς τεμνομένης. and οὐκ ἀνεξομένων instead of  οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν.  
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Whereas Thucydides begins with the feelings and activity of the people in Athens, then 
proceeds to Pericles, Plutarch begins immediately with Pericles’ reaction to the Spartan attempt 
to goad Athens into battle.479 The theme here is Pericles’ resoluteness and good judgment against 
the passions of the people, which is shown in Plutarch’s use of the History. Plutarch writes a 
phrase verbatim from 2.21.2, δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο, but the subject has completely shifted. In 
Thucydides, it is the Athenians who saw ravaging of their land as a terrible thing, but Plutarch 
seems to answer this objection in Pericles’ own mind, that Pericles thought it was a terrible thing 
to join a risky battle against such a large enemy force.480 Plutarch’s numbers of the enemy at 
sixty thousand strong seems too high to modern historians, but it is not from Thucydides and it is 
difficult to determine where Plutarch found the figure; his emphasis points to an actual source 
rather than free invention.481 Plutarch’s idea that the entire city would be at stake is not from 
Thucydides, but this would be a proper inference if he believed the large size of the 
Peloponnesian army, as it would have required the Athenians to commit their full forces.  
Plutarch’s next sentence is loosely based on 2.22.1. Pericles’ admonishment contrasting 
the value of men and trees is not sourced from Thucydides, but Stadter sees the resemblance to 
ideas in Pericles’ speech in 1.143.5.482 Already assuming that the land-wasting had upset the 
people, Plutarch states that Pericles tried to keep them calm (κατεπράϋνε) with this 
encouragement. Thucydides said something similar, that he tried to keep the city calm (ἡσυχίας) 
and under guard as he could.483 Plutarch will pick up on the guard image later, but he states in 
the second sentence that Pericles did not call the people into the assembly (εἰς ἐκκλησίαν οὐ 
συνῆγε). This is taken from Thucydides, who says ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον 
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οὐδένα, emphatically stating that Pericles did not call an assembly nor a ξύλλογον. Gomme 
understands this word to mean ‘an informal meeting of citizens’ in this context.484 Hornblower 
disagrees, and refers to it as a ‘military meeting,’485 as it obviously would discuss whether to 
make the foray or not. Plutarch drops this phrase in order to focus upon the assembly of the 
demos. How Pericles, as one of the generals, had the constitutional power to postpone the regular 
official assembly is controversial in modern scholarship. Stadter suggests it was a special 
military, or ‘crisis’ meeting that he avoided, or that Pericles had the power to delay the official 
meeting until the Peloponnesians withdrew.486 Gomme and Rhodes agree with the former, since 
there is no evidence that generals could stop the regular assembly.487 Hornblower argues that 
generals had more power than is often assumed, but suggests Pericles could have pressured other 
officials to call it off as well.488 Plutarch accepted the authority of Thucydides’ account without 
question, however. In light of Thucydides’ other statements about Pericles’ power in the city, 
and Plutarch’s acceptance of this in strong terms earlier that ‘of his power there can be no doubt’ 
based upon both Thucydides and the gibes of the comic poets,489 it was not abnormal for Pericles 
to prevent the meeting. With the greater body of now-lost fourth century literature known to 
Plutarch, he may have even had a better understanding of the mechanics of government in 
Athens than modern scholarship on some of these points. 
Plutarch’s explanation for the repression of the assembly was Pericles ‘fearing he would 
be constrained against his judgment (παρὰ γνώμην).’ As noted above, Plutarch left out γνώμη 
before, but it is brought back here and is found in the text of Thucydides before him.490 There, 
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Thucydides refers to judgment as the correct way, which the people may act against if they are 
called together for a decision. Plutarch on the other hand associates this term more closely with 
Pericles, that the people would force him against γνώμην. De Romilly argues that Plutarch’s 
usage is more personalized to Pericles, assigning a motive to Pericles that Thucydides did not 
give him, a ‘personal desire to act according to his own wishes.’491 While he likely ‘thought he 
was giving exactly the same explanation, only in different words,’ it is actually a ‘distortion.’492 
Thucydides was not constructing the polarity to be ‘Pericles against others’ as Plutarch portrays 
it, but another kind of tension, ‘within the city and for the city, reason against passion,’ the 
underlying motive being fear that the people would come together and make a decision that 
would be detrimental to the city.493 This forms a part of Thucydides’ overall analysis of 
democracy found throughout his History, the interworking and behaviour of the mob that 
Plutarch leaves out.494 He therefore ‘loses the whole point Thucydides was trying to make,’ 
which could be assigned to his aim of biography rather than history.495 
There are some problems with de Romilly’s argument, however.496 It is true that Plutarch 
was personalizing ‘judgment’ to Pericles, but the meaning of Thucydides was not changed, nor is 
the assignment of the motive to be Pericles’ own wishes equivalent to a shift from what was best 
for the city or a change from the Thucydidean political analysis. Plutarch considered Pericles’ 
motive not merely to act as he desired, but to act for the sake of the city. This is clear in several 
places in the Life,497 as in this passage in ‘staking the city itself’ on a hoplite battle with the 
Spartans. Later in the synkrisis he maintains that Pericles possessed foresight on how to win the 
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war, as borne out by the events afterward, as well as giving the implication that Pericles’ refusal 
to allow Athens to make concessions to Sparta was noble.498 Plutarch’s political philosophy and 
analysis elsewhere is in line with that of Thucydides here, at least in his views of the fickleness 
of the crowd, as noted above.499 As a Platonist, Plutarch especially would have considered 
‘Reason’ to exist independently of Pericles, yet something to which, due to his greatness of 
character, he had access. Rather than a distortion, Plutarch is making logical inferences from 
Thucydides’ text – if the people’s passion represents the irrationality of the mob, and Pericles 
knew the rational approach, then obviously Plutarch would posit that Pericles possessed this 
approach within himself. It is the same situation, except it is retold from Pericles’ perspective.  
Also, Plutarch was at no cross-purpose with Thucydides’ didactic aim. One of 
Thucydides’ purposes in writing was to educate the reader about political theory, and Plutarch 
likewise, except that he was teaching political theory honed through the character of Pericles, an 
example of an individual acting in reasoned judgment against the hostility of the majority. 
Plutarch’s philosophical beliefs about the ability of the good statesman were at work in his poetic 
language of Pericles steering the city like the helmsman of a ship, a picture taken from Plato’s 
Republic.500 The way Plutarch uses this imagery from Plato is especially interesting. Plato’s 
helmsman is an expert in steering the ship, but the others on board are clamoring for the helm, 
their ignorance of how to steer notwithstanding, and eventually snatch it away from him.501 
Plutarch’s citation of this image may foreshadow Pericles’ eventual dismissal to Plutarch’s 
audience, if they knew the Republic. This Platonic picture fits well with both Thucydides’ 
argument that Pericles alone had the right plan and the others the wrong plan, and also Plutarch’s 
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interpretation of Thucydides: Plutarch ‘almost makes him appear Plato’s philosopher-king’ as 
Stadter observes,502 showing Plutarch’s Platonic ideology at work in his interpretation of Pericles 
and the historical situation. 
Plutarch finishes the sentence by saying that  he kept the city under guard (φυλακαῖς), 
which is comparable to Thucydides’ ἐφύλασσε.503 Pericles paid no heed to the rabble, and 
instead exercised his own reasoned plans (λογισμοῖς). This word is an equivalent to Thucydides’ 
term gnome, for ‘judgment,’ in Plutarch’s own way, and serves as his own technical term. In 
examining this word, Duff observes that it carries the idea of ‘reason and reasoned behaviour’ 
and the ability of a leader to persevere in his logismoi in the face of opposition was a mark of 
greatness and virtue.504 Further, this statement about Pericles’ perseverance in his logismoi is 
meant as a comparison with its counterpart Fabius, that Hannibal’s shocking victory at Cannae 
blew away the logismoi of Rome, yet the logismoi of Fabius stood firm despite the efforts of 
Hannibal and the disagreement of his own subordinates.505  
Plutarch’s next sentence moves backward to Thucydides 2.21.3. Both 2.21 and 2.22 
could have been on the same section of open scroll in front of Plutarch, allowing him to jump 
back and forth in constructing his own narrative. Thucydides says the city was excited with every 
kind of excitement, angry at Pericles, and abused him for being a general who would not lead 
them to battle, holding him responsible for all they were suffering. 
παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὧν παρῄνεσε 
πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, αἴτιόν τε σφίσιν 
ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον 
Thus in every way the city was in a state of irritation; and they were indignant against 
Pericles, and remembering none of his earlier warnings they abused him because, though 
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their general, he would not lead them out, and considered him responsible for all their 
sufferings.506 
 
καίτοι πολλοὶ μὲν αὐτοῦ τῶν φίλων δεόμενοι προσέκειντο, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν 
ἀπειλοῦντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες, χοροὶ1 δ᾿ ᾖδον ᾄσματα καὶ σκώμματα πρὸς αἰσχύνην, 
ἐφυβρίζοντες αὐτοῦ τὴν στρατηγίαν ὡς ἄνανδρον καὶ προϊεμένην τὰ πράγματα τοῖς 
πολεμίοις. ἐπεφύετο δὲ καὶ Κλέων ἤδη, διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὀργῆς τῶν πολιτῶν 
πορευόμενος  
And yet many of his friends beset him with entreaties, and many of his enemies with 
threats and denunciations, and choruses sang songs of scurrilous mockery, railing at his 
generalship for its cowardice, and its abandonment of everything to the enemy. Cleon, 
too, was already harassing him, taking advantage of the wrath with which the citizens 
regarded him […].507 
 
Plutarch includes what Thucydides says, except their forgetfulness of his prior advice. 
Intead, Pericles’ verbal advice is internalized into his personal belief and determination to carry 
it out. There are four areas of addition, which will each be examined in turn. First, he added that 
Pericles’ friends went to him with entreaties. One explanation would guess that with clear 
sources of enemies stating their opposition to Pericles for not giving battle, Plutarch was using 
artistic license to balance out enemies with friends.508 Alternatively, Plutarch could have had a 
source at his disposal that mentioned disagreement from Pericles’ friends, but this is unknown. 
The best explanation may be that Plutarch was making historical deductions from Thucydides 
that Pericles’ friends must have actually disagreed with him and pleaded for action. Thucydides 
implied the entire city except Pericles wanted to go out. He said the city was in every kind (παντί 
τε τρόπῳ) of excitement (ἀνηρέθιστο) and presented the city collectively blaming Pericles. The 
universal language could be taken to mean that everyone, even Pericles’ supporters, wanted to go 
out, which would be reasonable, since by Plutarch’s Thucydidean understanding the majority of 
the city supported Pericles.  Further, every τρόπῳ of excitement, a word which carries 
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connotations of kinds, manner, or direction,509  could imply purely anti-Periclean kinds of 
rancour, upset from Pericles’ friends, and discontent from other quarters in between. Thucydides 
also presented Pericles as standing alone in this tactic. Plutarch considered Pericles a good 
statesman, and an important quality of such a statesman is making free choices rather than 
choosing under compulsion of circumstance.510 Such a presentation from Thucydides would lead 
Plutarch to believe that a good statesman like Pericles would be making a choice that is freely 
chosen, as all of the other forces of the city are against his decision. With a desire to present 
Pericles as determined even in the face of counter-influence from friends, Plutarch could move 
towards an interpretation that Pericles must have resisted the entreaties of friends as well, who 
desired that Pericles remain in power and not be overwhelmed by the surge of unpopularity. It 
would make sense then, from what he reads in Thucydides, that Pericles’ friends were pressing 
him as well. 
The second difference is the addition of ‘enemies’ who denounce and threaten Pericles. 
The analysis above could equally be applied an ‘enemies’ inference on Plutarch’s part. As has 
been laid out in his previous chapters, Pericles had opponents who were scratching at removing 
Pericles from his position of power and popularity, and they would without question take 
advantage of this very unpopular move to attack Pericles. Plutarch names Kleon here, which 
Thucydides does not do at this point. Plutarch probably assumed that since Kleon was a 
demagogue trying to undercut Pericles, he would certainly take the opportunity to attack him 
now, besides the fact that the Hermippus verses say as much. The addition of ‘choruses’ singing 
denunciations of Pericles in Athens makes sense historically, because Hermippus wrote chorus 
verses that Plutarch quotes here, thus he could say that choruses sang these lines, but Plutarch 
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evidently assumes that the play was written and performed while the Peloponnesians were still 
camping and spoiling the land in Attica.   
The fourth difference is minor. The general who would not lead them out to battle is 
turned to the general who is cowardly (ἄνανδρον). The implication from Thucydides is clear 
enough, that the jeering against the general who does not fight would include an accusation of 
cowardice. Plutarch did not focus on what the people were actually losing, compared to 
Thucydides, because showing any for the people’s justification of their complaint would detract 
from his presentation of Pericles’ resolve, though he will revisit it in his next chapter. 
Chapter 34: Pericles’ management of Athenian displeasure  
This next chapter is also sourced in Thucydides, in chronological order from where he 
was before. Thucydides’ accounts of the Peloponnesian marches and Athenian financial and 
administrative decisions are passed over511 and the Athenian fleet’s action in the Peloponnese 
from 2.25 is summarized in two parts as it related to Pericles, with settling of Aegina from 2.27 
in the middle. Coming off the last chapter of the criticism of Pericles, it states, ‘Pericles was not 
moved by these things, but gently and silently underwent the ignominy and the hatred, and 
sending out an armament of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese, did not himself sail with it, 
but remained behind, keeping the city under watch’ until the Peloponnesians withdrew.512 This 
agrees with Thucydides that the expedition was sent while the Spartans were still in Attica. 
Thucydides is silent on whether or not Pericles went with the expedition, though the implication 
is that he did not – the generals are named (Carcinus, Proteas, and Socrates), and if Pericles was 
there, Thucydides would have said so. Plutarch assigned a motive to Pericles’ staying behind, 
namely, to keep an eye on the city to be sure they did not deviate from his plan, which Stadter 
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says is Plutarch’s ‘own deduction.’513 With the knowledge that the men in the city wanted badly 
to go out from the city, Plutarch could guess this to be the reason Pericles did not deploy, as he 
was the only man keeping them from a march outside the walls and forestalling any meetings to 
that end. Besides this, we see another example of an agency shift, from ‘Athenians’ sending out 
the fleet to Pericles himself sending them. 
Plutarch then quotes from 2.27 about the settling of Aegina, along with his own historical 
analysis. First he states that people (τοὺς πολλοὺς) were distressed over the war and Pericles 
soothed them by distributions and allotments. This is not in Thucydides, but serves as another 
explanation for why people were settled in Aegina. Thucydides gave two reasons why the 
Aeginetans were expelled and replaced. First, they were blamed (αἰτίους ) for starting the war, 
which harkens back to his earlier statement (noted above) that they were secretly speaking with 
Sparta to foment war. Second, since Aegina lies off the coast of the Peloponnese, it was useful 
for Athens’ own citizens to live and hold the place.514 Plutarch was silent on these military 
reasons, and did not necessarily disagree with them, but seemed to deduce for himself the 
political reason for settling Athenians there, unless it was from Ephorus or another source. 
Stadter gives credence to Plutarch’s interpretation, noting one reason for the settlement would 
have been ‘to provide land and living space for those dispossessed by the invasion of Attica.’515 
Plutarch’s subsequent clause ‘for the Aeginetans he drove out entirely’ (Αἰγινήτας γὰρ ἐξελάσας 
ἅπαντας) is a paraphrase from Thucydides (ανέστησαν δὲ καὶ Αἰγινήτας τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐξ 
Αἰγίνης), omitting the ‘summer’ timeframe. Thucydides’ explanations being skipped over, he 
held on to the statement of the sending of colonists shortly afterward. He did not say they were 
sent out, as Thucydides did, but focused on what would have happened before that – dividing 
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allotments of land by lot – a clever way of maintaining uniqueness from Thucydides while 
stating the same event. But there may also be an element of criticism or correction of Thucydides 
in the term for the settlers. The History reads ἐποίκους and οἰκήτορας for ‘colonist.’ Plutarch 
uses the word κληρουχίας, or cleruchy, which seems to be the more accurate term for citizens 
who were given newly conquered land without specific organization as a new polis.516 Further, 
specific evidence concerning the Athenian settlement of Aegina, some of which Plutarch likely 
had access to, also suggests it was a cleruchy.517 
What follows is both a historical inference and compression from Thucydides. Plutarch 
ignores for the time being the eclipse and Athens securing alliances,518 and moves to material 
from 2.30-33. Plutarch says the Peloponnesians suffered damage, and this destruction could offer 
some consolation (παρηγορία) to the Athenians.519 The expedition ‘ravaged much territory and 
sacked villages and small cities, while Pericles himself, by land, invaded the Megarid and razed 
it all.’520 Thus the details and longer narration from Thucydides, such as Athenian attacks on 
Methone and Peia, victories over the Corinthians, and the Cephallenian tetrapolis are subsumed 
under a brief description.521 This compression is necessary to allow Plutarch to expand on 
Pericles’ ultimately political responses. Plutarch had given critical thought to the loss the 
Athenians underwent from the invasion. Thucydides had already given details about how many 
people came in from the rural communities outside of Athens,522 especially the Acharnians,523 
and Plutarch maintains the problem throughout his narrative of the war. He surely had seen many 
small villages, being a resident and traveller in Greece, and what the cutting of trees, buildings, 
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and supplies would mean for many people. He therefore draws from this that the people’s angst 
actually was very high, and believed Pericles would have done everything he could to alleviate 
their suffering and discontent, and the attacks on Sparta helped him politically. At this point, 
Plutarch skipped over Pericles’ funeral oration,524 possibly because it was already so well-known 
to his audience and he did not feel the need to revisit it.  
Plutarch proceeds to build off the successes of the Athenian war effort to show how 
correct Pericles was, conjecturing that the war would have been over quickly were it not for the 
δαιμόνιον, referring to the plague, the next section of Thucydides before him. Stadter notes that 
the word δαιμόνιον is picked up from Thucydides 2.64.1, which is Pericles’ speech prior to his 
dismissal, where he says what is sent from the gods ought to be endured while fighting enemies 
courageously.525 This speech is considerably ahead of where Plutarch was in the scroll, so this 
may have been from memory. Additionally, he may have believed Thucydides was accurately 
representing Pericles’ own view of the subject in this case. Plutarch would be inclined to believe 
this preserved Pericles’ attitude, since he would expect as much from the virtuous Pericles, given 
his own reverence for divine activity. In any case, it was preferable to Thucydides’ own more 
cynical treatment of the gods and the plague. Plutarch saw the plague to be the only reason the 
plan failed. Indeed, this divine force ruins ‘human plans’ (ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς). Since Pericles 
eventually died from the plague and it weakened Athen’s fighting strength,526 this would be the 
case by default in his mind. Plutarch says the plague destroyed those with ‘youth and power,’ 
which fits well with Thucydides’ picture of the plague striking even those in good health and 
strong.527 Plutarch’s ἡ λοιμώδης ἐνέπεσε φθορὰ is similar to Thucydides’ λοιμὸς οὐδὲ φθορὰ.528 
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The next sentence which concludes the chapter describes the plague and anger at Pericles in 
poetic language, but is based from his general knowledge of Thucydides.529 Thucydides does not 
even discuss the blame on Pericles until 2.59, though Plutarch is foreshadowing what will 
happen later. His use of imagery of being a doctor shows again the influence of philosophical 
study on his understanding of history, since it is a common Platonic device for the 
knowledgeable statesman.530  
Chapter 35: Pericles falls to fortune 
For this chapter, Plutarch has moved to the next section in Thucydides, 2.56, concerning 
the next expedition. Thucydides says that Pericles was still judging that Athens should not march 
out to battle, but organized a force of one hundred ships, including specially modified ships for 
holding horses, four thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalry. He notes that fifty ships from 
Chios and Lesbos joined them as well. Plutarch summarizes this, adding the ship numbers 
together to ‘one hundred fifty’ and ‘many’ hoplites and cavalry.531 However, Plutarch assigns 
two additional motives to Pericles. First, he states that Pericles wanted to ‘heal’ these  problems 
(Ταῦτα βουλόμενος ἰᾶσθαι). This goes along with his Platonic political image of the doctor, and 
perhaps suggests that Pericles was acting to alleviate the plague. Since Ταῦτα is plural and has no 
object, the referents are to the previous paragraph, which gave the claim that the plague was 
caused by the crowding into the city, the country men having no employment and filling each 
other with corruption, with no change or relief. Plutarch likely thought there was some truth to 
this claim, as Stadter says that ‘he himself seems to have associated such diseases with potent 
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emanations or effluences.’532 Plutarch elsewhere, in noting the measures taken for children 
whose parents die of dropsy and the spread of this plague from Egypt to Athens, connects 
contagiousness and proximity, theorizing the spread of disease by its passing from one thing 
through another.533 The expedition was therefore a way to get men out of the city and give them 
something useful to do. The second reason given is to harm (παραλυπεῖν) the enemy. This may 
harken back to a political as well as military purpose, the idea found previously in 34.2, that what 
the enemy suffered helped comfort the Athenians. Significantly, this word for harm is found in 
the History 2.51.1, where he says that no disease harmed them besides the plague. Plutarch may 
have turned this term specifically to show Pericles’ high spirit in planning attacks against the 
Peloponnese despite being attacked by disease. Plutarch confirms the dual political-military 
function at the end of the sentence, saying that at the point of launching out it gave ‘great hope to 
the citizens, and no less fear to the enemy in consequence of so great a force.’534 
At this juncture Plutarch departs from Thucydides to give an anecdote told in the 
philosophical schools in Athens, perhaps one he heard while studying under Ammonius there. 
Pericles’ lack of superstition in this episode is a major positive example, and implicitly 
strengthens the link between Pericles and Anaxagoras, who believed eclipses to be natural 
shadows.535 This story of the eclipse is problematic in its departure from Thucydides, however. 
Thucydides speaks of an eclipse, not at this point in the narrative, but back in 2.28, which 
occurred the year before this expedition.  
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Due to Plutarch’s ‘working so closely from Thucydides,’ Stadter argues, it is ‘not simple 
negligence or ignorance but his method’ that brought about the error.536 Stadter proceeds to 
imagine that Plutarch forgot about the Thucydidean notice of the eclipse from the energy he 
exerted into the dramatic plague account, and since the anecdote involved some expedition with 
the fleet, Plutarch may have thought to put it here, sourced either from memory or a separate 
notebook. Stadter also sees the final λέγεται  as a sign of noncommittal to the veracity of the 
story. However, the question of forgetfulness seems difficult for us to sustain, if Plutarch had the 
scroll in front of him, and used material in 2.27 nearby, which suggests he saw the eclipse 
mention. A few more points are in order to suggest that Plutarch did not actually notice it. 
Thucydides’ eclipse section is buried between the Aeginetan issue (2.27) and accounts of new 
Athenian alliances (2.29). Plutarch only uses the beginning sentence of the Aegina section, that 
concerning the Athenian settlement of the place. When Thucydides begins stating where the 
Aeginetans were settled, Plutarch may have immediately turned the scroll ahead to the next 
section he knew he would use, 2.30-31, which talks of Athenian victories, or he may have 
written on the Athenian victories from memory upon glancing at what it said, while jumping 
ahead in the scroll to the plague account, since his 2.30-31 summary is very brief and 
generalized. Furthermore, Thucydides only mentions the eclipse in two sentences. With so much 
irrelevant material being skipped over, the smallness of the section, and the awkwardness of 
using a scroll, perhaps it is plausible that Plutarch simply did not notice it there. 
Plutarch then picks up where he left off in Thucydides 2.56 to 2.58.537 Plutarch gave a 
much more negative presentation of the expedition than Thucydides did, but this is due to his 
selection of facts to include rather than direct contradiction of Thucydides. Plutarch did not 
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mention the wasting of Troezen, Halieis, or Hermione, or the capture of the coastal town of 
Prasiae, but only the failed siege of Epidaurus. Plutarch implies that the general failure is based 
upon his reading of Thucydides, as he says that Pericles ‘seems’ (δοκεῖ ) to have accomplished 
nothing worthy of his preparations (τῆς παρασκευῆς ἄξιον δρᾶσαι). This phrase itself is an echo 
of οὔτε τἆλλα τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀξίως found in Thucydides 2.58.2. He conflates the Epidaurus 
siege with the reinforcements of Hagnon aiding in the siege of Potidaea, both in the use of this 
phrase and in the description of the plague, the outbreak of which at Potidaea brought the 
mission to a close.538 Such conflation was an acceptable procedure for Plutarch, as Pelling’s 
study shows.539 Plutarch did preserve the main point, that the plague swept the Athenians and 
their allies. The progressively worse problems Pericles faces are among the themes of these last 
few chapters of the Life, and the presentation of his poor fortune becomes an interpretive focus at 
this stage.  
The Life continues in the chronology set by Thucydides by drawing off the next section 
in 2.59, which sets up Pericles’ assembly speech and the discontent surrounding it. Plutarch says 
the Athenians were ‘exasperated’ against Pericles ‘on this account,’ therefore he attempted to 
‘appease and encourage’ them.540 By ‘this account’ Plutarch could mean the general problems 
they faced, but both the unsuccessful military operations and the plague seem to be the main 
issues. Thucydides includes these, except Thucydides emphasizes the loss of property from the 
Peloponnesian advances also, which are not included by Plutarch. As noted above, however, 
Pericles’ motivation for the expedition was to ‘heal’ the Athenian’s despair in doing damage to 
the enemy and possibly alleviate the problems of the plague. To this extent, Pericles’ efforts 
failed, thus the loss of property is simply assumed to be an underlying problem in Plutarch’s 
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narrative because it was delineated already in chapter 33. Historiographically, then, there was no 
need to repeat the property loss here, especially as the focus is on the results of Pericles’ 
expedition and his goals for the expedition. Gomme also notes that the Athenian change of heart 
against Pericles makes good historical sense during the time of Pericles’ lacklustre expedition, 
providing plenty of fodder for his opponents to attack him in his absence, then upon his return to 
the city.541 Plutarch preserved the political angle that Thucydides provided in 2.59 that all of 
these things together made the people dejected in every way, and therefore attacked Pericles.  
Plutarch describes the speech of Pericles in terms of ‘appeasement’ and ‘encouragement’ which 
are the main points of the speech as recorded in Thucydides, where he defended himself, pointed 
out the necessity for themselves to carry on the war, and gave them reasons why they could win 
and why they were great.542 
Plutarch’s next sentence overall agrees with the subsequent section in Thucydides, where 
the people vote to fine him. Plutarch says Pericles was not able to allay their anger (οὐ μὴν 
παρέλυσε τὴν ὀργὴν), which is from Thucydides 2.65 (ὀργῆς παραλύειν). Plutarch did not include 
Thucydides’ comments that Pericles convinced them to continue the war but that the personal 
hatred against him remained. This absence is probably because only the anger against Pericles 
seemed relevant for the theme of Pericles’ difficulties, and any other decision Athens made was 
excluded from the individual focus. There is one notable addition, however. Thucydides 2.65 
does not say Pericles was still general or removed from command. On the other hand, Plutarch 
assumes he was general at this time, and states they voted to strip him of command. In the 
context of Pericles’ last speech back in 2.59, it states Pericles called the assembly ‘being still 
general’ which Hornblower says could indicate that Pericles was actually general and removed 
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of command at this time, but this cannot be confirmed.543 Nevertheless, Plutarch took it this way, 
and he may be supported by the fact that later in the History (2.65) Pericles was elected general 
again.544 
From here, Plutarch uses other sources to discuss Pericles’ fines, then his perseverance 
through his family troubles and deaths in chapter 36. In chapter 37, he returns to Thucydides one 
more time, though since Thucydides is not significantly used for the rest of the book, he may 
have said it from memory rather than having the scroll in front of him at this stage of the 
composition. Plutarch writes that the city ‘made trial of its other generals and counsellors for the 
conduct of the war, but since no one appeared to have weight that was adequate or authority that 
was competent for such leadership, it yearned for Pericles, and summoned him back to the bema 
and the war-office.’545 This picks up from 2.65.4 of Thucydides, who states that shortly 
afterwards the people elected him general and gave the affairs of everything back to him. The 
two reasons Thucydides provides are, firstly, that as time progressed, their personal troubles 
were felt less severely and secondly, they held Pericles to be the most capable among them. 
Plutarch has not included the first reason, but expands on the implications of the second. A valid 
question could be asked of the historical situation: if Pericles was the best man to conduct affairs, 
what does that say about the other leaders in Athens? The answer must be that they were simply 
not as capable, and Plutarch felt the freedom to state this. A further support for Plutarch’s 
assumption is from Thucydides 2.65.8-10, which discusses leaders after Pericles and their lack of 
depth in comparison to Pericles. Since Pericles died in less than a year after his re-election, 
Plutarch would be justified to think that these men who took over from Pericles after his 
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demotion were the same men who took over after his death. From here, Plutarch leaves 
Thucydides, and other sources provide the background of his reinstatement, request to allow his 
son heirship, and his illness and death. 
Conclusions on Pericles 
From this survey of passages where Thucydides provided the source material for the 
Pericles, we can see a number of patterns and ways in which Plutarch’s preservation and 
inferences from the History can be explained by a historiographical approach. Plutarch remains 
mostly faithful to the Thucydidean record at points regarding the character under examination, 
chronology of events, facts, and narrative structure. However, at all of these points of agreement 
he frequently uses synonyms or varied phrasing, or may substitute a Platonic-tinged metaphor for 
a Thucydidean statement, and shifts material to different places in his narrative according to his 
own topical themes. 
Plutarch’s respect for the accuracy of Thucydides’ account demonstrates his trust in 
traditional authorities – certain historical records are simply to be believed. Plutarch had a wide 
variety of sources on Pericles, many of them from simple recollection, since Plutarch, widely 
read as he was, had read much of the Greek literature in prior years that mentions Pericles for 
other reasons. 546 Much of this literature was far more critical of Pericles than Thucydides was, 
which challenged Plutarch to fit it all together in some way, such as the evolution of Pericles’ 
political technique and character. Thucydides led Plutarch to weigh the negative evidence as less 
likely to be historically factual. On the significant body of evidence accusing Pericles of 
fomenting war for personal reasons, Plutarch concluded that the truth of the claims is not 
clear.547 This sort of statement stems from Plutarch’s respect for the grandeur of Pericles’ 
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character, imagined in large part thanks to Thucydides. This is not to say he believed everything 
in Thucydides without question – he presented some areas of possible disagreement, such as the 
tone of the success or failure of a campaign or ‘cleruchy’ over ‘colony’ in Aegina. 
 The divergences from Thucydides can actually be explained by logical deduction from 
the evidence, interpretations run through a biographical paradigm. Plutarch had his own agenda 
and did not see the need to replicate Thucydides’ technical terms. His philosophical political 
perspectives enabled him to draw conclusions of his own from the text. The belief in the 
incapability of the mob compared to the wisdom of Pericles is presented along Platonic lines, 
reminiscent of a philosopher-king who knew what was best but was eventually overcome by the 
irrational passions of the crowd. Plutarch also emphasizes individuals – bringing out Pericles, 
Kleon, and Archidamus to represent the power behind collective entities. Ethical understandings 
of action are paramount, as Pericles’ virtues and wisdom are emphasized where appropriate, as 
well as inferences of how people acted and felt in light of the situation Thucydides presented. 
Thucydides was asking different questions than Plutarch was asking, but the fact that Plutarch 
was asking questions of a historical text and reading between its lines shows that his method was 
historiographical. This is the sort of work historians do. 
In response now to some strong wariness towards Plutarch mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Plutarch’s choices may be dispiriting for the historian whose particular questions about 
the past are different from those Plutarch was asking. Plutarch gives an indication of 
historiographical care, and in our own  critical handling of ancient texts there is a danger of what 
Pitcher calls an ‘excess of readerly paranoia’ in studying ancient writers of history.548 Plutarch is 
not oversimplifying matters of historical record if those matters are irrelevant to his own 
questions. It is permissible in history to summarize and avoid a long excursus, and inevitable that 
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ideology would influence treatments of the evidence. Parallelism and the individual perspective 
need not be considered, as Bosworth says, an ‘element of distortion,’549 but rather unique 
research questions, where Plutarch found a way in which a Greek and  Roman were similar and 
followed the trail to find any other areas of similarity that writers with other questions may have 
missed. As Pitcher comments again, ‘Selectivity, it is worth stressing, is not always tantamount 
to suppression.’550 There is the potential for distortion and suppression of inconvenient facts, but 
not necessarily more than any other research question, and it could just as well be seen, from 
Plutarch’s point of view, as an opportunity for further reflection and understanding of the past 
and its relevance for improving the readers. Even the universal historian Polybius emphasized 
important individuals and freely embedded parallelisms, as when he compared the good 
generalship of Hannibal and Epameinondas against hard fortune.551  
That rhetoric, poetry, and drama influenced Plutarch’s language is not in doubt, but we 
have seen ways in which Plutarch’s interpretive decisions can be explained specifically by 
historiography. In light of studies of modern scholarship by Pelling and others noted above in 
Chapter 2 where Plutarch exemplifies a careful interpreter of history in many other cases, this 
would be the best way to take these passages rather than the reductionism of rhetorical or 
dramatic effects.  His views of classical authority, political paradigms, Platonism, critical 
questioning of sources, logical inferences, ethics, and piety combined into a model of 
historiographical interpretation. We will explore some of these themes in the next chapter on 
Nicias, and see other examples of Plutarch’s philosophy aiding him in historiographical method 
for the Lives. 
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CHAPTER 4: Thucydides in Plutarch’s Life of Nicias 
Thucydides was undoubtedly in front of Plutarch during his composition of the Nicias,552 
as we presupposed for Pericles. Nicias is dependent upon Thucydides for material because 
Nicias was more obscure, and fewer sources on him survived for Plutarch to access, though the 
mention of Philistus and Timaeus implies that he could take some material from them.553 For this 
reason, most of the work is basically material from Thucydides, which has given Nicias some 
scholarly attention in discussions of how Plutarch used Thucydides.554 Littman has already given 
a basic survey of Plutarch’s use of Thucydides for Nicias.555 For this reason and due to space 
constraints, there will not be a complete survey of all of Plutarch’s quotations from Thucydides. 
Rather, this will be a more generalized examination, selecting a handful of significant usages 
based upon three criteria: selections that show the same methods as performed in Pericles, 
passages that have received scholarly attention regarding Plutarch’s use of Thucydides, or 
passages that show examples of a character-theory of historical interpretation, of which Nicias is 
a sharper example than Pericles.  
Nicias required a different methodological approach from the Pericles, since the lack of 
historical material about Nicias left Thucydides to be his main source. Plutarch’s efforts to 
discover the character of Nicias and to draw every detail he could out of his limited sources 
provides an opportunity that Pericles did not afford us as much. It allows us to explore Plutarch’s 
idea of character types, another aspect of Plutarch’s interpretive paradigm. Pelling has given 
studies on Plutarch’s ‘character theory,’ and the level of his correspondence to the theory in 
practice, but considerable work remains to show that character theory is a historiographical 
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method, a way of gaining further insight into the past.556 Plutarch believed in the possibility of 
change in character, as noted in Chapter 2, but he also had an idea of predictable, more static 
characters. The Peripatos systematized character types, the most notable example today being 
Theophrastus’ descriptions of stock characters, of which ‘the superstitious man’ is one.557 
Plutarch was aware of Theophrastus and cited him fairly frequently in his writings.558 He may 
not have attributed the extreme caricature of the superstitious man drawn by Theophrastus to 
Nicias, but he did consider it a type, as is evident from his essay on superstition.559 There is also 
a type of the ‘cautious general’ that Plutarch believed existed, as we know from Aratus 10, and it 
is in this category that Plutarch considers Nicias to be.560 The signature move of such generals is 
a hesitancy to join battle, or perform any risky action, but once the decision is made they are 
‘swift and effective.’561 In what follows below, we will expand on this to argue that Plutarch’s 
belief in stable character enabled him to make inferences from Thucydides about what happened. 
After commenting on Plutarch’s overall use of Thucydides for Nicias, we will examine 
whether Plutarch’s view of the character of Nicias was framed by Thucydides. Then, we will 
observe how Plutarch’s historically-informed beliefs about the characters in Thucydides’ 
narrative shape his interpretations of the evidence in the case of Nicias, Kleon, and the Athenian 
people. From here, a study will be undertaken regarding Plutarch’s use of Thucydides regarding 
the initial foray towards Sicily and a defense of Plutarch’s historiographical interest. Lastly, we 
will discover ways in which Plutarch’s idea of character enable him to make historiographical 
inferences from the Thucydidean record. 
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Plutarch and Thucydides in Nicias 
In the prologue of Nicias, Plutarch makes some interesting statements about Thucydides 
and historiography. Upon introducing Nicias and Sicily as the proper parallel to Crassus and the 
Parthian disaster, there is a declaration of methodology and modesty. Unlike the arrogant 
Timaeus, he will not compete with Thucydides, who even surpassed himself in ‘pathos, 
vividness, and variety’ and cannot be matched.562 Plutarch shows his respect for classical 
authorities: they cannot be improved upon, and those who try to compete with them or reduce 
them are wrong. Yet while disavowing jealous competition with other writers and attempts to 
imitate the inimitable classical masters,563 Plutarch must still make his work necessary and 
original.  Plutarch does not separate his account from any sense of the historicity of Thucydides’ 
narratives. Rather, as Pelling points out, in this prologue it is the ‘artistic qualities’ in Thucydides 
that Plutarch commends and refuses to vie with.564 This is the opposite of what we would expect 
if Plutarch’s main method aim was to create exciting, rather than factual, stories about the hero. 
It is Thucydides who has the exciting narrative that Plutarch refuses to compete with, but he can 
add additional facts about Nicias that were not known to his readers before. 
Plutarch presents a two-pronged approach.565 First, he cannot ignore the events included 
in Thucydides and Philistus because they indicate the nature and disposition of the man (τὸν 
τρόπον καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς) under his many sufferings, but must include them briefly, 
without unnecessary detail. Second, he aims to include other details which have other writers 
have missed, incidental mentions in other texts or inscriptions and decrees that are relevant to 
character and temperament. Pelling observes that this search for other data shows a ‘serious 
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historical enquiry committed to the truth, especially (in this case) when the truth goes beyond 
Thucydides.’566 We see a concern here for the facts, and facts that contribute to understanding 
the real Nicias for the benefit of his audience. 
It is significant that knowledge of Thucydides is assumed of the audience.567 In quoting 
from obscure sources, the audience would likely be unaware of how he represented them, but 
any departures from Thucydides would be noticed. Plutarch would know that any error he made 
could be noticed by the audience. This is one argument to avoid explaining Plutarch’s 
differences from Thucydides as carelessness, rhetorical exaggeration, or fictionalizing. We 
should be careful to note that a departure from Thucydides which may seem to be a contradiction 
to us, would not be unexpected in Plutarch’s milieu.  
The assessment of Nicias by Thucydides and Plutarch 
We will begin our study of Nicias with the same initial question as was stated for 
Pericles. Was Plutarch’s view of the character of Nicias influenced by Thucydides, and did they 
share the same basic assessment of this man? Thucydides seems to present a positive view of 
Nicias. Although Westlake has argued that Thucydides is not prejudiced either way, he at least 
serves as a flawed protagonist.568 The complexity of Thucydides’ presentation of Nicias will be 
noted further below, but his assessment of Nicias at his death in 7.86 carries the most weight as 
far as overall judgment on his character. Thucydides transcends his usually staid narrative to say 
that Nicias ‘was a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved to come to so 
miserable an end, since the whole of his life had been devoted to the study and practice of 
virtue.’569 Thucydides has given the most basic assessment needed for Plutarchan biography: the 
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man had virtue. However, the errors Nicias committed, which Thucydides records also, were 
severe, and related to his characteristic lack of ‘boldness, enterprise, and energy,’ as Westlake 
comments.570 The kinds of errors Nicias made, along with his weaker character qualities, were 
very serious when seen through the prism of Plutarch’s philosophical system, and Plutarch 
voices criticism of Nicias throughout the biography.  
For this reason, scholars are divided whether or not Plutarch presents Nicias as a hero or 
an unworthy character.571 Nikolaidis argues that overall Plutarch presents Nicias negatively, 
choosing critical presentations of Nicias when more positive directions were available, placing 
Nicias implicitly in the category of Alcibiades, Antony and others who were bios examples to 
avoid.572 Plutarch makes very sharp judgments on Nicias for being superstitious, cowardly, 
timid, and ostentatious, and for many of his foolish actions, such as yielding his command to 
Kleon, being too cautious on the Sicilian campaign, or halting the march out of Syracuse in fear 
of the eclipse. Nikoladis further contends that many of Plutarch’s deductions from Thucydides 
spin a much more negative picture than Thucydides gives, such as attributing Nicias’ success as 
a general to fortune, which is not at all what Thucydides says.573  
Some of the more detailed inferences will be examined better below, but it is important to 
first highlight Plutarch’s ideological reasons for blaming Nicias. Plutarch’s love of Athens and 
strong stance on the destructiveness of superstition would make the study of Nicias a particularly 
painful one. Plutarch condemns superstition rather intensely in this essay on the subject, calling 
superstition impiety, because it charges gods with evil,574 and leads to atheism.575 He further 
argues that superstition is worse than atheism, because it involves fear, and the belief that the 
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divinities mean harm rather than good for people, which is actually an insult to them.576 Nicias 
even makes an appearance in the piece: Plutarch declares that if Nicias had removed superstition 
from himself regarding the eclipse, ‘it would perhaps have been the best thing in the world.’577 
He ends the essay with a strong statement that ‘there is no infirmity comprehending such a 
multitude of errors and emotions, and involving opinions so contradictory, or rather antagonistic’ 
than superstition.578 Any strong statements in Plutarch’s rhetorical pieces should be taken with 
caution, as they may go farther on one side of any issue for the sake of argument.579 However, it 
is clear that Plutarch did consider superstition very harmful, and it shows in Nicias. As we saw 
from the prologue, Thucydides’ presentation of the Sicilian expedition was particularly admired 
by Plutarch, making the story all the more poignant to him. The errors that led to the needless 
destruction of the finest Athenian force would have irritated the Athens-admiring Plutarch. This 
explains a harsh tint of his criticisms of Nicias. 
However, there are reasons to question whether Nicias is meant to show a completely 
undesirable character, or that Plutarch was unfair to Nicias, as his text and Plutarch’s philosophy 
once again make clear. Nicias is commended in many of his actions, and sometimes Plutarch is 
more generous than Thucydides in his appraisal.580 Nicias is presented as supporting and actively 
procuring peace with Sparta and restoration of friendliness in Greece,581 and the synkrisis lists 
this as a godlike quality of Nicias.582 It was a very positive aspect for Plutarch, as harmony and 
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Greek unity held exalted positions within his thought,583 and the breakdown of the ‘Peace of 
Nicias’ was a turning point towards the worst in Greek disunity. In fact, in another Life Plutarch 
includes Nicias in a list of ‘great warriors’ who had fought for the liberty of Greece.584 Nicias is 
called a ‘good and moderate man’ for not becoming caught up in the wave of excitement for the 
Sicilian expedition, even if his stubborn reluctance later was inopportune.585 Pelling comments 
that Plutarch is more critical of the Athenian demos than of Nicias, indicating that Nicias had 
some plausible reasons to be nervous and afraid of them.586 His selfless effort in caring for the 
men on the bitter retreat from Syracuse is also commended.587 The synkrisis at the end criticizes 
Nicias harshly against Crassus on some points, but criticizes Crassus equally harshly against 
Nicias on others, and gives strong praise of him as well.588 
There are likewise subtler hints of positive evaluations of Nicias. At the start of the Life, 
he notes Aristotle’s statement that Nicias was among the three best Athenian politicians, 
alongside Thucydides son of Melesias and Theramenes.589 He then says that Theramenes of the 
three was actually not as good as Nicias and Thucydides son of Melesias, then that Thucydides 
was part of the aristocratic party that opposed Pericles previously. Knowing Plutarch’s 
admiration for Pericles, this probably places Nicias at the top of the three. The historical situation 
in Athens at this time indicated a lack of wisdom and political merit in general. As we saw in 
Pericles, Plutarch probably considered Athens to be in overall decline after the death of Pericles. 
This is the generation that condemned Socrates after all. Therefore, in this post-Periclean period, 
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Nicias is presented to be the better man than the demos and the other Athenian leaders, 
especially Alcibiades.590 This means that Plutarch would likely have agreed with Thucydides’ 
assessment that Nicias, of all the other Hellenes of his era, least deserved his awful fate. Nicias 
was simply one of the best that could be had at the time, though certainly not as great as a 
Pericles or Aristides.  
Nicias had a mix of good and bad qualities, and Plutarch highlighted the bad qualities for 
didactic reasons, as they were considered deadly philosophically. The faults of Nicias were 
serious and important to avoid, thus it is not surprising that Plutarch would emphasize them. 
While he detested superstition, he could be understanding of weakness, or in the case of Nicias, 
ignorance.591 As Pelling observes, Plutarch desired ‘ethical generosity in treating human 
weakness.’592 Although Nikolaidis argues that Plutarch was not displaying his characteristic 
generosity for Nicias,593 Plutarch’s praise of Nicias should not be taken lightly, even if balanced 
by perhaps unfair criticism, which itself might stem from frustration with Nicias more than 
actual condemnation. Our view is that Plutarch shares Thucydides’ judgment that Nicias was 
virtuous, but interpreting the events and actions through his philosophical paradigms, he 
explicitly criticizes certain blameworthy aspects of Nicias more than Thucydides did.594 
Characterization of Nicias, Kleon, and the demos  
The assembly meeting concerning Pylos in Nic. 7 provides a particularly good 
opportunity to explore Plutarch’s characterization methods in historical interpretation. Gathering 
from the material in Thucydides, Plutarch constructs a significant picture of the character of 
Nicias, Kleon, and the people. A summary of the situation is provided beforehand – Pylos was 
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under siege, but it was more time-consuming and unmanageable than expected because they 
were not able to defeat the Spartans and block their supply line, and they feared it would only 
become worse with the onset of winter.595 This is a distillation of Thucydides’ own more detailed 
account of the situation.596 The news of the difficulties brought pressure to bear on Kleon when it 
reached Athens, because he opposed an earlier truce offer that the Athenians were wishing they 
had accepted at this point.597 Regarding the truce, however, Plutarch adds that Kleon had 
opposed the truce because of his enmity with Nicias who supported it, which Thucydides does 
not say here, nor in 4.21 where he discussed it.598 Plutarch’s word for enemy (ἐχθρὸς) is used in 
the equivalent section of Thucydides, except there it is used a few lines down to denote the 
relationship of Kleon and Nicias at the start of the assembly debate, making this a possible 
Plutarchan deduction from his knowledge of Kleon’s character. Thucydides includes an episode 
of Kleon questioning the truth of the reports, then withdrawing his questioning when they 
appointed him to go there and observe, fearing he would have to retract his words or be proven a 
liar.599 Plutarch omits that episode, but moves on to create a picture of the assembly in Athens 
discussing the issue. Plutarch makes explicit what was more subtle in Thucydides in relating 
Kleon’s attack of Nicias. Thucydides says Kleon pointed at Nicias, adding that he was his 
opponent (ἐχθρὸς), and asserted that if the generals were men they would easily be able to take 
the island. On the other hand, Plutarch flatly states that Kleon ‘laid all the blame’ on Nicias 
himself. This is an inference from Thucydides’ parenthesis of Kleon being ἐχθρὸς to Nicias. It 
was clear from the context, for Plutarch, that this was what Kleon was really doing, rather than 
pointing to Nicias as merely representative of all of the generals involved.  
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As the episode continues de Romilly notices three interesting differences between their 
accounts.600 First, Plutarch turns the report-style of Thucydides into direct speech. De Romilly 
passes over this fact without much comment, but it would seem Plutarch is trying to relate a 
familiar event in a fresh way for his audience. This is a reconstruction of a historical event, 
bringing the audience of the Life even closer to the situation by recreating it in their imagination, 
as dialogue brings more immediacy to the story. The second difference is the assignment of 
motives, where de Romilly observes that Thucydides wrote six lines regarding the motives of 
Kleon and his demagoguery, but Plutarch did not discuss even one of them.601 When Nicias 
offers Kleon the command, and the crowd urges him until he takes it, de Romilly posits that 
Plutarch gives a ‘pyschological and moral’ explanation and Thucydides an ‘intellectual 
explanation’ for Kleon’s decision.602 Thucydides says that Kleon had no other way out if he were 
to remain consistent with what he had said, but Plutarch says his ambition was incited and on 
fire. Was Kleon trapped, or did he snatch up the opportunity? 
This difference can be explained by Plutarch’s character theory and his idea of historical 
causation. Drawing from Thucydides, comic poets, and other sources, Plutarch knows Kleon as a 
pandering demagogue. Plutarch had a well-developed idea (and dislike) of this type of character. 
Plutarch upheld the ideal statesman, the politicus, as the wise middle between two other extreme 
categories of leaders – the demagogue and the tyrant.603 The tyrant may deceive or terrify people 
with power to gain more power, but the demagogue deceives in another way, by flattery.604 In his 
essay on flattery, he defines flatterers to be unsound in character, those who change themselves 
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according to whoever they are trying to flatter.605 Demagogues were flatterers of the masses, 
which Plutarch believed especially disgraceful.606  
In fact, Plutarch’s entire conception of the demagogue character type may have been 
largely developed from exposure to writing about Kleon, especially from Aristophanes.607 Kleon 
makes a frequent appearance in the History as well, pushing some kind of agitation, which itself 
was enough to give Plutarch a robust sense of his status as an unvirtuous demagogue.608 Kleon 
was always appealing to the baser desires of the people, and asserting his own ascendency, a 
combination that made it historically obvious to Plutarch that Kleon opposed the truce with 
Sparta for his animosity with Nicias,609 as was noted above. It would also explain his reading of 
Kleon accepting command out of ambition. Plutarch does not necessarily disagree with 
Thucydides that Kleon was forced into it – Plutarch implies as much when he relates that Kleon 
kept refusing the call. But his entrapment must have included an ambitious motive as well, 
especially judging from his boast of not fearing the Spartans and taking a small force 
immediately after accepting the command in Thucydides 4.28.3. Therefore an ‘intellectual’ 
versus ‘psychological’ idea in Thucydides and Plutarch may not be the best description of the 
two authors, as they are both presenting the same demagogue except Plutarch has made further 
deductions based upon this understanding of Kleon’s character. In any case, character theory 
aided in Plutarch’s historical reasoning. Further, in Plutarch’s historical understanding of Athens 
and of the merits of Nicias, a destructive Kleon with certain motives of personal ambition is 
more significant than the motives Thucydides lists. Kleon gaining authority and influence 
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opened the floodgates of political turmoil and confusion in Athens, and it was this very episode 
that brought Kleon to greater power in the city.610  
The third difference de Romilly sees is in the Athenian response to Kleon accepting 
command in the way that he did. Thucydides says the Athenians laughed at Kleon’s boast of 
taking the place in twenty days, and the wise men were glad that they would either rid 
themselves of Kleon or would have the place taken.611 De Romilly comments that Plutarch left 
out the wise people’s opinion but emphasizes the laughter, adding the adjective μέγα and adding 
it was ‘an agreeable game’ which highlights the more serious tone of Thucydides who connected 
this event with the future misfortune.612  
This comment is insightful on more subdued and serious tendencies in Thucydides’ work. 
However, it does not seem to get across the Thucydidean vein Plutarch is using. He is not 
obligated to replicate the precise tone of Thucydides to practice good historiography, as 
historians would find ways to be faithful to the spirit of the work while looking at it in a different 
way.613 While the additions could be seen as artistic license, there are points from Thucydides’ 
text Plutarch could have pulled from. The wise men, who Plutarch does not name, were glad 
(ἀσμένοις) that Kleon was leaving, which could add to the happiness of the joke. However, this 
word often appears in classical literature in the context of relief rather than levity.614 A more 
likely option is deduction from the nature of the crowd, which is a major theme in both passages. 
Thucydides described the prodding of Kleon ‘as the crowd was apt to do’ (οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ 
ποιεῖν). Plutarch is also operating within the characterization of the crowd. What would the 
crowd do in this situation? The answer entirely depends on how humorous or outlandish Kleon 
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is. Plutarch probably took that it was very much so, for at least two reasons. First, Plutarch is 
making a general statement of the people’s opinions of Kleon at this point, that they were already 
accustomed to his κουφότητα, which is a play off of Thucydides’ κουφολογίᾳ, or thoughtless 
talking. Plutarch is actually giving an argument here. Second, there is evidence at this stage of 
Kleon’s career of the people’s awareness of Kleon’s antics. Immediately following this episode, 
Plutarch illustrates his argument with an anecdote of Kleon’s adjournment of the waiting 
assembly for the day because he was busy, which also brought laughter. Thus, Plutarch has 
extended Thucydides’ ideas of Kleon’s character, as well as the character of the crowd. Kleon’s 
antics are absurd, and the crowd by nature seeks entertainment and teasing. 
 In Nicias, the Athenians as a collective entity play an important singular character. 
Plutarch had a universal viewpoint about the common people, regardless of what society was 
under discussion: Plutarch’s simplistic application of classical views of the people onto Rome 
has been noted,615 and he does this for Greek Lives as well. Saïd points out Plutarch’s Platonic 
background for his concepts of the people, as in the Republic and Laws the masses of the city are 
representative of the irrational, appetitive part of the soul.616 Saïd likewise argues that Plutarch 
portrays the people in his Lives as being led by their desires and passions, using many of the 
same words Plato used in describing them.617 We have seen this in the Pericles, where Pericles 
went along with the people’s desires until he gained enough power to exert his own reasoned 
plans over them, making him equivalent to the rational part of the soul.618 The contrast with 
Pericles then in Nicias would be all the more apparent, as Nicias, the wiser man in the city, was 
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not capable of controlling the people or outmaneuvering his demagogue opponents, Alcibiades 
and Kleon. 
The people are also an avenue of character pronouncement upon Nicias. Plutarch often 
does not give his own judgment of Nicias about some action, but includes what the demos 
thought about it.619 This tack is used for an early evaluation of the character of Nicias in 2.3-4, 
where Nicias was put forward to lead the rich, but the common people also appreciated him to be 
set up against Kleon’s buffoonery, and they liked that he was timid and afraid of them. After 
Kleon’s successful capture of Pylos, Nicias was discredited and ridiculed for giving his 
command to Kleon, as Plutarch understood from Aristophanes’ play.620 The peace Nicias 
negotiated brought him respect and praise from everyone, and Plutarch discusses at length what 
people were saying about him for this,621 though later they were angry with him when the war re-
engaged and so many prisoners had been restored to Sparta.622 The pact between Nicias and 
Alcibiades to ostracize Hyperbolus was amusing at first, but then scorned by the people, which 
Plutarch uses as a springboard for discussing ostracism and its purpose, and a meditation about 
the fate of Nicias’ decision regarding the ostracism vote.623 Thus, the people provide both 
information to highlight character traits about Nicias and also an indirect evaluation mechanism 
in the narrative. 
The invasion of Sicily provides the clearest examples of Plutarch’s characterization of the 
demos. Alcibiades is presented as stirring Athens with excitement for involvement in Sicily 
before the assembly had met.624 This fits with Plutarch’s characterization of the masses as 
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passive and being acted upon by an outside force, usually a political leader.625 Plutarch includes 
an image of ‘youth in their training-schools and the old men in their work-shops and lounging-
places’ sitting together drawing maps of Sicily and surrounding regions in thoughts of 
conquering the Western Mediterranean.626 Plutarch emphasizes also their stubbornness in voting 
on the expedition. The pleas of Nicias only serve to harden them to his advice, and paradoxically 
convince them they ought to invade Sicily and appoint Nicias general in the expedition he so 
strongly opposes, in hopes that he would provide balance to the other generals.627 In chapter 13, 
where the omens and oracles regarding the expedition are discussed, Plutarch comments, ‘no 
signs could deter the people from the expedition, where they ever so obvious and clear.’628 By 
Plutarch’s philosophy, the irrational demos would do anything when their passions were so 
stirred, and this becomes a mechanism of explanation for the history surrounding the hero of the 
Life. 
The generals’ debate – compression and characterization in chapter 14 
The difference of opinion among the Athenian generals of Nicias chapter 14, taken from 
6.47-50 in the History, has been given as an example of Plutarch distorting a situation beyond the 
limit of proper historiography, thus it deserves our attention. Thucydides begins his account of 
the situation by having the three generals meeting together while the fleet was at Rhegium. They 
had just received word that Egesta could not give the funds they had promised, and that Rhegium 
would not ally with them in their campaign in Sicily.629 Therefore, Nicias, Alcibiades, and 
Lamachos held council on what to do given these discouraging circumstances: Nicias that they 
should sail around Sicily to make a statement of power and return to Athens, Alcibiades that they 
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should foment revolt in the cities then attack Selinus and Syracuse, and Lamachos that they 
should head for Syracuse and fight as soon as possible, because it would terrify the enemy 
immediately and give the most chance of victory.630  
Regarding Plutarch’s redaction of this passage, de Romilly writes that while Plutarch’s 
compression of the episode is understandable for a biography, it is divergent enough from 
Thucydides to make it ‘question of mere fact.’631 Plutarch reverses the order of the opinions of 
the generals. Thucydides lists the generals and their advice to be Nicias, Alcibiades, then 
Lamachos, but Plutarch does the opposite, listing Lamachos, Alcibiades, then Nicias at the end, 
‘as if Nicias’ advice had prevailed.’632 We will argue, however, that it misrepresents Plutarch’s 
usage of Thucydides to say that he altered fact, upon closer examination of what Plutarch was 
actually doing.  
Chapter 14 is not episodic or chronological, but a general statement about Nicias in the 
first phase of the expedition. Plutarch sets up the discussion in a very different way: in his 
previous chapter, the force was still in Athens, and he is covering ground very quickly. There is 
no description of the launch of the fleet itself or the debates in Syracuse or itinerary of the 
Athenian fleet as Thucydides had included, since they contain more detail than his narrative 
requires. Thucydides devotes 6.30-52, a very large section, to the fleet’s departure and 
subsequent events before coming to Sicily, and it would have been a challenge to merely retell 
the narrative with a drastic word cut. Instead, after talking about the ill-omen of the men 
departing during a festival from non-Thucydidean sources,633 Plutarch embarks on character 
analysis. He discusses the merits of Nicias’ wisdom and honesty in opposing the expedition, but 
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criticizes the hesitancy and caution that would mark this campaign, ‘gazing homewards from his 
ship like a child, and many times resuming and dwelling on the thought that the people had not 
yielded to his reasonings, till he took the edge and zeal of his colleagues in command and lost the 
fittest time for action.’634 There is no time-element at this point, but he observes that Nicias’ 
actions affected the others negatively.  
The very next sentence states the opinions of the three generals, but there are important 
things to note in the way Plutarch relates this. The sentence begins with ὁ δέ, a simple 
contrastive. There is no indicator here of time, place, situation, or causation in which these 
opinions were expressed, or any idea of one specific war council even being held. He states the 
opinions of Lamachos and Alcibiades, then the proposal of Nicias, ending with a declaration of 
the depressive effect his proposal had upon the men.635 Plutarch expresses the opinions of the 
generals only in the context of making a point about Nicias and the results of his words. It would 
seem then that Plutarch is not changing the facts as to how the council ended, because there is no 
‘council.’ Therefore, neither is there a vote in which Lamachos went with Alcibiades’ plan to 
break the deadlock. Rather, Plutarch was stating the simple opinions of each general on what to 
do, with the emphasis that Nicias’ lack of rigor was bad for morale. The text does not state what 
decision was taken at this point, but that the advice of Nicias discouraged the men, which is an 
idea Plutarch repeats in this chapter twice.636  
Plutarch continues moving in circles in this chapter. After the opinions of the three 
generals, he relates that when Alcibiades was recalled, Nicias held sole command and was idle 
(14.3-4), then gives an episode of Alcibiades while he was still with the fleet sailing for Syracuse 
and the possible omen of the captured ship (14.5-6) before repeating again that after this 
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Alcibiades left and Nicias held sole command (15.1). It may also be noted that Plutarch’s 
audience, if the prologue is any indication, already knew Thucydides and would not take 
Plutarch to mean that there was a particular three-general council where Nicias forced his 
opinion. Westlake points out that the function of this episode for Thucydides is to demonstrate 
the disunity among the generals, and also to show that the plan of Alcibiades was not fully 
implemented; both Nicias and Lamachos each followed their own plans to some degree.637  
The omission of Alcibiades’ plan would fit into acceptable practice for historical 
summary. Plutarch does not give an account of the various minor incidents that took place with 
Alcibiades still present, sailing around to cities in alliance attempts.638 If Plutarch had noted that 
Alcibiades’ advice was taken, he would have to break from his historical point of Nicias’ 
character, and also would need to explain what the fleet did to follow Alcibiades’ advice before 
his recall, which is also irrelevant. If the other omissions of the fleet at Rhegium or delegations 
to Catana are acceptable practice for historiography, would it be any more misleading to omit 
that before Nicias’ caution prevailed, they followed Alcibiades’ plan for a short and 
unproductive time? This seems to be a case of summarizing rather than actually altering the 
facts. 
Characterization of Nicias: superstitious and cautious general.  
Actions after the recall of Alcibiades provide very good examples of Plutarch’s 
characterization method of interpreting history, especially for Nicias in his caution as a general 
and his superstition. Plutarch had already given attention to both attributes. In chapter 4 he cited 
Thucydides to say that Nicias was overly inclined towards divination, and provided some other 
source material to that regard. After discussing the caution of Nicias in dealings with the 
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demos,639 in chapter 6 Plutarch explains his caution as a general. Knowing how merciless the 
people could be on generals who failed, Nicias avoided difficult expeditions and instead focused 
on quick forays that carried less risk. Plutarch notes the wisdom of Nicias in doing this, and lists 
a number of his victories as general. Framing Nicias’ character on these points allowed Plutarch 
to make predictions and inferences from his sources to shed more light on what happened, 
beyond what Thucydides explicitly states. These two aspects of his character are related and play 
off each other. 
At this point in the History, the two Athenian generals divide their forces and took 
command of each by lot, then sailed along the coast of Sicily with the intention of gathering 
allies and funds.640 Unsuccessful in this effort with Himera, they captured Hyccra and enslaved 
the people, dealt with allied Egesta and the Sicels, and attempted to capture Hybla but failed as 
the summer ended. Thucydides in the next chapter proceeds to winter events, the Athenians 
preparing to attack Syracuse and Syracusan movements.641 He portrays the Syracusan attitude to 
be one of growing boldness: ‘For after the Athenians had failed to make an immediate attack, as 
they had first feared and expected they would do, the Syracusans gained confidence with every 
day that went by.’642  
Plutarch compresses this material into chapter 15 with added interpretations of his own. 
Immediately after noting Alcibiades’ departure, he asserts that Nicias was now in command. 
Already this is a striking divergence from the corresponding passage of Thucydides, which refers 
to both of the generals doing the actions, with the one exception of naming Nicias as the general 
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who sailed to Egesta.643 Littman does not discuss this difference from Thucydides in his own 
explanation of this section,644 though Pelling cites it to say that Plutarch emphasized Nicias’ 
authority.645 Pelling suggests this is an inference on Plutarch’s part, which we will assume 
here.646 But is there warrant to say that Nicias actually had this authority?  
Plutarch thought so, and he argues the point with historical reasoning. Building upon the 
record of Nicias being affluent, Plutarch contrasts his wealth and prestige with records of 
Lamachos’ poverty, to the extent of charging Athens for his clothes and boots, an idea possibly 
originating from a comedy, though this is uncertain.647 He also gives an anecdote of a younger 
Nicias offering the older Sophocles the first word in a general’s council, which Sophocles 
rebuffs to say that Nicias is the senior general.648 Both stories may sound more dubious to 
modern scholars, especially with the chronology problems of the Sophocles story, though even 
Plutarch distances himself from this one with λέγεται.649 Plutarch does say that Lamachos was 
honourable and brave, thus one might wonder why this fact would not argue that Lamachos had 
an equal role to Nicias. Given Plutarch’s views of the flightiness of the Athenian people at this 
time, he would probably doubt the Athenians would give much weight to bravery over wealthy 
prestige. Besides his assumption that the richer, more important man of the two would naturally 
have command, he also bases this in the events. After restating that Lamachos was under Nicias’ 
command, he gives the summary of the History regarding the long period of time without a 
decisive attack and lack of success in fighting.650 A deduction that only Nicias and not the daring 
and determined Lamachos could be responsible for these delays would be fairly easy for him. 
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Lastly, the impression that Nicias held first place to Lamachos is even given by Thucydides. 
Hornblower observes, the name ‘Lamachos’ is avoided in Thucydides for the rest of book 6 until 
the account of his death in 6.101.2.651  
The next section shows Plutarch’s characterization of the cautious Nicias yet more 
clearly: 
[…] using his forces in a cautious and hesitating manner, he first gave the enemy courage 
by cruising around Sicily as far as possible from them, and then, by attacking the 
diminutive little city of Hybla, and going off without taking it, he won their utter 
contempt. Finally, he went back to Catana without effecting anything at all except the 
overthrow of Hyccara, a barbarian fastness.652 
 
The sailing around Sicily, failure to take little Hybla, return to Catana, and taking Hyccara are all 
facts from Thucydides.653 Additionally, the disrespect from the enemy is from the History, as 
quoted above, for which Thucydides had given three reasons: the Athenian delay in attacking, 
the long distance the Athenians placed between them, and the Athenian failure to take Hybla.654 
Plutarch has essentially repeated the last two reasons, but the first idea on the delay is expanded 
upon. The phrase of Thucydides in 6.63.2, ‘did not attack them at once’ (οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπέκειντο) is 
used twice in 7.42.3 where Demosthenes, representing Thucydides’ own opinion as Hornblower 
has shown, argues with Nicias that not attacking immediately was a mistake.655 Plutarch picks up 
Thucydides’ criticism of Nicias’ delays by saying he used the forces in a ‘cautious and hesitating 
manner’ (χρώμενος εὐλαβῶς καὶ διὰ μελλήσεως). Littman comments on this addition that 
Plutarch ‘is constantly trying to show that Nicias’ weakness was his hesitation, which indeed it 
was at Syracuse; hence, he is careful to underline this trait where Thucydides leaves it to be 
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understood.’656 Mere delay is turned into over-wariness and hesitation, which is grounded in both 
Thucydides’ implications and Plutarch’s characterization of Nicias as a cautious general. 
 Plutarch continues his narrative in chapter 16, and here Thucydides’ account657 meshes 
with Plutarch’s paradigm of the cautious general turning to brilliant action. Plutarch does not 
repeat the details of the numerous pages Thucydides occupies on the tactics and battle, but 
summarizes key points and judgments. In 16.1 there is only one significant addition for our 
purposes here: Plutarch says that the Syracusan pressure and plan to attack the Athenians made 
Nicias ‘reluctantly’ sail for Syracuse. This is the pivot for the cautious general – always avoiding 
action but there comes a point when then the situation compels action. This pivot is covered in 
Thucydides 6.64.1, but there is no mention of reluctance. Also, the language is of the ‘Athenian 
generals,’ not Nicias specifically, as once again Plutarch is taking all of the actions of Nicias and 
Lamachos to mean Nicias as the primary general (though he does not necessarily deny that 
Lamachos assists and gives counsel). Thucydides relates the plan to send the man from Catana 
for tricking the Syracusans into marching out and the surprise appearance of the Athenians by 
the city in 6.64-66, which Plutarch follows closely, though in a shortened version.658 Plutarch 
then pronounces this battle as the best generalship of Nicias in Sicily, giving an abbreviated 
account of the battle from 6.67-70.659 Now that Nicias is committed to action, he would do well. 
Plutarch adds Nicias cutting bridges afterward and a comment from Hermocrates, which may be 
from Philistus.660 He also asserts that the action of Nicias terrified the Syracusans enough to elect 
three generals with absolute powers, which is what Thucydides 6.72-73 records, except the 
attribution of fear to their motives was his own.  
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 The next paragraph in Nicias concerning the temple at Olympieium brings Plutarch’s 
methods together. What happened at the temple is a problem. After the Syracusan retreat, 
Thucydides states that the Syracusans sent a garrison to the nearby Olympieium fearing the 
Athenians would make off with the treasure.661 However, he states, ‘The Athenians did not go to 
the temple (πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον); they gathered their dead, put them on a pyre, and 
camped there for the night.’662 Contrarily, two other extant writings on this episode from 
Diodorus and Pausanias say that the Athenians did take the Olympieium.663 Both writers may 
have taken this information from Philistus.664 Hornblower notes that Thucydides’ negative 
presentation of πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον may indicate a polemical point against a circulating 
account that the Athenians captured the place.665 In light of the disagreement in other authors, it 
seems that ‘the facts of the matter were indeed controversial.’666 Plutarch would have been aware 
of the discrepancy if Philistus did indeed say the temple was captured, because he had access to 
Philistus, as we saw in the prologue. Even if not, Plutarch was widely read, and if there were 
enough claims that the temple was captured for both Diodorus and Pausanias to say so, he likely 
would have been aware of it. 
How Plutarch handles the situation shows the application of his character theory to a 
historical problem. What would the cautious and pious Nicias have done? Both of these aspects 
of Nicias’ character could argue that he would not have captured the temple, from Plutarch’s 
point of view. With Syracusan cavalry around and a force of men in a good defensive position, 
an attack would have seemed risky. Further, Nicias would have been very concerned about the 
controversy of capturing sacred ground and the risk of his soldiers plundering something, 
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angering gods and inviting some punishment to occur, especially as he was already 
uncomfortable with the entire Sicilian enterprise. This is the man who forewent the honour of a 
trophy to pick up forgotten war-dead667 and desired to wait twenty-seven days after the lunar 
eclipse.668 The Athenian demos whom he feared would also blame him. Ideas like this about 
Nicias’ character and the nature of the events would influence Plutarch’s interpretation of the 
historical record. Plutarch tells the narrative this way:  
[…] the Athenians set out to seize it [the Olypieum], inasmuch as it contained many 
offerings of gold and silver. But Nicias purposely delayed operations until it was too late, 
and allowed a garrison from Syracuse to enter in, because he thought that if his soldiers 
plundered the temple’s treasures the commonwealth would get no advantage from it, and 
he himself would incur the blame for the sacrilege.669 
 
Littman suggests Plutarch makes an apparent compromise between the two competing 
traditions,670 but we further suggest that this compromise is based upon a theory of character. 
Plutarch is in essence giving a nod to the non-Thucydidean tradition that there was an idea to 
seize the temple, yet he also preserves the concern to not commit impiety. Pausanius said that the 
Athenians did not disturb the offerings or the priest, and Plutarch would naturally see Nicias as 
one who would especially be concerned about this. However, he ultimately sides with 
Thucydides that it was not taken, and his theory of Nicias’ character could have been a major 
factor in deciding this.671 
Plutarch’s conception of the character of Nicias also influenced his interpretation of the 
withdrawal from Syracuse. The way Thucydides tells it, withdrawal was the most expedient 
course of action – winter was arriving, the base would not be the best place to fight since the 
Athenians had no cavalry and needed to send for some, they needed more money and could 
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gather more allies from Sicily, and they would need food and supplies to attack Syracuse in the 
spring.672 Evidently, Plutarch did not find these reasons convincing.673 He says that Nicias did 
not make use of his victory, but withdrew to Naxos. He actually seems to acknowledge 
Thucydides’ list, but uses hindsight to show this was not effective – his spending on armament 
was not used, and his attempts to obtain allies with the Sicels were largely unsuccessful. This 
inaction encouraged the Syracusans to march to Catana and burn the old Athenian camp. 
Plutarch again reiterates the cautious general type through the mouths of others, that ‘everyone’ 
was criticizing Nicias for his hesitation, which is not in Thucydides and may be Plutarch’s own 
deduction.674 Plutarch sums up the character of Nicias immediately: ‘When he was once in action 
no one could find fault with the man, for after he had set out to do a thing he was vigorous and 
effective; but in venturing out to do it he was hesitating and timid.’675 Plutarch is able to show 
this once again in the next chapter, that when winter was over Nicias sailed back to Syracuse and 
prosecuted the siege vigorously.  
The rest of the Life can be seen as a series of such back-and-forth patterns, of Nicias 
cautious and hesitant, moving into action brilliantly when given no other choice, then 
withdrawing and not following through with the fight. Chapters 16-17 represent Nicias in action, 
performing amazing feats in carrying out the siege and thinking quickly to avert danger when 
their camp was under attack in the battle that killed Lamachos. Plutarch deduces that Nicias had 
great hopes with his successes,676 and made him bolder, ‘contrary to his nature.’677 Later, when 
Syracuse received aid from Sparta and Demosthenes came with reinforcements from Athens, the 
caution of Nicias comes out again, as Demosthenes pushes for battle and his hesitancy is 
                                                          
672 Thuc. 6.71. 
673 Nic. 16.7. 
674 Pelling 2000:47. 
675 Nic. 16.8. 
676 Pelling 2011:135 n. 14. 
677 Nic. 18.6. 
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criticized and overruled.678 The eclipse of the moon also combines Nicias’ characteristic 
hesitancy to act in military decisions as well as his superstition. Immediately before the eclipse 
Nicias had been pressured to withdraw, but he refused now out of his basic fear.679 This last 
example of Nicias’ superstition is the climax of the theme in Nicias. Plutarch presents these 
character flaws at their height, and cites anti-examples from philosophy and the statesman Dion 
to indicate how Nicias should have acted.680 These accounts all have their foundation in 
Thucydides, but Plutarch particularly highlights this theme according to his understanding of 
character.681 The retreat and its tragic ending occupy the rest of the Life,682 where Nicias 
vindicates himself by acting valiantly and giving himself for his men, again forced into action 
and performing brilliantly despite the awful circumstances.  
Nevertheless, Plutarch’s portrayal of his last days shows how the character traits of 
Nicias have caused both his success and his fall, an aspect that Pelling argues is different from 
Thucydides.683 Nicias, for Thucydides, is caught up in events much larger than himself, and this 
is how the causation in his narrative is framed.684 Plutarch on the other hand makes the tragedy 
‘more personal’ to Nicias, bringing out what was latent in Thucydides to show how Nicias’ 
decisions, flowing from his nature, brought events to unfold as they did.685 While agreeing with 
this analysis, however, it should also be remembered that Plutarch includes the larger picture 
from Thucydides as well, but through a character-focused paradigm: the demagoguery of Kleon 
and the irrationality of the demos. These contextual factors originating from their characters, 
combined with the flaws in Nicias, bring the tragic end. 
                                                          
678 Nic. 21. 
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681 See Littman 1970:222-223. 
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We can also observe that despite the tragic elements of the story, Plutarch seems to 
distance himself from generic factors of tragedy. Pelling’s study on the endings of Lives shows 
that he generally sought to relate a more positive ending, and Nicias is an example of this, ending 
with the idea that it was not ‘all in vain,’ but rather that Nicias always knew that this was how it 
would end, lessening the tragic effects or any surprise involved.686 Plutarch’s ending line of 
Nicias also provides some meaningful interpretation of the death of Nicias, along with the irony. 
Nicias told the Athenians that invading Sicily would achieve a bad end, yet they absolutely did 
not believe the report of the defeat until it was proven to them by the event. Marinatos has 
argued that Thucydides portrays Nicias as a wise advisor and insightful warner about the tragic 
end of Athenian desires.687 Duff says that Plutarch is conveying the same idea here, that Nicias is 
‘cast as a kind of tragic “warner,” familiar from tragedy or Herodotus: only after his death, and 
with difficulty, is he believed.’688 In this last line the character of Nicias and the demos come 
together – the unthinking people and the wise but weak Nicias. From these lessons of character, 
Plutarch undoubtedly hoped that the history would be informative and helpful to the lives of his 
audience. 
Conclusions on Nicias 
As Pelling has written, Nicias and his ‘nervous unease’ is ‘a theme which Plutarch takes 
from Thucydides but develops in a more thoroughgoing way.’689 Yet as shown above, we can 
build from this to argue not only that Plutarch was developing the life and character of Nicias 
from Thucydides, but also that character was a way of historical interpretation, of reconstructing 
what happened. Plutarch uses evidence from Thucydides to construct clearly delineated 
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characters in his narrative – the demagogue Kleon, the irrational demos, and the anxious Nicias. 
We have seen that Plutarch not only uses a theory of character to choose what facts to include 
from Thucydides, but also uses it to increase understanding of the historical situation. He 
attempts to solve historical problems, such as reasons for any kind of delayed action, or whether 
the Athenians took the temple near Syracuse, by the fact of the cautious nature of Nicias. This 
can rightly be called a historiographical method, even where the character theory is focused upon 
the psychology of Nicias. In discussing Thucydides’ treatment of psychology, Westlake 
comments, ‘historians commonly draw inferences of this kind about individuals from general 
indications of character, and indeed the practice is almost unavoidable when writing about the 
past.’690 Thucydides wrote centuries before Plutarch, and Plutarch was faced with questions 
Thucydides did not intend to answer. Therefore, Plutarch speculated and deduced what he could 
from what he did have of Thucydides and other sources.  
We have already noted that some commentators suggest this is a distortion on Plutarch’s 
part. However, seeing Plutarch’s work as distortions of the historical record is problematic. The 
grounding provided by our study of Plutarch’s presentation of historical persons drawn from 
Thucydides can be connected to other areas of Plutarchan studies as well. When Schettino sees 
Plutarch to manipulate the historical record of Crassus, the reason she gives is the how his 
eventual defeat at Carrhae casts a shadow over the entire Life.691 Schettino states that Plutarch’s 
universal, ethical interpretation of Crassus diminishes the historical value of him as an 
individual.692 However, our study has revealed an ethical, universal interpretation of Thucydides 
regarding Nicias as well, and we have shown that such a take does not mean Plutarch is being 
ahistorical or not doing historiography. Greek historiography was didactic and meant to show 
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universal principles, making individuals representative of larger conceptions. Polybius would 
bring out the same when discussing Philip, Hannibal, or Scipio693 and his idea that history has 
didactic value for today would only make sense if there were universal principles at work.694  
Nicias, being the parallel of Crassus, also has the Sicilian disaster colouring Nicias’ life, as the 
prologue makes clear.695  
It is true that both Crassus and Nicias acted in history in other ways and are significant 
beyond their eventual defeats, but Plutarch’s biographies do not deny this fact, and do include 
other historical trajectories, such as elucidating the consequences of Nicias giving command to 
Kleon or Crassus’ importance as a political figure and his role in defeating the slave revolt.696 
Their defeats were significant for Athenian and Roman history, were well-known, provided 
Plutarch with plenty of source material, and represented lessons in character and action that 
could be useful for Plutarch’s audience. It is these ‘shadows’ of their last campaigns that 
provides the most historical meaning to each Life and its recipients. Kahler points out that a 
biography concerns ‘historic personalities whose lives carry meaning for their people, or for 
humanity.’697 In light of how important their respective catastrophes were to the memories of 
both Greeks and Romans, it could not help but become a theme of both Lives, and make them 
more significant, not less, historically.  
 This also shows a concern that the narrative itself be historical. Pitcher observes that 
even in modern history, the difference between ‘evidence’ and ‘speculation' and the ‘verifiable’ 
versus the ‘plausible’ is difficult to determine, and is now clarified with tense changes such as ‘x 
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would have known this’ or ‘Y will have decided that.’698 Plutarch did not have such tense change 
techniques and qualifiers available to him. He would not necessarily let the reader know which 
words were his own speculations and which were from a source, or relate in extended detail his 
thinking behind every interpretive decision, nor would he be expected to. Plutarch made 
educated guesses based upon his ideological perspective - views of stock, natural characters or 
beliefs about political systems – perspectives his audience would likely have shared, or at least 
been aware of. Some of Plutarch's guesses do not sound as plausible to us today, but the fact 
remains that the work of historians today is primarily composed of arguments over the most 
plausible guesses about history in light of meagre and mixed evidence – the same kinds of 
labours that Plutarch engaged in.  
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Conclusion  
Summary 
This thesis has argued that Plutarch’s biographical method is historiography, tracing 
classical Greek historiographical and biographical theory up to the Imperial period, then 
constructing Plutarch’s philosophy and methodology, and finally examining Plutarch’s 
engagement with Thucydides for the Pericles and Nicias. In tracing the development of the genre 
of biography, we saw that it has multiple influences, descending from philosophy, 
historiography, encomium, and poetry. We saw that ancient genre was flexible, and in comparing 
history and biography, there was a great deal of overlap. The methods and purposes of historians 
and biographers coincide in moral vision, the need to sort through sources and documents 
carefully, and an interest in the great deeds or words of significant individuals. The most 
necessary difference, according to practice and apparent reader expectations was scope: 
biographies were shorter than histories and each focused upon the life of a one person at time. 
These conclusions did not prove in themselves that the Greek bioi used historiographical method, 
but that it is possible to consider it this way, opening the way for discussing Plutarch. 
In the next chapter, we examined Plutarch’s intellectual background and what influences 
would affect his interpretation of history. We saw that Plutarch’s separation of history and 
biography in Alexander is not a separation in method, but in scope. Additionally, the Lives were 
considered to be in a very real sense history, the generic demarcation notwithstanding. Plutarch’s 
idea of history was that must be informative, true to fact, and bring out the character of the 
participants. 
The next two chapters examined Plutarch’s reading of Thucydides in the Pericles and 
Nicias, to demonstrate that this methodology is historiography. His repetition and preservation of 
the History in his quotations and summaries support this, and as Marincola has explained, the 
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historian has an obligation to be faithful to the written records, to the traditions that have been 
given.699 On the other hand, there is a need to be unique from one’s predecessors, which is what 
Plutarch did in rewording, paraphrasing, and deducing from Thucydides.700 Plutarch’s additions, 
subtractions, and other divergences from Thucydides, if not due to other sources, can be 
explained by Plutarch’s historical reasoning. He kept to the representation of Pericles that 
Thucydides provided, but synthesized conflicting sources into a character progression in 
Pericles’ political habit to arrive there. We have focused particularly on problematic areas, 
speculating on the logic Plutarch would have constructed in examining his sources. Further, his 
ideologies – his concept of characterization, Platonist political philosophy, ethical views of 
history, veneration for the classical tradition, and critical method of questioning were part of his 
overall paradigm that is useful for explaining what happened in the past.  
Just as in Pericles, Plutarch follows closely the text of Thucydides for Nicias, yet 
reorganizes and summarizes according to the demands of a biography. Additionally, we found 
that Plutarch’s conception of character could be used in the Nicias to make deductions about the 
historical record, to say what happened and what caused it. Even though the scope of Plutarch’s 
bioi is centred around individuals and their character, his methods of characterisation are types of 
historiography. 
Thus, we have seen ways in which Plutarch’s additions and differences from Thucydides 
need not be seen as fictional elaboration, or literary embellishment, but as serious historical 
reasoning. This is not to say that Plutarch was correct in his guesswork, or did not commit errors, 
but it does attempt to show that apparent problems in his methodology can be demonstrated as 
consistent with his overall historiographical care. His errors and ancient perspective 
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notwithstanding, we can agree with Pelling that Plutarch did try to get it right, and in our effort to 
demonstrate Plutarch’s consistency on the issue, we suggest he wanted to get it right every time. 
For future research 
Further research on Plutarch could be aided by seeing his methods as historiographical. It 
could further our understanding of his philosophy, his Greekness under Roman rule, and the 
relationship between the Moralia and Lives. Looking at Plutarch’s attempts to reconstruct the 
past might also be compared to the idea of ‘history as re-enactment.’ Looking for 
historiographical method in Imperial period biographies is also a promising direction. Suetonius 
writing in Latin near Plutarch’s time, as well as Non-Greeks writing in biographies in Greek, 
such as Philo’s Life of Moses and the synoptic gospels would make fruitful areas of study, as 
would comparisons to each other and to Plutarch’s Lives.  
Philo was a Platonist living under Roman dominion reaching back to more glorious days 
of the past to write a biography of Moses, an ancient hero of his people. Philo used the Hebrew 
Bible as a source for this work, which enables us to compare his source text with the final 
product and observe whether his methodology bears similarity to Greek historiography. McGing 
has already began work in this area,701 but there is more work to be done, and a comparison with 
Plutarch’s methodology would also be interesting, as a fellow Platonist yet also from a separate 
religious tradition. 
Likewise, the synoptic gospels would provide an opportunity to examine the innovations 
of Greek biography. In most of the 20th century the gospels were considered as sui generis 
literature,702 though now they are more commonly grouped under biography after the studies of 
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Burridge, first published in 1992.703 The understanding of the gospels as biographies has been 
profitable for new directions in gospel studies, and has created interdisciplinary dialogue 
between New Testament and Classical scholarship.704 Connecting biographical method and 
historiographical method could also open up new opportunities in this area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
703 Though Votaw 1915:45-73 and 217-49; and Stanton 1974 also made contributions. Burridge’s book is now 
republished and revised as Burridge 2004. 
704 Burridge 2004:252-288. 
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